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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examined the antecedents and 
consequences of strategic change in the commercial banking 
industry between 1980 and 1987. Based on a review of the 
literature, a conceptual model was developed that predicted 
change would be influenced by two factors, adaptive forces 
and inertial forces. Adaptive forces include two factors 
that have been hypothesized to encourage change, prior 
performance and slack resources. Inertial forces include two 
factors sometimes thought to inhibit change, organizational 
size and age. Change outcomes were predicted to be 
influenced by degree of change and moderated by adaptive and 
inertial forces. Guided by previous theoretical and 
empirical research, cluster analysis was used to measure 
strategic change and degree of change.
The conceptual model proved to be useful in 
understanding the relationship between certain firm level 
factors and the propensity of organizations to change 
strategies. Some evidence was found to support the notion 
that prior performance, slack resources, and age are all 
important antecedents to change. Specifically, declining 
performance and slack resources in the form of excess capital 
were found to encourage change as predicted. Contrary to 
predictions, age was found to be a positive force for change.
xi
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Change was found to have positive consequences for the 
banks in this study; i.e. it was positively related to
performance and survival. The relationship between change 
and performance became more clear when degree of change was 
considered. Those banks that underwent moderate levels of 
change outperformed those that did not change as well as 
those that underwent more drastic changes, suggesting a
curvilinear relationship. Age and slack resources were found 
to moderate the change performance relationship as well. 
Specifically, for firms that changed strategies, age and 
slack resources in the form of liquidity were found to be 
negatively related to performance. The findings concerning 
slack were surprising, however, high levels of liquidity may 
suggest risk aversion on the part of banks. Overall, the 
findings provide some evidence to support the conceptual
model and they lend credence to the major assumptions
underlying the strategic management perspective.
xii
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Major changes in technology, shifts in socioeconomic 
conditions, and regulatory changes can and often do result 
in the restructuring of entire industries (Meyer, Brooks, 
and Goes, 1990). Such discontinuous environmental changes 
can render certain strategies and organizational 
competencies obsolete and change the basis of competition 
within industries (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) . The 
strategic management literature suggests that managers have 
considerable latitude in altering their firm's competitive 
strategies and reconfiguring resources in response to these 
environmental changes (Porter, 1991; Hofer and Schendel, 
1978) . In many cases such alterations are seen as necessary 
to maintain performance and ensure continued survival of 
the organization.
Despite its emphasis in the strategic management 
literature, the extent to which managers are able to 
successfully alter their competitive strategies in response 
to environmental discont- inuities remains a source of 
debate (Boeker, 1989; Romanelli and Tushman, 1986). 
Population ecologists emphasize the role of inertial forces 
that largely preclude major organizational change (Hannan
1
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2and Freeman, 1977; 1984). Furthermore, when changes are 
attempted they tend to be disruptive and increase the 
organizations risk of failure (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
This viewpoint suggests that environmental selection more 
accurately explains changes in strategies within an 
industry over time. Organizations whose strategies fit the 
environment survive and others are "selected out." Thus 
changes in strategy within a given population are said to 
occur due to selection and replacement rather than 
strategic adaptation (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986).
Although the strategic management and selection 
perspectives are usually seen as conflicting (Astley and 
Van de Ven, 1983), it has been argued that a richer 
understanding of strategic adaptation may be obtained by 
considering them simultaneously (Mascarenhas, 1989; Cook, 
Shortell, Conrad, and Morrisey, 1983; Ginzberg and 
Bucholtz, 1990). That is, the extent to which either view 
is salient may depend on factors peculiar to the situation 
or the organization. For example, it has been suggested 
that the selection arguments may be more salient when 
focusing on changes in the core features of the 
organization (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; Scott, 1987), 
changes that fail to build on established routines and 
competencies (Haveman, 1992), and when predicting the 
outcomes of change for older, larger, and more complex 
organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Similarly,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
strategic management theorists have argued that the 
relationship between strategic adaptation and performance 
is likely to depend on factors such as the degree or type 
of change attempted (Snow and Hambrick, 1980; Nadler, 1988; 
Shortell, Morrison, and Friedman, 1990), the need for 
change (Beer, 1988; Shortell et. al, 1990), and the 
resources available to implement change (Ginsberg and 
Bucholtz, 1990). In other words, predictions concerning 
the propensity of organizations to engage in strategic 
change and the outcomes of that change may be influenced by 
various organizational and contextual factors.
To date surprisingly little progress has been made in 
understanding the degree to which strategic change at the 
business level can be successfully managed (Ginsberg, 1988; 
Zajac and Shortell, 1989) . Relatively few empirical 
studies have attempted to test the basic proposition that 
strategic change enhances organizational effectiveness, and 
those that have report mixed results. The difficulty 
associated with doing large scale longitudinal research and 
the relative ease of access to large scale 'static' data 
bases is no doubt one reason for this situation (Ginsberg,
1988). However, confusion and controversy over basic 
conceptual issues such as how strategy is defined and what 
constitutes a strategic change have also hampered research 
(Ginsberg, 1988). Consequently, traditional strategic 
management prescriptions regarding the need to respond to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4environmental threats and opportunities by altering 
strategies are only thinly supported by empirical evidence 
at present (Ginsberg, 1988; Guarino, 1991).
This study is driven by three basic research 
questions, two of which have been the focus of much of the 
strategic change research performed to date. The first two 
questions are:
1. Do organizations engage in strategic change following 
environmental discontinuities?
2. Do those organizations that change strategies following 
major environmental discontinuities improve their 
performance and survival chances?
The research results suggest that strategic change is 
not uncommon following environmental discontinuities. 
Nevertheless, more research is needed to explore the first 
question. First, the evidence is far from overwhelming.
The question lends itself to single industry studies, 
leading to questions of generalizability. Also, the answer 
to this question may depend on how strategy and strategic 
change are conceptualized and measured. These issues 
suggest the need for replication in different settings, 
using different measures and methods. Second, the question 
of why some organizations change and others do not needs to 
be addressed. A growing number of studies have begun 
exploring this issue, but many questions remain.
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The answer to the second question has proven much more 
elusive. Few studies have examined change outcomes, and 
those have produced mostly conflicting or inconclusive 
results. This indicates the need for closer examination of 
strategic change and change outcomes. As noted, the 
conceptual literature has begun to focus on reconciling the 
divergent views by considering different contexts that may 
alter change and change outcomes. Factors such as the type 
or degree of change, age, size, prior performance, and 
slack resources have all been hypothesized to impact the 
propensity to change, and a few studies have suggested that 
such variables may moderate change outcomes. In short, 
both the theoretical and empirical literature suggest that 
the answer to the above questions may be, "it all depends." 
Therefore, while examining the first two questions, this 
study will focus on a third, less explored, question:
3. To what extent is the relationship between change in 
strategy, performance, and survival influenced by firm 
and situation specific factors?
Specifically, it will be argued that the outcomes of 
strategic change can best be understood and predicted by 
simultaneously considering three important categories of 
variables; adaptive forces that encourage and enable 
change, inertial forces that retard change (Ginsberg and 
Bucholtz, 1990), and the degree of change sought (Singh et 
al., 1986; Haveman, 1992).
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The answers to these questions have a great deal of 
significance for both academicians and practitioners. 
Ginsberg (1988) notes that no generalizable conclusions can 
be drawn from the current research concerning the 
performance outcomes of strategic change. One reason for 
this is that relatively few studies have attempted to 
examine the contextual factors that may determine whether 
changes are adaptive or disruptive (Singh et al., 1986) .
If the answer to the first two questions is "it all 
depends", then finding the circumstances under which 
strategic change is more likely to be adaptive has a great 
deal of significance for future researchers examining the 
topic and managers contemplating change.
The Study
Site
This dissertation examines the antecedents and 
consequences of strategic change in the commercial banking 
industry between 1980 and 1987. The commercial banking 
industry provides an interesting and appropriate setting 
for examining the outcome of strategic change. The 
industry underwent a major change in its competitive 
environment following the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, and 
the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 . These regulatory 
changes placed extreme pressure on bank profit margins by 
removing interest rate ceilings on the deposit side and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7removing artificial entry barriers, thus increasing 
competition on the lending side. In addition, during the 
early 1980's banks were faced with changing technological 
and general economic environments that further impacted the 
competitive structure of the industry (Ballarin, 1986). As 
a result, commercial banks were forced to reconsider their 
basic competitive strategies, and make decisions concerning 
the markets in which they would operate and the products 
and services they would offer (Storrs, 1988; Tregoe, Tobia, 
and Zimmerman, 1988).
Scope of the Study
This study concerns itself with changes in the content 
of business level competitive strategy and the outcomes of 
those changes. Three components are said to describe an 
organization's competitive strategy at the business level; 
scope, competitive weapons, and segment differentiation 
(Chrisman, Hofer, and Boulton, 1988). Scope, the component 
of interest in this study, refers to the basic choices an 
organization must make regarding products or services 
offered to customers, geographic markets served, and 
technologies (Abell, 1980). Although the use of narrow 
definitions of strategy are said to increase the risk of 
specification error (Ginsberg, 1988), its use is justified 
in this study for several reasons. First, the majority of 
the studies examining strategic groups or strategic change 
in the strategic management literature have primarily
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8relied on some aspect of product or market scope to measure 
strategy (Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993). Second, the 
population ecology literature has commonly focused on the 
breadth of product offerings (niche-width) to differentiate 
organization forms (Freeman and Hannan, 1983; Carroll,
1987) . In fact, Havemann (1992) has argued that products 
offered, markets served, and technology are the most 
important factors in defining organization form. Finally, 
it has been noted that the range of products offered and 
markets served have become increasingly important strategic 
considerations for commercial banks in a deregulated 
environment (Storrs, 1988; Austin and Mandula, 1985) .
Thus, product/market scope appears to be an appropriate 
strategic component on which to differentiate commercial 
banks.
Most strategic management studies that have examined 
the outcomes of strategic change have focused on some 
aspect of financial performance to gauge success.
Population ecologists, however, have argued that these 
studies may be biased because they fail to consider 
organizational failure as an outcome (Hannan and Freeman, 
1989; Freeman and Boeker, 1984) . In other words, they are 
biased to the extent that they only examine surviving 
organizations. If, in fact, organizational mortality is a 
common event and is associated with organizational change 
as the population ecologists argue, samples that exclude
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9failed firms can be argued to be biased. Thus, this study 
will include failed firms in the sample and, in addition to 
examining performance, will specifically examine the impact 
of change on organizational survival.
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation contains seven chapters. Following 
this introductory chapter, the second chapter will briefly 
summarize the events occurring in the banking industry 
during the time frame of the study. The third chapter 
summarizes the conceptual and empirical literature relevant 
for this study. Chapter four further develops the 
theoretical framework and proposes specific hypotheses to 
be tested. Chapter five outlines the research methodology 
used in this study. This will include a discussion of data 
sources, empirical measures, and methods of statistical 
analysis. Chapter six discusses the results of the 
statistical analysis and the final chapter provides an 
overall discussion of the conclusions and implications of 
the findings.
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CHAPTER 2
BANKING IN THE 1980'S: AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION
Regulators have sought to control the activities of 
commercial banks on the federal and/or state level in three 
basic ways: limiting the range of products and services 
offered, restricting geographic expansion, and regulating 
interest rates. Commercial banks have traditionally been 
prohibited from offering certain services, such as 
investment and insurance underwriting, primarily due to the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1932. The primary legislation in the 
area of geographic expansion is the McFadden Act, which 
gave each state the right to make decisions regarding 
branch banking. Subsequent rulings have placed the issue 
of interstate banking in the hands of individual states as 
well. Prior to 1980, interest rates on the liability side 
were regulated through the Federal Reserve System's 
"Regulation Q." This placed ceilings on interest rates 
paid on deposits and in effect gave commercial banks a 
monopoly on demand deposits. Interest rates on loans have 
been controlled on the state level, but are typically not a 
factor in banking activities.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, and the Garn-St. Germain Act
10
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of 1982 are widely acclaimed to represent the biggest 
change for commercial banks since the 1930's. The direct 
implication for commercial banks was a lifting of most 
interest rate restrictions imposed by regulation Q. Among 
other things, the DIDMCA phased out interest rate ceilings 
on time deposits, and allowed the payment of interest on 
checking accounts, while Garn-St Germain allowed the 
establishment of interest bearing Money Market Demand 
Accounts. These actions were designed to help banks stem 
the outflow of deposits to higher paying money market 
funds. While accomplishing this task, price deregulation 
created a problem by narrowing interest rate spreads; i.e., 
the difference between the interest rates banks pay 
depositors and collect from borrowers. Thus, banks were 
pressured to lend more money at higher rates.
Another indirect but highly significant implication of 
the DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, is that they removed most 
of the barriers that separated other financial 
intermediaries from commercial banks. Savings and Loans, 
Mutual Savings Banks, and Credit Unions were given greatly 
expanded product domains, including the right to provide 
checking accounts and offer a variety of loans and services 
that were traditionally the primary domain of commercial 
banks. Thus, commercial banks lost their legal monopoly on 
checking accounts (a very important competitive advantage),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and experienced significantly increased competition in the 
lending arena.
At this point, commercial banks remain rather highly 
regulated in the product/service and geographic domains, 
though strides toward deregulation have occurred over the 
last decade. The Glass-Steagall Act remains in force, but 
individual banks have managed to win court cases allowing 
them to engage in activities normally reserved for the 
brokerage business. Thus the door has been opened for 
product diversification into new areas. As noted, 
geographic regulation remains largely the purview of 
individual states, and states have varied considerably in 
the rate and extent to which they have allowed branching 
and interstate banking (Reger et al, 1992) . Thus, 
deregulation in these areas has proceeded in a rather 
sporadic basis over the last decade.
It is important to note, that during this same time 
period the commercial banking industry was also subjected 
to competitive pressures only indirectly related to 
deregulation. First, there was increased competition from 
non-traditional sources, including insurance companies, 
retailers, security dealers, and foreign banks (Roussakis,
1989). The reason for this incursion is rather complex and 
not completely understood (Ballarin, 1986) though it is 
partially the result of regulatory, economic, and 
technological changes that occurred during the 1970s and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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80s. It is notable that these competitors were able to 
extend practically all of the services offered by 
commercial banks, while not being subject to product and 
geographic constraints still imposed on the industry.
Though more recent legislation has been designed to 
eliminate this disparity by imposing constraints on 
entrants, for most of the decade banks were (and to a large 
extent still are) faced with a considerable competitive 
disadvantage.
A second trend noted was that large U.S. corporations 
began reducing their cost of debt during the 1970's and 
80's by circumventing intermediaries and going directly to 
capital markets (Ballarin, 1986). This has been 
accomplished primarily through the use of commercial paper 
(short term unsecured promissory notes). As a result, 
commercial banks have seen a portion of their market 
considered to be the most attractive severely diminished.
The point of the above discussion is to note that the 
environment for the commercial banking industry became 
decidedly more hostile during the 1980's. In terms of 
Porter's (1980) five forces model the banking industry 
experienced significant changes in barriers to entry, 
substitute products, and bargaining power of buyers and 
suppliers. As noted above regulatory and other 
environmental changes permitted entry by thrifts and non- 
traditional competitors into the traditional domains of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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commercial banking. This, along with the proliferation of 
substitute products on both the supply and demand sides led 
to increased power on behalf of both suppliers and users of 
funds. The net effect on commercial banks was an increase 
in cost of funds, coupled with a less munificent lending 
environment.
Evidence of the difficulties experienced in the 
industry lies in the record number of bank closures that 
occurred during the last decade (see Figures 1 and 2). To 
get an idea of the severity of this problem, over 844 banks 
failed between 1982 and 1988, compared to 190 failures 
during the entire 30 year prior to 1980 (Roussakis, 1989) . 
Bank failures in 1987 and 1988 each totaled more than the 
aggregate number occurring during the period 1950-1979.
Given the above scenario, the banking industry would 
seem to be a very appropriate setting in which to examine 
change in strategic content. There can be little doubt 
that deregulation represents a major environmental change 
for the industry, and the change would appear to be 
significantly threatening to cause firms to consider 
changing strategy. Also, the nature and timing of 
regulatory changes can be identified objectively. Finally, 
the industry contains a large number of comparable firms 
for which archival data is available.
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant 
theoretical and empirical perspectives on strategic change. 
First, the various theoretical perspectives on strategic 
change will be addressed, then the empirical research will 
be reviewed.
Perspectives on Organizational Adaptation
Theories of organizational adaptation can be
classified into three basic categories; natural selection
theories, rational adaptation theories, and random
transformation theories (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Singh,
House, and Tucker, 1986). The following section briefly
summarizes the major points associated with each of these
approaches.
Natural Selection
The essence of the natural selection view is summed up
by Hannan and Freeman (1989) as follows:
..most of the variability in the core structures 
of organizations comes about through the creation 
of new organizations and organization forms and 
the demise of old ones. These perspectives argue 
that existing organizations, especially the 
largest and most powerful, rarely change strategy 
and structure quickly enough to keep up with the 
demands of uncertain, changing environments.
They emphasize that major innovations in 
organizational strategy and structure occur early
17
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in the life histories of individual organizations
and of organizational populations (p. 11).
Selection arguments are premised on the notion that 
strong inertial forces constrain organizations from 
initiating and implementing changes to the core features of 
the organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984; 1989) . 
Inertial forces arise from both internal arrangements 
(investments in assets, information constraints, internal 
politics, and history) and the environment (legal barriers, 
information constraints, and legitimacy constraints).
These inertial forces serve to reduce the frequency and 
speed of organizational change and the degree to which it 
can be planned and controlled (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
1989) . Thus, selection occurs through an interaction of 
relatively immutable organizational characteristics and 
changing environmental circumstances (Carroll, 1987) . When 
organizational strategy and structure fit the environment, 
selection is favorable; when they do not, selection is 
unfavorable.
It is important to note that the selection argument 
does not require that inertial forces preclude 
organizational change; merely that they render attempts at 
changing ineffective or dysfunctional. The selection 
theorists argue that one way they do this is by slowing 
down the change process. Organizations that fail to learn 
about their environments and modify strategies at a faster 
rate than the environment will remain in a constant state
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of misalignment and are apt to reduce their odds of 
survival (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Thus, to the extent 
that organizations remain relatively inert, i.e., their 
strategies and structures change at a slower rate than the 
environment, the selection perspective can be argued to be 
salient.
Selection theorists have further asserted that changes 
to the core aspects of the organization; i.e., goals, forms 
of authority, technology, and marketing strategy, rob the 
organization of survival value (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Changes of a strategic nature typically upset established 
work routines, require the hiring of new employees or 
retraining of existing employees, disrupt communication 
patterns, and force the organization to forge new 
relationships with customers and suppliers (Haveman, 1992; 
Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
1989). This process of dismantling and rebuilding internal 
routines and external relationships also leaves the 
organization vulnerable to increased conflict as rival 
constituents seek to influence the outcome in a manner that 
benefits their own interest (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . 
Thus, during reorganization resources are diverted away 
from the production of goods and services and toward the 
reorganization effort and other non-productive uses. This 
redirection of resources reduces the organization's 
reliability of performance to that of a new organization,
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thus subjecting the firm to "liability of newness" 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . In short, 
according to the selection perspective, efforts devoted to 
reorganization severely reduce efficiency, which leads to 
poor performance and increased risk of failure (Haveman, 
1992) .
Rational Adaptation
The rational adaptation view asserts that managers 
and/or dominant coalitions are able to influence 
organizational change, and that adaptation in response to 
changed environmental circumstances is likely to have a 
positive influence on organizational performance and 
probability of survival. Various theoretical approaches 
revolve around this central theme, though they tend to 
differ in their explanations of what drives change and the 
degree of choice available to managers. Some of the 
theoretical perspectives that fall under this general 
category are contingency theory (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), resource dependency (Aldrich 
and Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), 
institutional theory (Scott and Meyer, 1983), and the 
strategic management perspective (Andrews, 1971; Schendel 
and Hofer, 1979) .
Contingency Theory
The underlying premises of contingency theory are: 1) 
there is no one best way to organize; and 2) all ways of
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organizing are not equally effective (Galbraith, 1973) . 
Contingency theorists also assume a strong causal 
relationship between the environment, internal structures, 
and performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The general 
notion is that organizations who best match their internal 
structural features to external demands of the environment 
will achieve the best performance (Scott, 1987).
The above premises are actually common to some degree in 
all the rational adaptation views, however, contingency 
theory is different in several aspects. First, the general 
emphasis is on matching internal structural features to 
various environmental demands. For example, Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967) found evidence to suggest that higher levels 
of environmental complexity and uncertainty require a 
greater degree of structural differentiation and 
integration. Second, contingency theorists stress the 
environment as the driving force, with organizations 
confined to a reactionary role. Thus, this approach is 
perceived to be more deterministic than some of the other 
rational adaptation perspectives. Finally, the ability of 
firms to adapt their structures to changing environments is 
implied, but not a central concern. In fact, some have 
argued that contingency theory can be seen as being 
consistent with either a rational adaptation or natural 
selection view (Scott, 1987) . The overriding concern seems 
to be in understanding the structural contingencies
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required by various environments, and not in understanding 
how those features were obtained.
Resource Dependency
Resource dependency theorists take a less 
deterministic view, suggesting managers often act upon as 
well as adapt to their environments in order to reduce 
dependencies and control critical resources (Aldrich and 
Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The notion 
here is that firms must acquire and hold on to scarce 
environmental resources to prosper and survive. Because 
organizations are not internally self sufficient, they must 
rely on resources from their environment, and thus become 
interdependent with outside organizations. The degree of 
dependence varies, depending on the importance and scarcity 
of the resources. Underlying this perspective is Emerson's 
(1963) idea that power and dependency are related. If a 
firm becomes dependent on another for acquiring scarce 
resources, then the other firm has power over the first. 
Interorganizational dependency offers the opportunity for 
political and economic influence, thus increasing 
uncertainty for the dependent firm.
To reduce dependencies and acquire scarce resources, 
firms engage in a number of "bridging" strategies to deal 
with their environments. Such strategies include 
bargaining, contracting, co-optation, joining trade 
associations, lobbying, engaging in joint ventures,
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diversification, and merging with other firms (Scott,
1987) . From this perspective, effective managers are seen 
as those that can both react to changing environmental 
circumstances and act in ways to alter their environments 
so as to reduce uncertainties and dependencies. Thus, the 
ability to adapt is central to the resource dependency 
view.
Institutional Theory
Like contingency theorists, institutional theorists 
also emphasize the need for achieving a fit between formal 
structure and the environment, but the focus here is on the 
institutional environment and the need for legitimacy 
(Scott and Meyer, 1983). Institutional environments 
consists of various rules and requirements to which 
individual organizations must conform to receive legitimacy 
and support. For some organizations, such environments 
demands may be more crucial for survival than competitive, 
or technical demands, e.g. schools, hospitals, and mental 
health clinics (Scott, 1987).
Institutional theorists stress the need for 
organizations to adapt to changing institutional rules in 
order to insure survival. Such adaptation may take the 
form of adopting both formal and informal structural 
requirements, incorporating procedures, and hiring 
personnel (Scott, 1987). Examples include conforming to 
certain structures and procedures to meet standards for
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accreditation, incorporating popular structures or 
management tools, and obtaining personnel on the basis of 
meeting certain licensing requirements. Institutional 
theorists stress that such adaptation may be required by 
strong institutional pressures, regardless of technical 
requirements. Thus, institutional theorists also stress 
the need for and ability to adapt to environmental 
pressures, but for different reasons than suggested by the 
contingency and resource dependency theorists.
Strategic Management
The strategic management perspective, perhaps the most 
dominant of the adaptation theories, is distinct from the 
other perspectives due to its greater emphasis on 
managerial behavior and choice, and its explicit focus on 
formulation and implementation of organizational strategies 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) . Strategic management can be 
viewed as an adaptive process, whereby managers seek to 
achieve a match between an organization's resources and 
skills and its external environment, with strategy being 
the basic alignment mechanism (Andrews, 1971; Schendel and 
Hofer, 1979; Chakravarthy, 1982; Miles and Snow, 1984) .
The quality of a firms adaptation can be judged by the 
degree to which current strategic decisions build on the 
existing stock of organizational resources and skills and 
the degree to which these resources are utilized to take 
advantage of market opportunities (Cool and Schendel, 1988;
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Chakravarthy, 1986). Strategies that are not appropriate 
given the current competitive environment or that are not 
congruent with the organization's resources are less likely 
to be effective than those that exhibit a good "fit" along 
both these dimensions. In the language of traditional 
strategic analysis, organizations obtain superior 
performance by implementing strategies that exploit 
internal strengths and avoid weaknesses, while responding 
to market threats and opportunities. Thus, strategic 
choice and adaptation are central to the strategic 
management process.
Although the strategic management perspective 
emphasizes strategic choice and adaptation, it is important 
to note that most theorists recognize difficulties 
associated with changes in strategic positions. Choosing 
an appropriate strategic response to changing environmental 
circumstances requires the maintenance of an appropriate 
resource configuration to support such a change. Such 
resources usually involve both tangibles and intangibles 
that may or may not be readily available in factor markets 
(Barney, 1986; 1991). If resources are readily available 
they may require large initial capital outlays. Resources 
that are not readily available must be accumulated over 
time, placing the organization in a position of operating 
at a relative disadvantage to its competitors. Such costs 
and penalties associated with moving between strategic
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groups are commonly referred to as mobility barriers (Caves 
and Porter, 1977). The higher the costs and penalties 
associated with switching strategic positions, the higher 
the mobility barriers are said to be.
Mobility barriers have some similarities to the 
inertial arguments proposed by the selection proponents. 
However, such barriers are typically seen by strategic 
management researchers as limiting, but not completely 
constraining strategic choice. For example, Porter (1991: 
104) states:
Firms inherit positions that constrain and shape their 
choices, but do not determine them. They have 
considerable latitude in reconfiguring the value chain 
with which they compete, expanding or contracting their 
competitive scope, and influencing important dimensions 
of their industry environment.
Others note that such barriers may be particularly
vulnerable during times of industry upheaval or
disequilibrium (Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan and Thomas, 1990) .
Random Transformation
Other theorists view organizations as loosely coupled
systems or "garbage cans" where streams of problems,
solutions, participants, and decision opportunities drift
around and meet to produce change only by chance (Cohen,
March, and Olsen, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976). This
perspective sees organizations as ambiguous and complex
settings, where changes occur in response to irrational,
endogenous processes. Thus changes have little to do with
the desires of management or environmental demands.
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This view is strikingly different from both the 
selection and rational adaptation view in that it downplays 
the importance of the strategy/environment linkage. Under 
this perspective, one would expect no relationship between 
environmental change, organizational change, and 
organizational performance. Although change can occur 
quite frequently, it is at best random with respect to 
performance and survival value.
An important feature of this view, is that it is 
limited in its application to particular circumstances. 
Those advocating this view, note that it is applicable 
under conditions of "inconsistent and ill-defined 
preferences," "unclear technologies," and "fluid 
participation" (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). These 
conditions are labeled as "organized anarchy." Although 
there is room for argument as to the extent that business 
organizations are characterized by organized anarchy, most 
theorists agree that these circumstances are more 
conspicuous in public and educational organizations. This 
is reinforced by the notion that this model was originated 
based on observations of decision making in colleges and 
universities (Scott, 1987). In general, such anarchy can 
be hypothesized to exist only in the face of extremely 
munificent and non-competitive environments. That is, 
where the strategy/ environment linkage may in fact be 
quite weak. Given the fact that the banking industry
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represents a competitive environment, with scarce 
resources, the random transformation model is not expected 
to be applicable.
Discussion
Of the various positions on organization adaptation 
described above, the population ecology and strategic 
management perspectives stand out in their opposition over 
basic assumptions. The population ecology model assumes 
that managers are helpless in the face of external and 
internal inertial forces. Inertial forces, combined with 
the liability of newness hypothesis, suggest that 
organizations will not often attempt changes to their core 
features, and that such changes will usually harm 
performance and increase the risk of failure. The 
strategic management perspective also assumes rationality, 
but suggests that managers have the discretion to change 
internal strategies and structures and the ability to 
effectively adapt to changing environmental demands. It is 
notable that both viewpoints stress the importance of 
achieving consistency between environmental demands and 
internal organizational states, and both assume a certain 
amount of rationality on the part of managers. Thus the 
main point of disagreement concerns the ability of managers 
to successfully initiate changes to the core features of 
their organizations.
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Empirical Literature
Although the literature remains rather thin, a growing 
number of empirical studies have appeared in recent years 
that address the issues of strategic change. (See Table 1 
for a summary) Perhaps the earliest research to examine 
changes in strategy was Chandler's (1962) historical study 
of Du Pont, General Motors, Standard Oil Company, and Sears 
Roebuck and Company. Chandler found that these firms 
changed their structure to correspond to changes in 
strategy, and noted that changes in strategy corresponded 
with changes in environmental opportunities, i.e., changes 
in technology, economic infrastructure, and demographics 
(p. 15). In other words, major strategic changes were 
accomplished in response to environmental change.
Another frequently cited study is Miles's (1982) in- 
depth examination of the adaptive behavior of the "Big Six" 
tobacco companies as they reacted to the threats posed by 
the smoking/cancer linkage and the 1970 ban on radio and TV 
ads for cigarettes. The general finding was that these 
companies were able to survive and remain viable through 
diversification efforts i.e., changes in strategy.
However, Hannan and Freeman (1989) pointed out that Miles 
may have been misled by sample bias, since 37 of the 78 
tobacco companies in existence in 1956 had ceased to exist 
by 1986.
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Much of the strategic management research on strategic 
change has grown out of the literature dealing with 
strategic groups. As noted above, the main stream 
strategic management literature suggests that movement 
between strategic groups (firms following similar 
strategies) is difficult due to mobility barriers (Caves 
and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1980). Thus, much of this 
literature has been directed at measuring the extent of 
changes in group membership and the environmental 
circumstances under which such changes are likely to occur.
Oster (1982), used advertising to sales ratios to 
group firms from multiple industries into strategic groups. 
She found that movement between groups occurred relatively 
infrequently, and that change was impacted by the height of 
mobility barriers. Similarly, Mascarenhas (1989) found 
mobility rates to be relatively low among off-shore 
drilling firms, although change was more prevalent during 
periods of decline and between similar groups. One 
important point to make about these studies concerns the 
computation of mobility rates. Each study compares actual 
group changes to all possible changes, including the 
possibilities that each firm could change strategies in 
each year of the study. Because this is quite unlikely, 
the low mobility rates cited in these studies may be 
considered to be extremely conservative.
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Table 1: Empirical Literature Reviewed 
Authors/ Relevant
Industry____________________ Topic___
Strategic Group Studies 
Oster (1982)
Multiple
Frequency of 
Change
Mascarenhas (1989) Frequency of
Off-shore drilling Change
Bauerschmidt & Group mobility
Chrisman (1993) & Survival
Microcomputers
Cool & Schendel
(1987)
Pharmaceuticals
Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas (1990) 
Insurance
Bogner £ Pandian 
(1992)
Pharmaceuticals
(table con'd.)
Strategic group 
stability
Strategic group 
stability
Group stability 
vs. individual 
change
Findings
Group mobility is rare & change is 
impacted by mobility barriers (degree of 
change)
Mobility rates were relatively low. 
Change was more prevalent during periods 
of decline and between similar groups
Approximately 44% of survivors changed 
groups. Changes were influenced by 
mobility barriers and interdependence 
of group members.
Group structure underwent four major 
alterations, coinciding with major 
environmental jolts.
Group structure underwent nine major 
shift, coinciding with a period of 
frequent regulatory changes.
Strategic change often occurs indepen­
dent of the activities of group members 
and breaks in group stability.
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Authors/ Relevant
Industry___________________ Topic
Strategic Change Studies
Smith £e Grimm 
(1987)
Railroads
Zajac & Shortell 
(1989)
Hospitals
Shortell, Morrison & 
Friedman (1990) 
Hospitals
Patterns of change 
and performance
Patterns of change 
and performance
Various antecedents 
& consequences of 
change
Goes (1989) Impact of prior
Hospitals performance on
change/outcomes
Fombrun St 
Ginsberg (1990) 
Multiple
Ginsberg 
Bucholtz 
HMO' s
&
(1990)
Change antecedents
Inertial & adaptive 
antecedents to 
change
(table con'd.)
Findings
Firms changing strategies outperformed 
those that failed to change. Change 
patterns and outcomes were related.
Prior strategy was a good predictor of 
change. No relation between change and 
performance.
Approximately half the sample changed, but 
no significant performance improvements 
were observed. Prior performance, degree 
of change, and need for change were all 
found to impact implementation.
Low relative performance was a significant 
predictor of change. Change hurt the 
performance of firms experiencing high or 
increasing performance prior to the 
change.
Size, prior performance, and sector 
volatility were all significant pre­
dictors of change.
Age, structure, slack, munificence, and 
institutional forces all impacted 
length of time to convert to for-profit 
status.
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Authors/
Industry
Relevant
Topic
Population Ecology Studies
Singh, House,
& Tucker (1986) 
Voluntary Services
Haveman (1992) 
Savings & Loans
Organizational 
change & survival
Organizational 
change, performance, 
& survival
Banking Studies
Amel & Rhoades
(1988)
Banking
Guarino (1991) 
Eanking
Strategic group 
mobility
Strategic change 
Sc performance
Reger, Duhaime, Impact of dereg.
Sc Stimpert (1992) on risk taking
Banking and performance
(table con'd.)
Findings
Peripheral changes lowered the hazard 
of death, whereas core changes increased 
the hazard of death.
Changes that build on existing compet­
encies positively impact performance, 
but unrelated changes negatively impact 
performance. Certain related changes 
reduce the risk of failure.
On average, 40% of banks changed strat­
egic groups.
A statistically significant number of 
banks changed strategies (40% - 80%) 
Small banks experienced a moderate 
increase in performance following the 
change.
Regulatory change tended to promote 
conservative behavior on the part of 
banks
Ui
Ul
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Authors/
Industry_______
Rediker & 
Middleton (1992) 
Banking
Silverman & 
Castaldi (1992) 
Banking
Turnaround Studies
Schendel & Patton 
(1976)
Multiple
Grinyer & McKiernan 
(1990)
Multiple
Hambrick & D'Aveni
(1988)
Multiple
D'Aveni (1989) 
Multiple
(table con'd.)
Relevant 
____ Topic____
Antecedents to 
change
Antecedents to 
diversification
Succesful vs. unsuc- 
cesful turnarounds
Antecedents to highly 
succesful turnarounds
Antecedents to 
bankruptcy
Antecedents to 
bankruptcy
Findings
Changes in strategy were negatively 
influenced by firms size and prior perf­
ormance, and positively influenced by 
age of the top management team.
Perceived changes in competitive pressure 
consumer preferences, size, and variation 
in profitability were positively related 
to diversification
Severe decline in performance seemed to 
precipitate turnaround efforts. Succesful 
turnarounds were characterize by strategic 
and operating changes.
Changes were triggered by external events. 
All types of change were noted to occur 
simultaneously.
Bankrupt firms experienced a long down­
ward spiral. Strategic actions of failed 
firms tended to be either too much or too 
little.
Firms in decline tend to exhibit strategic 
paralysis.
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Authors/ Relevant
Industry____________________Topic___________________________ Findings________________
Robbins & Pearce Retrenchment efforts Retrenchment is an integral part of turn-
(1992) and turnaround around. Strategic changes were only
Textiles effective when combined with cost cutting
and asset reduction.
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Bauerschmidt and Chrisman (1993) examined strategic 
group mobility and organizational survival in the 
microcomputer industry in order to specifically test some 
of the assumptions underlying the population ecology and 
strategic management models. They found a relatively high 
degree of mobility, with over 44% of survivors changing 
strategic groups. They also presented evidence supporting 
the notion that changes in strategy are influenced (but not 
determined by) mobility barriers and strategic 
interdependence of group members.
A number of strategy researchers have examined 
patterns of strategic group stability and change over time 
by looking for breaks in the overall stability of an 
industry (Cool and Schendel, 1987; 1988; Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1990; Bogner and Pandian, 1992). Cool and Schendel 
(1987, 1988) found that the strategic group structure 
within the pharmaceutical industry underwent four major 
alterations over a twenty year period, roughly coinciding 
with major environmental jolts. Using a similar 
methodology, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) found the 
insurance industry more volatile, with nine major shifts in 
strategic variables and group structure recorded over a 
fifteen year period. The volatility of this industry was 
associated with a period of frequent regulatory changes. 
Bogner and Pandian (1992) extended this research stream by 
comparing the impact of changes in overall group structure
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with individual strategic changes. Their study suggests 
that strategic change often occurs independently of the 
activity of other group members and breaks in stable 
strategic time periods associated with environmental 
change. Although group membership may aid somewhat in 
predicting change, this research suggests the need to 
examine firm level factors in order to understand strategic 
change.
Other studies have sought to examine not only the 
incidence of strategic change, but firm level contextual 
factors impacting the change and change outcomes. Smith 
and Grimm (1987) found that 56% of the railroads in their 
sample changed strategies following deregulation in that 
industry and that those changing strategies were marginally 
more profitable than those not changing strategies. 
Moreover, there were important differences in performance 
associated with different types of strategic change, with 
those changing from an unfocused follower to innovators 
experiencing the greatest improvements. Zajac and Shortell
(1989) examined 570 hospitals and also found that over half 
their sample changed strategies following a major 
environmental discontinuity, and that the prior strategy 
was a good predictor of whether a change would be 
attempted. However, unlike Smith and Grimm, they found 
that changes in strategy did not translate into performance
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improvements, even when the changes were in the direction 
of a more preferable strategy for the changed environment.
In an extensive study, Shortell, Morrison, and 
Friedman (1990) used both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to examine various aspects of strategic adaptation 
among 370 hospitals. Once again, approximately half the 
sample switched strategies, with no significant performance 
differences noted between those that changed and those that 
did not change. They attributed this to the notion that 
many of the analyzers and prospectors in their study were 
well suited to their environment and had no need for 
change. Among other things, Shortell et al. concluded that 
poor performance in the immediate past should always result 
in considering the need for fundamental strategic change in 
a rapidly changing environment, that change efforts were 
limited by both slack resources and managerial mindset, and 
that changes within the "strategic comfort zone," i.e., 
less radical changes, were easier to implement.
Goes (1989) examined strategic change in the entire 
population of California hospitals between 1976 (n=495) and 
1987 (n=443). He recorded 203 changes out of 3611 change 
opportunities. As with Oster (1982) and Mascarenhas
(1989), change opportunities were computed under the 
assumption that each firm in the study had the opportunity 
to change strategies in each year of the study, resulting 
in extremely conservative change rates. Goes found that
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low relative performance (ROA), efficiency, and growth were 
significant predictors of whether or not organizations 
changed strategies, but that changes in these variables 
(regardless of the relative position) was unrelated to the 
propensity to change strategy. Interestingly, the study 
indicated that low performers that changed strategies did 
not significantly improve their performance, but that 
declining performers (regardless of their relative 
profitability) did marginally improve their performance.
It was also found that strategic change tended to have a 
negative impact on efficiency but positively influenced 
growth rates for hospitals that had relatively low or 
declining growth rates prior to the change. Conversely, 
those with high or increasing growth rates prior to the 
change tended to experience low or declining growth 
following the change. Overall, the study provided limited 
support for the proposition that strategic change 
positively impacts firms experiencing low or declining 
performance and rather strongly supported the proposition 
that it negatively impacts firms experiencing high or 
increasing performance.
Fombrun and Ginsberg (1990) examined the influence of 
various "inhibitors" that create inertia and "inductors" 
that stimulate changes in strategic posture, or in their 
terms, corporate aggressiveness. They found that size had 
a significant negative relationship to change, and that
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prior performance and sector volatility were related to 
change in a curvilinear fashion. That is, firms 
experiencing extreme levels of performance and volatility 
were less likely to change than those experiencing 
intermediate levels.
Ginsberg and Bucholtz (1990) examined the effects of 
various inertial forces (size, age, and structure), 
adaptive forces (slack, performance demands, competitive 
pressures, and environmental munificence), and 
institutional forces (chain affiliation, number of for- 
profit HMO's in market, and supportive state legislation) 
on the transformation of HMO's from nonprofit to for-profit 
orientations. They found that age, structure, slack, 
munificence, and institutional forces all impacted the 
length of time it took these organizations to convert to 
for-profit status following termination of federal 
assistance. Their model suggested the need for integrating 
the inertial and adaptive perspectives to understand 
organizational change.
Interestingly, the population ecology research to date 
has tended to focus on the states of the environment that 
give rise to particular adaptive forms (Scott, 1987) . For 
example, these studies have sought to find evidence to 
support ecological arguments that environments 
characterized by certain levels of change (i.e., fine 
grained vs. coarse grained) will better support
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organizations following certain strategies (i.e., 
generalists vs. specialists). Although inertia is an 
underlying assumption behind these studies, population 
ecologists have seldom directly tested this assumption.
Only two studies could be located that have directly 
examined the issue of organizational change and survival 
from the population ecology perspective. Singh, House, and 
Tucker (1986) measured the impact of various changes among 
voluntary service organizations on organizational mortality 
and found mixed results. Their study suggests that 
"peripheral" changes (e.g., changes in location and chief 
executive) lowered the hazard of death and was consistent 
with the adaptation perspective. "Core" changes (e.g., 
changes in goals, service areas, and structure) increased 
the chance of death, which is consistent with the 
ecological perspective. Since a change in strategy would 
be considered a core change, this study is at odds with the 
strategic management perspective. Haveman (1992) examined 
the impact of changes in loan portfolios among 308 
California thrifts on performance and mortality. The study 
found evidence to suggest that changes during a time of 
environmental upheaval and those that build on existing 
competencies have a positive impact on performance. On the 
other hand, unrelated changes (i.e., those that fail to 
build on existing competencies) appear to have a negative 
impact on performance. The relationship between change and
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survival is less pronounced, but certain related changes 
were found to significantly reduce the risk of failure.
This paper is interesting in that it argues from an 
ecological perspective the need to consider context and 
type of change when predicting change outcomes.
Several studies have specifically examined strategic 
change within the commercial banking industry. Amel and 
Rhoades (1988) examined strategic group stability among 
banks in sixteen urban markets between 1978 and 1984. The 
percentage of banks remaining in the same groups ranged 
from 29% to 100%, and averaged around 60%. The authors 
derived their groups by clustering 15 major portfolio and 
deposit variables derived from balance sheets, and used a 
six cluster solution. This study is particularly relevant 
because it uses similar variables and methods to derive 
strategic groups as proposed in this study, and provides 
evidence to suggest that a substantial number of banks 
changed strategies during the proposed time frame. 
Unfortunately, the authors provided no description of their 
groups or whether any patterns of change occurred.
Guarino (1991) examined the entire population of 
commercial banks from 1978 to 1987 to test certain 
propositions concerning the propensity of banks to change 
their strategies and the performance outcomes of such 
changes. The study showed that a statistically significant 
number of banks changed the category to which they
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allocated the highest percentage of their earning assets 
(80% of small banks and approximately 40% of medium and 
large banks). Furthermore, these changes occurred in a 
non-random manner in all three size categories; i.e., most 
banks moved from commercial or retail lending to investing 
in securities. Medium and large banks displayed no 
performance differences. Some groups of small banks 
experienced performance increases, and these firms are the 
ones that tended to change in the same direction as the 
majority. This study also suggests that strategic change 
among commercial banks was rather common following 
deregulation, but uses a simple univariate measure of 
strategy and strategic change, which by the author's own 
admission is likely to significantly increase specification 
error.
Reger, Duhaime, and Stimpert (1992), examined the 
influence of rate and extent of geographic deregulation on 
various strategic choice variables and performance. The 
authors found that change in deregulation (pace of change) 
had a significantly negative relationship with risk taking 
behavior and a positive relationship with performance.
Risk was positively related to performance, indicating that 
although incentives to engage in risky behavior were 
present, regulatory changes tend to provoke conservative 
behavior. Deregulation was found to have rather little 
impact on strategic choice variables. This study raises
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some interesting questions regarding the impact of 
deregulation on strategy, but fails to address the ability 
of firms to change strategic direction.
Another recent study (Rediker and Middleton, 1992) 
examined the relationships among top management team 
characteristics, prior financial performance, firm size, 
changes in the pattern and growth of strategy, and 
subsequent financial performance in a sample of bank 
holding companies. Changes in strategy were measured by 
changes in loan portfolio diversification and loan 
portfolio growth. The study found that changes in strategy 
were negatively influenced by firm size, and age of the top 
management team, and positively influenced by prior 
performance of the firm.
Silverman and Castaldi (1992) examined the impact of a 
number of contextual factors on the intentions of bank 
CEO's to diversify into non-traditional business areas.
They found that perceived environmental changes such as 
changes in competitive pressures and consumer preferences, 
size, and variation in profitability, were positively 
related to diversification intentions.
Because this study deals with environmental change, 
and the influence of prior performance on change, another 
relevant set of literature to consider is that dealing with 
turnarounds. Schendel and Patton (1976) examined 36 pairs 
of firms in decline, comparing those who managed a
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turnaround to those that did not. They concluded that 
steadily poor performance was not enough to spur a major 
turnaround effort. Those firms that achieved turnarounds 
were prompted by precipitous drops in performance that 
generated a crisis. Furthermore, they suggested that the 
most effective responses were those that combined strategic 
changes with improvements in operating efficiency. Efforts 
that were tentative, or geared only toward operating 
improvements tended to be less effective.
Hofer (1988) built on this distinction between 
operating and strategic turnarounds, and conceptualized a 
link between the degree and type of downturn and the 
appropriate response. Specifically, he suggested that 
moderate downturns in operating performance may be 
corrected by operating turnarounds, whereas severe 
downturns may require strategic and operating changes. 
However, he also noted that if weak downturns were due to 
strategic considerations, then strategic turnarounds may be 
necessary.
Grinyer and McKiernan (1990) examined 25 organizations 
that were identified as having experienced major 
performance improvements relative to their industry rivals. 
Among other things, they proposed that change would be 
triggered by gaps between aspirations and realized 
performance, and that changes would occur in stages, 
beginning with operational and cost cutting programs, then
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proceeding to changes in scope (which they define as 
strategic changes), and finally, changes in technology or 
fundamental changes such as divestment of previous core 
businesses and entry into unrelated businesses. A decline 
in performance was noted in the majority of changed firms, 
however, a group of control firms that did not change were 
also observed to experience similar performance downturns. 
Events triggering the actual change were considered to 
arise primarily from factors termed as "aspiration 
induced." These were mainly external events such as 
intervention by bankers, threat of takeover, or change of 
CEO (i.e., events that were theorized to widen the "gap" by 
increasing aspirations). Most firms exhibited the three 
categories of change, however, they typically occurred 
simultaneously rather than sequentially as proposed.
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) compared a sample of 57 
large bankruptcies with a matched sample of surviving 
firms. The failed firms were found to have experienced an 
extended period of performance decline, accompanied by 
extremes in strategic activities. The bankrupt firms 
experienced a downward spiral, characterized by declines in 
slack and performance, that were followed by either 
inaction, or extreme levels of strategic changes. This 
study suggests a curvilinear relationship between strategic 
change and survival, with moderate levels of change 
associated with survival.
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D'Aveni (1989) examined a matched set of 49 survivors 
and bankrupt firms. Among other things, he found that 
firms in decline tend to exhibit a greater degree of 
downsizing activity, but exhibited less strategic activity 
(i.e., they liquidated and divested, but on the whole did 
not change their lines of business). He concluded that 
firms in decline tend to exhibit strategic paralysis.
Robbins and Pearce (1992) examined the turnaround 
efforts of 38 firms in the textile industry. They found 
that retrenchment efforts, which include both cost cutting 
efforts and asset reduction, were positively related to 
subsequent performance, regardless of the reason for the 
decline. They also found that matching the severity of the 
decline with degree of retrenchment resulted in better 
outcomes. That is, successful firms tended to concentrate 
first on cost cutting efforts, and then moved to asset 
reduction only when the downturn became more severe.
Another interesting finding of this study is that changes 
of a strategic nature were only effective when accompanied 
by retrenchment efforts.
Summary of Empirical Literature
Although the literature on strategic change remains 
sparse, several inferences can be drawn form the studies 
cited above. First, strategic change appears to be a 
relatively common occurrence. Studies that treat strategic 
change as an event have consistently found that
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approximately half their sample changed strategies (40% to 
60%). The only exceptions to this are those studies that 
conservatively compare change occurrence against all 
possible changes, including the possibility that each firm 
could change strategy in each year of the study. The 
consistency of these results, obtained across multiple 
industries and using different methodologies, suggests 
quite strongly that strategic change cannot be 
characterized as a rare event.
Second, the evidence indicates that strategic change 
is more common under conditions of environmental 
turbulence. Studies by Cool and Schendel (1987, 1988), 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), and Bogner and Pandian (1992) 
consistently found that breaks in strategic group stability 
coincided with major environmental discontinuities. In 
addition, Mascarenhas (1989) found that strategic change 
was more common during periods of economic decline. In 
fact, all of the single industry studies showing high 
levels of strategic change were performed during periods of 
economic decline and industry disequilibrium. This 
supports the strategic management perspective which argues 
that organizations should alter their strategies when 
environmental changes render existing strategies obsolete. 
It also suggests that the time frame chosen for this study 
is particularly appropriate for examining change, since the
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decade of the 80's was an extremely turbulent period for 
the banking industry.
Because a large proportion of firms also fail to 
change strategies during periods of disequilibrium, it is 
apparent that firm level factors play an important role in 
determining strategic change. A growing number of authors 
have begun to explore these firm level factors. For 
example, there is limited evidence that certain contextual 
factors such as age, size, prior performance, and slack 
resources may influence the tendency to change (Fombrun and 
Ginsberg, 1990; Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990). The general 
notion is that larger and older firms tend to have greater 
levels of inertia, thus these factors tend to inhibit 
change. On the other hand, low or decreasing prior 
performance and slack resources represent the need and 
ability to change, respectively, and these factors tend to 
promote change. The influence of prior performance on 
change has been further explored in the turnaround 
literature, with general support found for the notion that 
the degree and type of downturn should be appropriately 
matched to the degree of change. However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that performance downturns may also 
result in a sort of strategic paralysis (D'Aveni, 1989) .
In addition, some authors have found evidence that 
characteristics of top management teams can influence the
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tendency to change (Redeleer and Middleton, 1992; Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992).
Finally, the evidence regarding change outcomes can 
only be characterized as meager and contradictory. Less 
than one third (7) of the studies specifically examining 
strategic change, examined outcomes following strategic 
change. Of these, one found evidence supporting a positive 
relationship between strategic change and performance 
(Smith and Grimm, 1987), two found no evidence relating 
change to performance (Zajac and Shortell, 1989; Shortell, 
Morrison, and Friedman, 1990), and four studies found that 
specific firm level characteristics such as prior 
performance (Goes, 1989), type of change (Singh, House, and 
Tucker, 1986; Haveman, 1992), and size (Guarino, 1991; 
Rediker and Middleton, 1992) moderated the relationship 
between change and performance. The turnaround literature 
also suggests that choosing the appropriate degree of 
change is an important factor determining outcomes. Too 
much or too little change may both be detrimental (Hambrick 
and D'Aveni, 1988). Taken as a whole, this evidence 
suggests that the relationship between change and 
performance/survival may be moderated by certain firm level 
factors such as prior performance, size, and degree of 
change.
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Summary and Conclusions 
Although the strategic management and population 
ecology perspectives were presented in glaring contrast in 
this chapter, there has been a tendency toward convergence 
in recent years (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Boeker,
1989). A number of researchers within the strategic 
management camp have long recognized that managerial 
discretion is limited (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) and 
that organizations may be slow to react to environmental 
changes (Quinn, 1980; Miller and Friesen, 1984). On the 
other hand, selection theorists have increasingly begun to 
acknowledge the possibility of organizational change 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; 
Haveman, 1992). This convergence is apparent in the 
empirical research, which has increasingly focused on firm 
level factors that may inhibit or encourage change and also 
influence change outcomes. Thus the debate has tended to 
move away from the question of whether organizations adapt 
and has moved towards understanding the situations in which 
adaptation is most likely to occur.
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORY AMD HYPOTHESES
The literature reviewed in the previous chapter 
reveals a movement away from the basic question of whether 
organziations adapt, and toward understanding the 
circumstances under which adaptation is likely to occur. 
Factors such as organizational size, age, prior 
performance, slack resources, and degree of change have 
been hypothesized to influence change and moderate 
outcomes. A growing number of studies have explored the 
relationship between firm level factors and the propensity 
to change, but very few have examined the impact of these 
factors on performance or survival outcomes. In an attempt 
to address this gap in the literature, this chapter will 
introduce a basic conceptual model of strategic change and 
develop a number of testable hypotheses concerning the 
impact of firm level factors on change and change outcomes.
Conceptual Model 
The literature suggests three broad categories of 
variables that are likely to influence strategic change; 1) 
adaptive forces, 2) inertial forces, and 3) degree of 
change. Adaptive forces are those factors thought to 
facilitate strategic change. Two firm level factors often
52
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discussed in this regard are prior performance and slack 
resources. Inertial forces are those factors thought to 
hamper the initiation and implementation of strategic 
change. Two such factors often discussed in the literature 
are organizational size and age. Adaptive forces and 
inertial forces can be conceived of as directly influencing 
both initiation and consequences of strategic change. That 
is, the same adaptive forces that encourage strategic 
change, may for reasons explained later have a positive 
influence on change outcomes. Furthermore, adaptive and 
inertial forces may indirectly influence change outcomes by 
impacting the degree of change, which in turn can directly 
influence change outcomes. This model is demonstrated in 
Figure 3. The specific hypotheses to be tested are 
developed in the following sections.
Adaptive Forces 
Although recognizing the existence of inertial forces, 
strategic management proponents stress the dominance of 
adaptive forces in driving and facilitating major 
organizational transformations (Ginsberg and Bucholtz,
1990). Pressure for change can come from internal changes 
(such as changes in managerial skills or aspirations) or 
the external environment (such as changes in competitive 
forces), but is often conceptualized as deriving from a gap 
between desired and actual (or projected) performance 
(Hofer and Schendel, 1978). Thus, while inertial forces
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can inhibit change, "inductive forces" (Ginsberg, 1988; 
Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990) such as performance demands 
may create even more compelling reasons for change to 
occur. Put simply, major organizational change may become 
the best course of action when the cost of maintaining the 
status quo exceeds the cost of change (Haveman, 1992).
Another point often argued by strategy theorists is 
that organizations may opt to invest in resources that 
enhance their ability to adapt (Chakravarthy, 1982). The 
maintenance of slack resources, although sometimes argued 
to inhibit strategic change (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg,
1988), can be a major factor in implementing change once 
the organization becomes committed (Chakravarthy, 1982; 
Bourgeois, 1981). As noted by Bourgeois (1981), "slack is 
the resource that enables an organization both to adjust to 
gross shifts in the external environment with minimal 
trauma, and to experiment with new postures in relation 
that environment" (p. 31). The remainder of this section 
is devoted to developing a set of hypotheses concerning two 
factors that are thought to facilitate the change process; 
prior performance and slack resources.
Prior Performance
Pressure for strategic change can emanate from either 
internal or external changes, however performance is often 
argued to be a key variable in instigating change (Oster, 
1982; Goes and Meyer, 1990) . Theorists advocating a
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quantum or revolutionary view of strategic change point out 
that decline, or even a crisis is necessary to prompt major 
strategic changes (Miller and Friesen, 1984; Starbuck, 
Greve, and Hedberg, 1988). Implicit in this view is that 
strategies are "sticky" (Oster, 1982), i.e., various 
inertial forces make strategic change difficult. Also, if 
organizations are tightly linked configurations as 
suggested by some theorists (Miller and Mintzberg, 1988) , 
it may make sense to delay making major changes until the 
need for change becomes apparent. Low performance can 
indicate an erosion in "fit", and can thus act as an 
incentive for managers and other organizational 
participants to overcome inertial barriers to change.
Although there is some empirical evidence to support 
the above view (Oster, 1982; Goes and Meyer, 1990), others 
advocate different positions. For example, the "planning" 
approach to strategic management (Mintzberg, 1990; Goes,
1989), stresses the need for a proactive approach to 
strategic change. Arguing from a normative perspective, 
advocates of this approach emphasize the importance of 
responding to "weak signals" (Ansoff, 1975), so that change 
is accomplished before performance declines. Implicit in 
this position is the notion that strategies are rather 
facile in the hands of skillful managers (Goes, 1989). 
Others have argued that extremely low and extremely high
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performance foster rigidity toward strategic change 
(Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990).
The conceptual model in Figure 3 proposes that prior 
performance will be a significant antecedent for strategic 
change. Specifically, low or declining performance is 
argued to act as a catalyst for change. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is offered.
HI: Prior performance will be negatively related to degree
of change.
An unstated assumption in much of the literature that 
has examined the outcome of strategic change is that 
environmental changes tend to equally impact firms within 
an industry. That is, following an environmental jolt, all 
organizations within the affected industry will need to 
change their strategies (Smith and Grimm, 1989; Shortell et 
al., 1990). However, the literature that examines 
strategic group dynamics suggests that environmental 
changes have a differential impact on firms within an 
industry due to differences in beginning strategies and/or 
individual firm resources and skills (Meyer, 1982; Bogner 
and Pandian, 1992; Shortell et al., 1990; Cool and 
Schendel, 1988; Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993; 
Mascarenhas, 1989). Some firms will operate in niches that 
are more severely impacted, and/or will find their 
resources and skills less adequate than their competitors 
for dealing with revised environmental threats. These
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"mismatched" firms will experience poor performance due to 
a general loss of effectiveness. Failure to change under 
these circumstances will be associated with a continuous 
decline in performance and increased risk of failure. On 
the other hand, some organizations are likely to find that 
their existing resources and strategic orientation are 
relatively well matched to the demands of their new 
environment (Shortell et al., 1990). Although some 
adjustments may be necessary, in all probability these 
firms will be able to maintain the status quo and 
experience few adverse effects, i.e., they have little need 
for major strategic changes. Thus, within a given 
industry, failure to change in response to environmental 
changes will have different outcomes, depending on the 
individual organizations need for change.
In addition, it can be argued that organizations 
changing their strategies are likely to experience 
different outcomes, based on their need for change.
Haveman (1992) notes that change will improve performance 
and survival chances when the benefit from change (improved 
effectiveness) exceeds the loss of operating efficiency due 
to the change. Firms exhibiting poor performance due to a 
basic mismatch between organizational strategy and 
environment are likely to experience substantial benefits 
as they change to meet new environmental demands. That is, 
the greater the need for change, the greater the potential
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
benefits from undertaking the change. Also, it has been 
argued that the efficiency of engaging in organizational 
change increases when a clear threat is perceived; i.e., 
when need for change is high (Miller and Friesen, 1984) .
In the face of crisis, inertia tends to be reduced as 
organizational participants become more motivated to 
implement changes (Lawler, 1988; Tushman, Newman, and 
Nadler, 1988). Thus, organizations with low performance 
due to a mismatch between strategy and the environment are 
likely to benefit from changes in strategy because the 
potential gains are high and the loss in efficiency is 
reduced. In contrast, it has been argued that major 
organizational change is likely to be dysfunctional when 
there is little need for change (Tushman et al., 1988; 
Beer, 1988). Under these circumstances, the benefits 
accrue in smaller increments, and change efforts tend to be 
resisted more vigorously, resulting in higher overall 
costs.
The above arguments imply that it is important to 
control for performance in prior periods; i.e. need for 
change, when attempting to evaluate the relative impact of 
changes in strategy on short term performance and risk of 
failure. If need for change and change outcomes are 
related as argued above, and firms within a given industry 
undergoing discontinuous changes differ in their need for 
change, then divergent change outcomes can be expected. If
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these differences in need for change are quite significant, 
then comparison of change outcomes between firms that 
change and fail to change strategies is likely to find no 
significant difference. The large within-group variation 
would overshadow the between-group variation; i.e., there 
would be no main effect. If this is the case, it offers 
one explanation for why many of the studies performed to 
date have found little relationship between strategic 
change and performance (Zajac and Shortell, 1989; Shortell, 
Morrison, and Friedman, 1990; Guarino, 1991).
The previous arguments suggests the following set of 
hypotheses:
H2: Strategic change and prior performance covary
negatively with respect to subsequent performance and 
survival.
H2a: For organizations that change strategies, prior
performance will be negatively related to subsequent 
performance and chances of survival.
H2b: For organizations that do not change strategies, prior 
performance will be positively related to subsequent 
performance and chances of survival.
Slack Resources
Organizational slack is another prominent construct 
suggested in the research on strategic change (Ginsberg and 
Bucholtz, 1990; Bourgeois, 1981). Defined broadly, slack 
resources consist of "a cushion of actual or potential
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resources" (Bourgeois, 1981: 30) . More recently, theorists 
have made the distinction between unabsorbed slack (excess 
liquid resources) and absorbed slack (excess costs) (Singh, 
1986). In a related argument, Meyer (1982) noted that 
slack can be accumulated in different forms; e.g. financial 
slack, human resources and technology. This dissertation 
is concerned with the impact of excess or uncommited 
financial resources on strategic change, thus unabsorbed 
financial slack will be used in this analysis.
Slack resources can have a positive impact on both 
initiating and implementing strategic change (Bourgeois, 
1981). Cyert and March (1963) suggested that slack 
resources provide funds for experimentation and innovation. 
In terms of strategic position, excess funds can encourage 
managers to scan their relevant environments, and take a 
more proactive approach to experimenting with new products, 
technologies, and marketing approaches. Others (Starbuck, 
Greve, and Hedberg, 1988) argue that slack resources can 
inhibit change by dulling the organization's sensitivity to 
environmental circumstances and lowering the motivation to 
change. Thus, slack resources can be said to buffer the 
organization from its environment.
The model in Figure 3 suggests that slack resources 
will act as an adaptive rather than a buffering force.
That is, slack resources are anticipated to encourage
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change efforts. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
offered.
H3: Slack resources will be positively related to degree
of change.
Once an organization becomes commited to change, there 
seems to be general agreement that slack resources are 
likely to aid in implementation (Ginsberg and Bucholtz,
19 90) . Implementing a strategic change typically requires 
the accumulation of new resources and skills. To the 
extent that these resources are mobile; i.e., they can be 
bought and sold in factor markets (Barney, 1991), excess 
funds provide obvious benefits by allowing the firm to 
purchase the necessary resources. For example, a firm may 
draw down on its slack resources to acquire the personnel, 
technologies, and plant and equipment necessary to 
implement moves into new product lines or markets. Also, 
as pointed out by selection theorists, major organizational 
changes can be quite disruptive and result in loss of 
organizational efficiencies. Slack provides the 
organization with a cushion of resources that can be 
utilized during the reorganization process, thereby 
increasing the chances of success.
The logic above suggests a relationship between slack 
resources, strategic change, and change outcomes. For 
organizations choosing to change strategies, slack provides 
the resources to implement change, as well as a cushion to
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protect the firm from shocks during the change period. For 
organizations that do not change strategies, slack may also 
have some short term performance and survival implications, 
however these resources are probably much more salient for 
firms undergoing change. Thus:
H4: Strategic change and slack resources covary positively
with respect to subsequent performance and survival. 
H4a: Organizational slack will be more positively related 
to performance for organizations that change 
strategies than for organizations that do not change 
strategies.
Inertial Forces 
As noted above, selection theorists emphasize the role 
of inertial forces in constraining organizations from 
initiating and implementing changes of a strategic nature 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984). High levels of inertia 
tend to retard responsiveness to environmental changes, and 
when change is attempted they tend to reduce the speed of 
change and the degree to which it can be planned and 
controlled. When entering into reorganization 
organizations give up the survival value of their previous 
structure and begin the process of building a new structure 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). It is during this transition 
phase that organizations are particularly inefficient and 
vulnerable to failure (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . Inertial 
forces represent a drag on the change process, thereby
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increasing the duration of reorganization and lowering the 
chance of a successful outcome.
Selection theorists have pointed out that the strength 
of inertial forces are likely to vary among organizations 
of different ages and sizes (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) .
The remainder of this section discusses the effects of 
these two factors on strategic change and change outcomes. 
Organizational Age
Standardized routines, organization specific skills, 
and webs of internal and external relationships essential 
for performance and organizational survival are generally 
established over time. The well known liability of newness 
hypothesis (Stinchcombe, 1965), argues that death rates 
decline with age as organizations develop these skills and 
relationships. As routines are worked out, skills are 
learned, and internal and external relationships 
established over time, the organization develops 
reliability of performance that reduces the probability of 
failure. However, increases in the attributes that lead to 
higher degrees of performance and increased survivability 
also lead to increasing levels of organizational inertia. 
Established routines become increasingly entrenched over 
time as organizational participants find it easier to 
continue existing habits than to invest in new routines and 
skills (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In addition, 
organizations tend to become enmeshed in exchange
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relationships with customers and other organizations that, 
either through resource dependency or institutional 
processes, tend to constrain their actions (Ginsberg and 
Bucholtz, 1990). Thus, as organizations grow older 
inertial forces increase and major changes become more 
difficult to initiate. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
offered.
H5: Organizational age will be negatively related to
degree of change.
Although the liability of newness hypothesis asserts 
that older organizations will outperform and outlast 
younger organizations, the stronger inertial forces 
associated with older organizations suggests that they will 
have more difficulty implementing changes of a strategic 
nature. Therefore, when attempting changes to the core 
aspects of the organization, younger organizations are 
likely to find that their greater flexibility places them 
at a relative advantage. That is, their resources and 
skills are less likely to have crystallized, and changes 
will be attempted more readily and implemented more quickly 
and with less disruption. Thus, for organizations 
changing strategies, it could be argued that organizational 
age will be negatively related to performance and survival. 
On the other hand, the inertial characteristics associated 
with older organizations are likely to have survival value 
when major changes are not undertaken. In keeping with the
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liability of newness hypothesis, age is likely to be 
positively related to performance and survival for those 
firms that do not attempt major changes.
Therefore, the following hypotheses are offered:
H6: Organizational age and strategic change covary
negatively with respect to performance and survival. 
H6a: For organizations that change strategies, age will be 
negatively related to performance and survival.
H6b: For organizations that do not change strategies, age 
will be positively related to performance and 
survival.
Organizational Size
Large organizations tend to be more complex and are 
characterized by greater degrees of formalization and 
standardization than small organizations (Fombrum and 
Ginsberg, 1990) . As the organization grows larger, and the 
chain of command grows longer, strategic managers must 
delegate responsibility and rely on more complex and 
impersonal coordinating mechanisms. Thus, the organization 
becomes less amenable to the will of top managers (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984). In effect, the organization takes on a 
life of its own that becomes difficult to alter. On the 
other hand, smaller organizations are more flexible and 
have quicker response times as they tend to be less 
formalized and more an extension of the will of their top 
managers (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). In other words,
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inertial forces are thought to increase as organizational 
size increases. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
offered.
H7: Organizational size will be negatively related to
degree of change.
The above argument also suggests a simple linear 
relationship between organizational size and change 
outcomes; i.e., the larger the organization, the greater 
the inertia, and the less the chances of improving 
performance and enhancing survivability. That is, as 
inertial forces increase implementation becomes more 
difficult and positive outcomes become less likely.
However, two factors may serve to alter this relationship. 
First, the ability to survive major organizational changes 
may depend partly on the degree of resources available to 
the firm (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Although large 
organizations are more likely on average to experience 
increased response times and endure longer periods of 
reorganization, they typically have greater resources to 
weather such extended downturns. Small organizations 
typically have smaller margins for error (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989) and are particularly vulnerable to 
environmental shocks during reorganization efforts.
Second, large organizations tend to be more powerful and 
are more likely to alter their environments in ways that 
improve their chances of survival (Scott, 1987). This line
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of reasoning has led some researchers to speculate that 
selection arguments are more appropriate for small 
organizations than large organizations (Scott, 1987; 
Aldrich, 1979; Astley and Van de Ven, 1983).
The above arguments have several important 
implications. First, organizational size is likely to be 
negatively related to performance outcomes for 
organizations that change strategies. Larger organizations 
must overcome greater obstacles, making the change effort 
more expensive to implement. On the other hand, it has 
been demonstrated that larger banks tend to be more 
profitable in general (Guarino, 1991), so one would expect 
size to be positively related to performance for firms that 
do not change strategies. The second important implication 
is that large organizations may stand a better chance of 
surviving strategic changes, despite the higher levels of 
inertia that must be overcome. This is likely to be 
particularly true in the banking environment, where the 
consequences of large bank failures have significant social 
implications, and bank closures are controlled by 
regulatory agencies. Thus the following hypotheses are 
offered.
H8: Strategic change and organizational size covary
negatively with respect to subsequent performance.
H8a: For organizations that change strategies, size will be 
negatively related to performance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
H8b: For organizations that do not change strategies, size 
will be positively related to performance.
H9: Size will be positively related to survival,
regardless of strategic change.
Degree of Change 
Another crucial aspect to consider when examining the 
outcomes of strategic change is the type of change 
experienced. Population ecologists have made a distinction 
between core and peripheral changes, noting that selection 
arguments apply to changes in the core aspects of the 
organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Singh, House, and 
Tucker, 1986). Core features include stated goals, forms 
of authority, core technology, and marketing strategy.
These aspects of the organization are seen as providing a 
basis for distinguishing organizational forms, and are 
considered highly inert (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In 
practice, however, most authors have focused on defining 
organizational forms in terms of domain, that is the 
customers served, products and services offered, and 
technologies used (Abell, 1980; Haveman, 1992). Changes 
along these dimensions represents a change in 
organizational form which, according to the selection 
argument, typically results in decreased performance and 
increased risk of failure.
Although recognizing that there are costs and risks 
associated with domain changes, strategic management
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theorists have often argued that these costs tend to vary 
depending on the degree or direction of the change. The 
costs of moving from one strategic position to another 
involves capital outlays and/or relative operating cost 
penalties commonly referred to as mobility barriers (Caves 
and Porter, 1977; McGee and Thomas, 1986) . Typically, some 
strategic positions are easier to assume than others due to 
differences in the costs of entry; i.e., the height of 
mobility barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977). The lower the 
barriers, the less the cost, and the greater the likelihood 
of a successful entry. Harrigan (1985) argues that the 
relative height of mobility barriers separating strategic 
groups can be measured directly in a cluster analysis by 
the distance between clusters. Presumably, the closer the 
groups, the more similarities they share, and the lower the 
mobility barriers (Mascarenhas, 1989). Since changes to 
more similar groups are less costly, one may argue that 
these changes are less disruptive and most likely to 
improve survival chances.
On the other hand, it could be argued that changes of 
a more "quantum" nature may be more beneficial to 
performance than changes of an incremental nature. 
Organizations in groups that are relatively similar in 
nature are more prone to experience similar problems when 
faced with environmental changes. Incremental changes to 
these more similar groups may be easier to implement, but
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may result in a similar set of problems. Thus, the 
organization experiences less risk, but also fewer benefits 
from the change. If this is true, it suggests a 
risk/return tradeoff when changing strategies. Changes of 
a large magnitude will be riskier, but may promise higher 
returns for organizations that are ill suited to their 
current environment. Conversely, small changes will be 
less risky, but result in smaller returns. Thus, the 
following is hypothesized:
H10: Degree of change will be negatively related to 
survival.
Hll: Among survivors of change, degree of change will be 
positively related to performance.
Summary
This chapter developed a set of testable hypotheses, 
primarily concerning the relationship between performance 
demands, slack resources, size, and age on the strategic 
change -outcome linkage. The general notion, is that by 
taking these variables into account a clearer picture of 
the relationship between strategic change and 
performance/survival outcomes will emerge. In the next 
chapter, a set of research methods will be proposed to test 
these hypothesized relationships.
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
A comparative longitudinal design was used to examine 
the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. An eight 
year period, from 1980 to 1987 was chosen for the study. 
This time frame allowed for the investigation of strategic 
change and outcomes during the time immediately following 
the DIDMCA act of 1980.
Because loan portfolio strategies are likely to change 
relatively slowly, it was important to examine changes over 
as long a period as possible to allow them to materialize 
on the balance sheet. Thus, a decision was made to examine 
strategic change over a single four year time interval,
1982 to 1985, and assess performance over a three period 
prior to and following this interval (see Figure 4). 
Specifically, prior performance was assessed over a three 
year period from 1980 to 1982, and subsequent performance 
was assessed from 1985 to 1987. Failures were assessed 
over a two year period, 1986 and 1987. This design had the 
advantages of examining strategy over a relatively long 
period of time, and thus increased the chances of detecting 
change. As noted above, it also captured the banking in­
dustry at a time when strategic change was likely to occur.
72
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Data Sources
Data were obtained through the Federal Reserve Call 
Report Data Base, which includes the population of insured 
banks for the United States. All insured banks are 
required by the Federal Reserve Board to submit semi-annual 
or quarterly call report data, depending on the size of the 
organization, that are included in this data set. The data 
set includes approximately 3,000 variables, including 
detailed balance sheet and income statements, as well as 
information concerning main office locations, branch 
locations, number of employees, and holding company 
affiliations.
This data set has several advantages over other data 
sets commonly used in strategic management research.
First, the data set is subjected to validity checks and 
audits that verify the internal consistency and overall 
quality of the data. It is audited by representatives of 
the regulatory agencies through periodic bank examinations. 
Second, it is almost fully representative of the population 
of commercial banks in the United States. It is not 
subject to problems of self selection common in data sets 
such as PIMS. Third, it contains much useful supplementary 
information regarding such items as geographic locations 
and ownership affiliations. Finally, it allows the 
researcher to choose large random samples or, even use the 
entire population if desired. The most obvious drawback to
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the database is that it includes information only at the 
level of the individual bank rather than the holding 
company. Thus, research questions must be limited to the 
level of analysis dealing with individual business units.
Sample Selection 
A random sample of banks that were operating in 1980 
was drawn from the population. Generally speaking, the 
larger the sample size, the better (Kerlinger, 1986); 
however, the minimum size needed depends on factors such as 
the level of significance desired, power of the test, 
population error variance, and effect size (Hinkle,
Wiersma, and Jurs, 1988) . The specific formula for 
determining sample size for a two sample case when the 
population variance is known is as follows:
n_ 2<72 (Zfl - Z„)2 
(ES)2
where: Za = critical value of the test statistic in the
sampling distribution associated with the null 
hypothesis at a given a.
ZB = standard score in the sampling distribution 
associated with the alternate hypothesis 
corresponding to Za for a given power. 
a2 = population error variance.
ES = effect size
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The population variance for one of the key variables 
in this study, ROA, can be derived from Goodman's (1988) 
study that also made use of the FDIC tapes. Level of 
significance and power are set at conventional rates of .05 
and .80, respectively. Effect size is ultimately an 
arbitrary decision, but Cohen offers rough guidelines of 
small, medium, and large effect sizes. This study will use 
his guideline for detecting small effect sizes (.25 x a). 
Using these guidelines:
Za = 1.645 (since a=.05)
Zjj = -.842 (since /3=.20) 
a = .01 (from previous study)
ES = .0025 (.25 x .01)
These parameters suggest a sample size of 
approximately 400 banks will be sufficient to detect a 
difference of .0025 in ROA between banks that change and 
those that fail to change strategies. This, however, is 
based on the assumption that the sample will be 
approximately equally divided between those banks that 
change and those that fail to change. Since there was no 
way to tell a priori how the sample would be divided, and 
because failed banks will need to be eliminated for a 
portion of the analysis, an initial sample of 1,000 banks 
operating in 1980 was drawn.
Banks that disappeared from the data base prior to 
1985 were eliminated from the sample, resulting in a sample
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of 861. This sample was the one used for clustering, and 
for analyzing the change/failure relationships. Sixty one 
firms from this initial sample disappeared from the data 
base in 1986 and 1987. These firms were eliminated in 
order to evaluate the change/performance relationships, 
resulting in a sample of 800. Of the 61 firms that 
disappeared, 27 were on the list of failed institutions 
maintained by the FDIC. The remaining banks were assumed 
to have merged with other financial institutions. The 27 
failed banks in the final sample represent nearly 8% of the 
348 banks that failed during that time period, and slightly 
more than 3% of the entire sample. This is consistent with 
the population failure rate of approximately 3V during this 
same period.
Operationalization of Variables 
Measuring Strategy
The use of scope or product/market domain to define 
and classify organizational strategies has a great deal of 
precedence in the strategic management literature in 
general (e.g., Hatten, Schendel, and Cooper, 1978; 
Mascarenhas, 1989), and in the banking literature in 
particular (Guarino, 1991; Reger et al., 1992; Amel and 
Rhoades, 1988; Passmore, 1985) . Also, population 
ecologists have tended to use scope variables to identify 
organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Haveman, 
1992). In fact, Haveman (1992) argues that product,
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market, and technology decisions are the defining 
characteristics of an organizational form. Thus, although 
other studies have used a broader array of components, the 
use of scope is thought to represent an appropriate 
measurement of strategy in this study.
To reflect the product/market choices made in the 
commercial banking industry, a variety of financial ratios 
were used. These ratios and their definitions are listed 
in Table 2. Sixteen variables were chosen to reflect 
asset/liability structures and geographic diversity. A key 
product/market choice in the banking industry is the extent 
to which competitors participate in various traditional 
lending/investment activities. Six variables were chosen 
to represent the depth of a bank's involvement in these 
activities. Five variables represented the percentage of a 
bank's lending/investment portfolio devoted to particular 
categories of traditional activities: retail (RET), 
commercial (COMM), agricultural (AG), and real estate (RE) 
loans, and investments (INV). The sixth variable, loan 
portfolio diversity (LPD) captured the degree to which a 
bank chose to concentrate it's traditional 
lending/investment activities. LPD was measured as 1 - 
Hirfendahl-Hirschman index of concentration (Rediker and 
Middleton, 1992; Scherer, 1980) for the five portfolio 
categories of retail loans, commercial loans, agricultural
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Table 2: Definition of Strategy Variables___________
 Variable Name Variable Definition
Assets - Loan Portfolio and Investments
RET  Retail Loans_____
Total Loans & Investments
COMM ____ Commercial Loans
Total Loans & Investments
AG Agricultural Loans
Total Loans & Investments
RE Real Estate Loans
Total Loans & Investments
INV  Investments__
Total Loans & Investments
LPD 1- E Ret2 + Comm2 + Ag2 + Re2 + Inv2
Assets - Non-traditional products
LEASE Dummy variable where:
0 = No lease financing
1 = Lease financing
FEDFUND Dummy variable where:
0 = No Fed Fund Loans
1 = Fed Fund Loans
CCARD Dummy variable where :
0 = No credit card acct.
1 = Credit card acct.
FEES Service Charge Income
Total Income
Liabilities - Deposit Composition
DEP Total Deposits
Total Assets
LRGCD Time Deposits > $100.000
Total Deposit
(table con'd.)
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Variable Name Variable Definition
Geographic Diversity 
DOMDEP Domestic Deposits 
Total Deposits
DOMLOAN Domestic Loans 
Total Loans
FORBR Foreign Branches 
Total Branches
TOTBR Total number of branches
loans, real estate loans, and investments. The specific 
formula for calculating LPD is:
Using five categories of assets, the LPD can range from 0, 
where the bank has concentrated all its resources in a 
single area, to .80, where the bank has evenly distributed 
its resources among all five areas. The LPD represents a 
gross measure of the scope of activities within the 
traditional lending/investment areas; i.e., the degree to 
which the bank chooses to focus its primary earning assets 
in a particular area. The individual category percentages 
measure the specific areas in which the bank chooses to 
focus.
To further capture product diversity, the extent to 
which the banks participated in less traditional product 
markets was assessed. These products included lease
LPD = 1 - £ (RET2 + COMM2 + AG2 + RE2 + INV2)
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financing, fed funds selling, credit cards, and fee based 
products. These activities are less commonly offered than 
the more traditional lending products and typically do not 
contribute a major portion of a bank's earnings. They do, 
however, provide an indication of the breadth of product 
offerings and the extent to which the bank is diversifying 
away from more traditional products and services. These 
variables were measured categorically, and were entered 
into the cluster analysis as dummy variables.
Two deposit variables were included: the ratio of 
total deposits to total assets (DEP) and the ratio of time 
deposits over $100,000 to total deposits (LRGCD). DEP 
represents the institutions dependence on total deposits, 
the traditional source of commercial bank funds. A low DEP 
ratio, would indicate the use of non-traditional funding 
sources and/or a greater reliance on equity capital. LRGCD 
measures the use of newer, more expensive, and relatively 
risky source of funds.
Four variables were used to measure geographic 
diversity. Domestic deposits to total deposits (DOMDEP) 
and domestic loans to total loans (DOMLOAN) highlight the 
extent of the bank's involvement in international 
activities. Foreign branches to total branches provides 
another measure of international activity, the extent to 
which the bank has a physical presence in foreign
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countries. Total branches (TOTBR)1 represents a gross 
approximation of geographic breadth, however, it is 
recognized that this may also be a function of population 
density as well as location.
Strategic Change
Strategic change was measured in this study as a shift 
between strategic groups, with strategic groups represented 
by clusters. The clustering procedure was performed with a 
data set which combined strategic variables of the banks 
taken at two different periods; i.e., each bank was entered 
into the same data base twice. Firms that fell into 
different clusters at time one and time two were considered 
to have changed strategies. Smith and Grimm (1987) used a 
similar technique for assessing strategic changes in the 
railroad industry, and noted two advantages. First, by 
clustering the data from different time periods in one 
analysis, it can be assured that the underlying structure 
of each strategy remains the same for each time period. 
Using separate clusters in different time periods can lead 
to judgement errors as one must assess the equivalence of 
the clusters from time one to time two. Second, combining 
the data provides a strong test for measuring changes in 
strategy. For a firm to change clusters, it must bear a 
closer resemblance to other firms than itself at a
‘Other measures of geographic diversity such as number 
of states or counties in which the bank competes, were not 
available from the data set.
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different time period. Thus, it could be argued that this 
technique is likely to identify only very conspicuous 
changes in strategy.
Decree of Change
Cluster analysis typically groups similar entities on 
the basis of euclidian distance measures (Hair et al.,
1992) . The general notion is to group entities such that 
the resulting clusters exhibit low within-group variance 
and high between-group variance. Harrigan (1985) argues 
that the between group variance or distance measures 
between groups of firms, can act as a surrogate for 
mobility barrier heights. That is, the greater the 
distance between any two given groups, the greater the 
mobility barrier heights, and the less the chance of 
switching group membership. Thus, in terms of this 
analysis, degree of change was assessed by measuring the 
relative distance a firm travels when switching clusters. 
The actual measurement used was the distance between 
cluster centroids provided in SAS output. Firms switching 
between groups in close proximity, as measured by distance 
between cluster centroids, were assumed to experience a 
less radical change than firms switching between groups 
whose cluster centroids were further apart. A failure to 
change strategic groups by a bank between time period one 
and two was coded as zero.
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Prior Performance
Strategy theorists often note the distinction between 
two separate components of performance, effectiveness and 
efficiency (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Drucker, 1954). Put 
very simply, effectiveness is doing the right thing, while 
efficiency is doing things right (Drucker, 1954) . Hofer 
and Schendel (1978) equate effectiveness with the 
relationship between the organization and its environment; 
i.e., strategic performance, and efficiency with internal 
structure and operating activities; i.e., technical 
performance. Financial performance at any point in time is 
likely to be a function of each component; both are 
necessary but neither is sufficient for the long term 
survival of an organization.
Prior performance measures in this study represent an 
attempt to capture effectiveness or strategic performance. 
Poor performance is expected to indicate poor "fit" while 
good performance is expected to indicate good "fit." 
However, when using financial performance measures, the 
results may be confounded by efficiency considerations.
For example, a firm may be very effective (i.e., have a 
good strategic fit) but be performing poorly due to 
inefficiencies. In this case, a change in strategy may 
have detrimental effects (Hofer, 1988). On the other hand, 
a firm may have a poor strategic fit following an 
environmental change, but continue to perform well in the
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short run due to efficiency improvements. In both of these 
examples prior financial performance alone would be a poor 
indicator of "need for change".
This dissertation utilized a multifaceted approach for 
assessing prior performance that took into account each of 
the above mentioned aspects. This method answers the call 
by researchers for multidimensional measures of performance 
that capture aspects of both operational and financial 
performance (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). The 
measurement framework, demonstrated in Figure 5, includes 
three separate performance indicators intended to capture 
different aspects of performance: financial performance
(ROA), efficiency, and effectiveness.
Also, because strategic change may be triggered by low 
or declining performance, it is important to capture each 
of these aspects when measuring prior performance. As 
noted by Goes (1989), changes in performance, regardless of 
relative standing to other firms, are likely to be 
important antecedents to change. Thus, prior financial 
performance and efficiency were assessed in two ways, as a 
change in performance over time and as average performance. 
Prior performance was measured over a three year period 
from 1980 to 1982. As noted below, effectiveness is itself 
a change measure, and therefore does not lend itself to 
being measured in a static manner. The following sections 
specify the actual measures used.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
Effectiveness
Efficiency
ROA
Figure 5.
Change Absolute
Measures Measures
Avg. Change 
in Net Loans 
to Assets
N/A
Avg. Change 
in Efficiency 
Ratio
Average
Efficiency
Ratio
Avg. Change 
in ROA
Average
ROA
Measurement of Prior Performance
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Effectiveness
One measure of effectiveness is that of sales growth 
(Hofer, 1988). However, since a major portion of a 
commercial bank's revenues are from interest income and is 
subject to uncontrollable changes in interest rates, a 
better measure may be that of overall loan portfolio 
growth. For most banks, the loan portfolio represents the 
vast majority of earning assets. Since loan portfolio 
growth can occur at the expense of loan quality, another 
important aspect of effectiveness is the overall riskiness 
associated with the loan portfolio. One way of controlling 
for this is to measure changes in net loans; i.e., gross 
loans minus the allowance for possible loan losses. Since 
loan loss provisions are regularly monitored by regulators 
for adequacy, this should provide an acceptable estimate of 
loan portfolio value. To control for size, net loans were 
expressed as a percentage of total assets, and changes were 
measured by subtracting the ratio at time 1 from that at 
time 2. These changes were measured over two time periods 
(1980-81, 1981-82) and averaged to arrive at a measure of 
prior effectiveness.
Efficiency
Efficiency was measured using the operating efficiency 
ratio (Chase Manhattan Bank, 1979):
_________ Total Non-Interest Expenses_________
Net Interest Margin + Total Non-Interest Income
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Where:
Total Non-Interest Expenses = Salaries and benefits + Net 
occupancy expense + furniture and equipment expense + 
provision for loan losses + other operating expenses.
Net Interest Margin = Total interest income minus total 
interest expense.
Total Non-Interest Income = Income from fiduciary 
activities + service charges on deposit accounts + other 
charges, commissions, and fees + other operating income.
This ratio measures how efficient managers are in 
allocating and controlling funds within their control such 
as salaries and benefits, occupancy expenses, furniture and 
equipment, and other operating expenses.
Financial Performance
ROA is, by far, the most commonly used measure of 
performance by researchers examining the banking industry 
(Reger et al., 1992; Goodman, 1988; Guarino, 1991;
Passmore, 1985). In addition, it is the financial 
indicator most closely scrutinized by bank analysts and by 
industry participants (Reger et al., 1992). Therefore, it 
was used in this study to assess overall financial 
performance. The exact ratio used was Net Operating 
Earnings/Total Assets. Net operating earnings consist of 
earnings after taxes but before securities gains or losses. 
The use of this figure in the numerator eliminates windfall 
profits or unusual losses from the securities portfolio
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which may have been out of control of management (Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 1979).
Slack
Following Bourgeois (1981) slack was assessed using 
financial data. One commonly used measure of slack is the 
current ratio, which measures the firms ability to cover 
short-term obligations with liquid resources (Hambrick and 
D'Aveni, 1988). The banking equivalent, that was used in 
this study, is the liquidity ratio (Chase Manhattan Bank, 
1979). This ratio is calculated as follows:
Cash + FFS - FFP + Invest. Portfolio - Pledged Securities 
Total Senior Liabilities - (Mort. Debt + Secured Dep.+ FFP)
Where:
FFS = Fed Funds Sold and Securities Purchased under 
Agreements to Resell.
FFP = Fed Funds Purchased and Securities Sold under 
Agreements to Repurchase.
Investment Portfolio = U.S. Treasury Securities + 
Obligations of U.S. Government Agencies + Obligations of 
States and Political Subdivisions + Other Securities + 
Trading Account Securities.
Secured Deposits = Deposits of U.S. Government + Deposits 
of States and Political Subdivisions.
Pledged Securities = Same as Secured Deposits.
Total Senior Liabilities = Total Liabilities.
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This ratio measures the percentage decline in funding 
sources which can be met by liquid assets, or the bank's 
cushion for meeting immediate resource needs.
Another commonly used measure of slack is the equity 
to debt ratio (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986; Hambrick and 
D'Aveni, 1988). Capital adequacy is an important 
measurement of a commercial banks ultimate ability to 
absorb losses and is monitored carefully by regulators. As 
such, the degree of available capital represents an 
important cache of unused resources that is available to 
buffer the firm during change. Capital adequacy was 
measured using the asset to capital ratio (total 
assets/total capital) a commonly utilized measure in the 
banking industry (Chase Manhattan Bank, 1979).
Ace and Size
Age was measured as the number of years from the 
founding of a bank. Most measures of firm size tend to be 
highly correlated (Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990), thus this 
study used total assets, a commonly used measure of size in 
the banking industry (Guarino, 1991; Goodman, 1988) .
Chance Outcomes
Two change outcomes are of interest in this study, 
performance and organizational failure. Performance 
outcomes were measured using the three indicators described 
above (net loan portfolio growth, the efficiency ratio, and 
ROA). For ROA and efficiency, the outcome of interest was
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the difference between prior and post performance. A 
difference measure was thought to be more appropriate for 
these variables since it is more sensitive to the 
relationships being examined. Because loan portfolio 
growth is a change measure itself, average growth was used 
as the dependent variable.
Failure is the second dependent variable. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Annual Report was 
consulted to identify failed institutions. Banks that were 
not closed or merged by orders of the FDIC, but disappeared 
from the data base during the time frame of the study were 
assumed to have voluntarily merged with another bank and 
were eliminated from the sample. Banks that disappeared 
from the sample between 1984 and 1987 and were closed or 
merged by orders of the FDIC will be coded as failed 
institutions.
Control Variables
One important variable to control for is holding 
company affiliation. Holding companies have the potential 
to significantly impact on a number of variables in this 
study, including change, type of change, and performance. 
That is, the parent may dictate change and direction of 
change, and may also affect change outcomes by providing 
resources that would not normally be available to the 
organization. This variable is available on the FDIC data 
tapes and was used as a control variable in the analysis.
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Another factor to control for is general economic 
conditions which can obviously influence the dependent 
variables of concern. For example, during the early 
1980's, banks in oil producing and agricultural states 
experienced more severe downturns than those in states with 
more diversified economies. Economic fluctuations were 
controlled by introducing unemployment rate statistics in 
the analysis for the state in which the bank is located.
Data Analysis
Data analysis proceeded in two stages. First, cluster 
analysis was used to identify banks that change strategies. 
Banks were coded to indicate change and degree of change. 
Second, multiple regression, hierarchical regression, and 
logistic regression analyses were used to test three sets 
of hypotheses: those examining change antecedents, those 
examining the strategic change/performance relationship, 
and those examining the strategic change/survival 
relationship.
Cluster Analysis
Cluster analysis is a family of multivariate technique 
designed to classify entities with respect to some 
predetermined criteria, so that the resulting clusters 
"exhibit high internal (within-cluster) homogeneity and 
high external (between-cluster) heterogeneity" (Hair et 
al., 1992: p. 4). In the present study, cluster analysis 
was used to separate firms into groups on the basis of
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their scope of activities in the banking industry. The 
purpose was to generate relatively stable and meaningful 
strategic groups, and to detect changes in strategy by 
identifying changes in group membership. Cluster analysis 
has been used widely in the strategic group literature 
(Cool and Schendel, 1987; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990), and 
more recently it has been utilized to detect changes in 
group membership (Smith and Grimm, 1987; Goes, 1989, 
Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993) .
The use of cluster analysis involves a number of 
choices that can lead to significantly different results, 
but for which there are no clear cut answers. Thus, use of 
the technique is perhaps as much an art as a science (Hair, 
et al., 1992). Some of the important decisions to be made 
concern dimension selection, scaling, the algorithm to be 
used, and the number of clusters formed (Harrigan, 1985; 
Hair et al., 1992).
The choice of dimensions to be measured and variables 
used represents an important theoretical decision. As 
argued above, scope represents an important dimension of an 
organization's competitive strategy, and the choice of 
variables in this study was designed to capture important 
elements of both breadth and depth of scope. In general, 
an attempt was made to follow Harrigan's (1985) advice to 
"select a few dimensions which seem theoretically 
appropriate for the greatest number of strategic groups"
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(p. 61). Also, cluster analysis can be dramatically 
affected by the inclusion of undifferentiated variables 
(Hair et al., 1992); i.e., variables that do not differ 
significantly across the sample. It is important to 
examine the results and eliminate such undifferentiated 
variables to obtain well defined clusters.
The next question pertains to how inter-object 
similarity should be measured. Cluster analysis typically 
relies on distance measures to assess similarity. The most 
commonly used measure of distance is Euclidean distance, 
although other variants include the "city block" approach, 
or Mahalanobis distance (Hair et al., 1992). Generally 
speaking, when using measurements based on different scales 
it is necessary to convert the raw measures to Z scores 
prior to calculating distances to eliminate bias introduced 
by scale differences (Hair et al., 1992). However, as 
pointed out by Harrigan (1985), normalizing the data in 
this fashion causes the mean and scatter information to be 
lost when performing subsequent analysis of group 
homogeneity. One way to overcome this limitation is simply 
to use standardized information for clustering purposes and 
raw data for analyzing the clusters and testing for 
homogeneity (Harrigan, 1985) . Also, since most techniques 
for assessing distance are sensitive to outliers (Hair et 
al., 1992), the strategy variables should be inspected for 
extreme observations.
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A number of different clustering algorithms or 
procedures for grouping similar objects exist. The goal of 
each approach is to minimize the within cluster variation 
and maximize the between cluster variation, but differences 
in procedures can result in different outcomes. Most 
clustering algorithms fall into one of two categories: 
hierarchical or nonhierarchical. Hierarchical procedures 
involve the construction of tree-like structures that 
either start with each individual observation as a single 
cluster and work toward building a single cluster 
(agglomerative methods) or start with one large cluster 
containing all observations and split the observations 
until each is in a single cluster (divisive methods) (Hair 
et al., 1992) . Five popular methods that fall under the 
hierarchical approach include single linkage, complete 
linkage, average linkage, Ward's method, and centroid.
Non-hierarchical procedures, frequently referred to as 
K-means clustering, do not involve the tree-like 
construction process. Instead, clustering centers are 
chosen and objects within a specified distance are included 
in the cluster. Three typical procedures include the 
sequential threshold approach, the parallel approach, and 
the optimizing approach.
Hierarchical procedures have been the most popular 
algorithm's in the past (Hair et al., 1992). They have the 
advantage of being fast and are thought to produce more
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interpretable clusters, but they can be misleading because 
early groupings tend to persist throughout the analysis 
which can lead to undesirable results. Non-hierarchical 
methods have gained in popularity and have the advantage of 
allowing switching of cluster membership during analysis, 
thus avoiding groups characterized by "chaining". However, 
some authors argue that this feature represents a 
disadvantage (McKelvey, 1982). Following the lead of 
Bauerschmidt and Chrisman (1993) this study made use of the 
FASTCLUS procedure provided by SAS. FASTCLUS is a non- 
hierarchical method that uses the nearest centroid sorting 
method. In the FASTCLUS procedure, the user specifies the 
number of clusters. The procedure begins by selecting a 
set of cluster seeds, and observations are assigned to the 
nearest seed to form temporary clusters. The initial seeds 
are then replaced by the means of the temporary clusters, 
and the process is repeated until no further changes occur 
in the clusters (SAS/STAT Users' Guide, 1988). This 
approach offers the advantage of emphasizing distinctions 
among the strategic groups, rather than familial 
relationships (Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993) .
A prominent issue with clustering techniques concerns 
how to select the number of clusters. Harrigan (1985) made 
use of ratios comparing within to between group variance, 
while Hair et al. (1992) advocate looking for jumps in the 
distances between groups as they are combined as objective
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guidelines to aid the analyst. Although a number of such 
guidelines exist, the final solution must be based on a 
combination of common sense, practical judgement, and 
theoretical foundations (Hair et al., 1992). The approach 
used for this study involved computing a number of cluster 
solutions, then subjecting each solution to both subjective 
and objective criteria. They were first examined for 
interpretability, and then subjected to three sets of 
diagnostic statistics, the ratio of within-group to 
between-group variance (Harrigan, 1985), the Pseudo F 
statistic, and the Cubic Clustering Criterion (Goes, 1989; 
Milligan and Cooper, 1985).
Following this, the reliability of the groups were 
assessed using a series of univariate and multivariate 
statistical techniques, and by comparing them to strategic 
types found elsewhere in the banking literature.
Statistical techniques utilized included univariate F- 
tests, Bonferroni t-tests, and Discriminant analysis. 
Testing Change Antecedents
The first set of hypotheses tested were those 
suggesting a relationship between various antecedents and 
degree of change. Specifically, it was suggested that 
degree of change will be impacted by prior performance, 
slack resources, and organizational age and size. These 
hypotheses were tested using a single multiple regression 
model as follows:
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DCHNG = a + bsROA + b2ROACH + b3EFF + b4EFFCH + b5CHLNAS + 
b6LIQUID + b7ASCAP + bgLAGE + b,LASSET + bl0HOLDC + e
where:
DCHNG = Degree of change.
ROA = Average return on assets.
ROACH = Average change in return on assets
EFF = Average efficiency ratio.
EFFCH = Average change in efficiency ratio
CHLNAS = Average change in loan to assets.
LIQUID = Average liquidity ratio.
AS CAP = Average assets to capital ratio.
LAGE = Log of age2.
LASSET = Log of assets.
HOLDC = Holding company affiliation.
Testing The Strategic Change Performance Relationship
Analysis of performance outcomes proceeded in several 
steps. First, hypotheses concerning the impact of prior 
performance, slack resources, organizational age, and size, 
were tested using separate multiple regression models for 
organizations that change and those that do not change. 
These regression models test the basic direction of the 
relationships. Second, moderated regression techniques 
were applied to formally test for an interaction effect.
2Log transformations of age and assets were used as they 
were found to significantly improve the distribution of the 
data; i.e. log transformations resulted in an approximate 
normal distribution.
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This indicated whether the hypothesized relationships were 
statistically different for firms that change and do not 
change strategies. Third, the hypothesis concerning the 
impact of degree of change on performance was assessed 
using multiple regression analysis.
Performance, Slack, Age, and Size
The hypotheses concerning the impact of prior 
performance, slack, age, and size were tested with the 
following models.
DROA = a + b,ROA + b,ROACH + b3LIQUID + b4ASCAP + b5LAGE
+ b6LASSET + b7HOLDC + BgUNEMP + e
DEFF = a + b[EFF + biEFFCH + b3LIQUID + b4ASCAP + b5LAGE
+ b6LASSET + b7HOLDC + BgUNEMP + e
CHLNASAF = a + b,CHLNASBE + b:LIQUID + b3ASCAP + b4LAGE +
b5LASSET + bgHOLDC + b7UNEMP + e
where:
DROA = Change in average return on assets.
ROA = Average return on assets, before.
ROACH = Average change in return on assets, before.
LIQUID = Average liquidity ratio.
ASCAP = Average assets to capital ratio.
LAGE = Log of age.
LASSET = Log of assets.
HOLDC = Holding company affiliation.
UNEMP = State unemployment figures.
DEFF = Change in average efficiency ratio.
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EFF = Average efficiency ratio, before.
EFFCH = Average change in efficiency ratio, before.
CHLNASAF = Average change in loan to assets, after.
CHLNASBE = Average change in loan to assets, before.
Because a fundamental question being asked is whether 
the above variables moderate the relationship between 
change and performance, a more rigorous set of moderated 
regression equations were examined to test for interaction 
effects. The appropriate analytical technique to test for 
moderating relationships depends largely on the type of 
measurements employed (continuous or categorical) (Barron 
and Kenny, 1986). When the moderator and independent 
variable are both categorical, the appropriate technique is 
analysis of variance (Barron and Kenny, 1986). The 
technique often suggested when the moderator is a 
continuous variable and the independent variable 
dichotomous, is a dummy variable interactive model (Berry 
and Feldman, 1985) . This involves running a series of 
regression equations and testing for the equality of slopes 
using the chow test or an equivalent hierarachical 
regression model (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1976; Cohen and 
Cohen, 1983; Pedhazur, 1982) . Another option under these 
circumstances is to dichotomize the moderating variable and 
employ analysis of variance or t-tests, however this 
practice has been criticized vigorously (Pedhazur, 1982; 
Stone, 1988). When both the moderator and continuous
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variables are continuous a multiplicative model is 
appropriate (Berry and Feldman, 1985; Baron and Kenny,
1986).
As noted, this study involves the examination of a 
series of continuous moderators (prior performance, slack, 
age, and size) and a dichotomous independent variable 
(change or no change). Therefore, a series of hierarchical 
regression models were utilized to test for an interaction 
effect (Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Stone, 1988; Pedhazur,
1982). More specifically, this involved running a main 
effects model and a full model containing an interactive 
term, and testing whether the model with the interactive 
term significantly increases the explained variance of the 
dependent variable. A difference in predictability between 
the full model and main effects model indicates 
significantly different slopes in the regression lines 
between firms that change and do not change strategies.
The test statistic for determining significance is:
(Rp* - Rm2) /  -  k M)
F= --------------------
(1 - Rp2) / (N - kF - 1)
where:
Rp2 = The squared multiple correlation coefficient for the 
full model.
RM2 = The squared multiple correlation coefficient for the 
main effects model.
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kF = The number of independent variables in the full 
model.
kM =The number of independent variables in the main 
effects model.
N =The total sample size.
The resulting F is distributed with kF - kM and N - kF - 1 
degrees of freedom. This test of significance was obtained 
from the SAS output, by using a stepwise model found in the 
REG procedure, and manipulating the data such that the 
interaction term was entered last. The basic question this 
technique answers is whether the use of separate regression 
coefficients for each group adds significantly to the 
explanation of the dependent variable, performance outcomes 
(Pedhazur, 1982). In other words, this test tells us if 
hypothesized moderators in fact have a different impact on 
performance between firms that change and do not change 
strategies.
Degree of Change
The next relationship to be considered is the impact 
of degree of change on performance outcomes. This 
hypothesis was tested by using regression models as 
follows:
DROA = a + b,DCHNG + bjHOLDC + b3UNEMP + e
DEFF = a + b,DCHNG + b2HOLDC + b3UNEMP + e
CHLNAS = a + b,DCHNG + bjHOLDC + b3UNEMP + e
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where:
DROA = Change in average ROA.
DCHNG = Degree of change.
HOLDC = Holding company affiliation.
UNEMP = State unemployment figures.
DEFF = Change in average efficiency ratio.
CHLNAS = Average change in loan to assets.
Testing the Strategic Chance Survival Relationship
Estimating the impact of change on survival involves 
the prediction of a dichotomous dependent variable, 
survival vs. failure. When analyzing the occurrence of 
events such as this, two possible analytical techniques are 
available; discriminant analysis and logit analysis. Logit 
analysis has the advantage of requiring far fewer 
assumptions than discriminant analysis, and it is very 
similar to regression in terms of it's statistical tests 
and diagnostics (Hair et al., 1992). Therefore, a logit 
model was fitted using the LOGISTIC procedure found in SAS. 
To test the hypotheses, concerning performance, slack, 
size, and age, a separate model was executed for firms that 
change and fail to change. The form of the logit model is 
as follows:
P (FAIL) = a + b,R0A + b2ROACH + b3EFF + b4EFFCH + b5 CHLNAS
+ b6LIQUID + b, AS CAP + b„LAGE + b,LASSET + bl0HOLDC 
+ b,,UNEMP + e
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where:
P(FAIL) = Probability of failure.
ROA = Average return on assets.
ROACH = Average change in return on assets.
EFF = Average efficiency ratio.
EFFCH = Average change in efficiency ratio.
CHLNAS = Average change in loan to assets.
LIQUID = Average liquidity ratio.
ASCAP = Average assets to capital ratio.
LAGE = Log of age.
LASSET = Log of assets.
HOLDC = Holding company affiliation.
UNEMP = State unemployment figures.
This model tests the basic direction of the 
hypothesized relationships. The statistical significance 
of the differences can be assessed by using a hierarchical 
procedure similar to that described above; i.e., 
calculating a main effects and full interactive model, and 
determining the statistical significance of adding the 
interactive term. Logistic regression has an overall 
measure of goodness of fit similar to R squared, referred 
to as -2LL (-2 Log Likelihood). This likelihood value can 
be used to compare fit between equations. Once again, the 
significance test is available in the SAS output, when 
using a stepwise model found in the LOGISTIC procedure.
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The impact of degree of change on failure was 
estimated by a straightforward logit model as follows:
P (FAIL) = a + b,DCHNG + b2H0LDC + b3UNEMP + e 
where:
P(FAIL) = Probability of failure.
DCHNG = Degree of change.
HOLDC = Holding company affiliation.
UNEMP = State unemployment figures.
Summary
This chapter has attempted to lay out the design and 
methodology of this study. It has detailed the nature of 
the study, presented the data and measures used, and 
explained the data analyses used in testing the hypotheses 
proposed in the previous chapter.
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RESULTS
This chapter reports the result of the statistical 
tests in five major sections. First, the results of the 
classification efforts using cluster analysis is presented. 
The second section reports the results of tests examining 
change antecedents. The third section presents the results 
of those tests that examined the relationship between 
strategic change and performance outcomes. The fourth 
section describes the outcomes of the statistical tests 
examining the relationship between strategic change and 
survival. The final section reviews the results and 
summarizes the chapter.
Cluster Analysis 
The main goal for the cluster analysis was to identify 
a set of stable and interpretable strategic groups and to 
detect changes in strategy by identifying changes in group 
membership. The following section details the procedures 
and outcomes.
Clustering Procedure
As noted, the FASTCLUS procedure was used to perform 
the cluster analysis. The strategy variables from 1982 and 
1985 were merged into the same data set as separate
106
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observations, resulting in 1,722 observations available for 
clustering. The variables were standardized prior to the 
analysis.
Initial attempts at clustering yielded unexpected 
results. Regardless of the number of clusters derived, 
approximately 98% of the sample remained grouped in a 
single cluster. Upon close examination of the strategy 
variables, it was determined that the cause for this was 
the inclusion of what Hair et al. (1992) refer to as 
undifferentiated variables; i.e., those that differ little 
across the sample. Four of the variables3 included in the 
original analysis fell into this category. For example:
1. DomLoan - Only 10 instances of foreign loans reported
out of a possible 1722 occurrences.
2. DomDep - Eight firms reported foreign deposits.
3. ForBr - Eleven firms reported foreign branches.
4. FedFund - All but eighty two firms sold fed funds.
The inclusion of such variables can obviously have a 
dramatic and undesirable impact on the results of a cluster 
analysis. To obtain well defined and interpretable
clusters, Hair et al. recommend deleting undifferentiated 
variables. The deletion of such variables is also endorsed 
by Harrigan (1985) who argues for the use of only those
3Prior to 1984 information on many foreign transactions 
was unavailable, except for the largest banks. It is likely 
that a larger number of banks were involved in foreign 
transactions than is indicated by these variables.
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variables with the greatest discriminatory power.
Therefore, the four variables above were removed from the 
analysis, resulting in the use of twelve strategic 
variables for the cluster analysis. Means and standard 
deviations for these variables are provided in Table 3.
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of all Strategy
Variables____________________________________________
1982 1985 Combined
Variable___________ Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Loan portfolio 
diversity (LPD)
.6302 .0980 .6742 .0832 .6522 .0935
% Retail Loans 
(RET)
.2232 .1302 .1482 .0934 .1857 .1193
% Comm. Loans 
(COMM)
.2236 .1413 .1601 .1116 .1918 .1312
% Agricultural 
Loans (AG)
.1629 .2150 .0864 .1203 .1246 .1783
% Real Estate 
Loans (RE)
.3114 .1743 .2435 .1318 .2774 .1582
% Investments 
(INV)
.0789 .1637 .3618 .1659 .2203 .2172
Lease Financing 
(LEASE)
.1347 .3416 .1951 .3965 .1649 .3712
Credit Card 
Accts. (CCARD)
.3182 .4661 .3647 .4816 .3415 .4743
% Fee Income 
(FEES)
.0416 .0312 .0555 .0349 .0485 .0338
Deposits/Assets
(DEP)
87.92 4 .426 88 .71 4 .436 88.31 4 .447
% Time Deposits 
> $100M (LRGCD)
11.42 10 .146 11.26 10.018 11.34 10.080
Total Branches 
(TOTBR)
3.49
N=
10.938
=861
4.12
N=
13.494 
=861
3 .80 
N=:
12.283 
1722
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Number of Clusters
Although a number of guidelines exist for determining 
the "optimum" number of clusters, there is no truly 
objective standard (Harrigan, 1985; Hair et al., 1992). 
Milligan and Cooper (1985) investigated thirty stopping 
rules for hierarchical cluster analysis using Monte Carlo 
simulations and found that most did a poor job of 
identifying a known cluster structure. Thus, most 
researchers agree that the best approach involves reliance 
on judgement, theoretical expectations, and a few well 
chosen diagnostic procedures (Goes, 1989; Hair et al.,
1992).
Based on previous empirical work using similar 
clustering procedures (Dess and Davis, 1984; Goes, 1989; 
Smith and Grimm, 1987; Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993), 
from theoretical generic strategies (Porter, 1980; Miles 
and Snow, 1978) and from proposed banking typologies 
(Goodman, 1988) the a priori expectation was for three to 
seven strategic configurations to emerge from the data. 
Also, from a practical standpoint, less than three 
configurations would probably not be very meaningful and 
more than seven would become cumbersome. Therefore, a 
decision was made to start with a series of five k-means 
runs, analyzing from three to seven clusters.
These initial clusters were first examined from the 
perspective of their interpretability and overall meaning­
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fullness. In general, it was found that the 
interpretability improved as the clusters increased from 
three to five. That is, each successive cluster seemed to 
be distinctive from the other clusters along one or more 
dimensions. However, when the clusters increased beyond 
five, they seemed to become less distinct and more 
difficult to interpret. In other words, partitioning the 
data set beyond five clusters did not seem to be 
meaningful, and in fact made interpretation more awkward.
Following this initial inspection of the clusters, 
three sets of diagnostic statistics were examined. The 
first was the ratio of within-group variance to between- 
group variance suggested by Harrigan (1985) . Low values of 
this statistic are preferred, since this indicates a 
greater degree of explained variance (variance between 
clusters) than unexplained variance (variance within 
clusters). Figure 6 presents a graph of this statistic for 
the five cluster solutions. Because this statistic will 
always improve as the number of clusters increases, the key 
to interpretation is to examine the degree of change 
(Harrigan, 1985). As can be seen, moving from three to 
four and four to five clusters results in significant 
improvements, but the incremental improvements are much 
less when moving to six and seven clusters. This would 
seem to confirm the initial subjective judgement that a 
five cluster solution is appropriate.
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Two additional diagnostic tools that are generated by 
the FASTCLUS procedure are the Pseudo F statistic and the 
Cubic Clustering Criterion (Goes, 1989). Milligan and 
Cooper (1985) found these two statistics to be among the 
most reliable in detecting the optimum cluster solution.
The Pseudo F statistic is similar to Fisher's F, in that 
higher values indicate a better cluster solution. Figure 7 
presents a graph of this statistic. Once again, the five 
cluster solution is confirmed.
The final diagnostic tool used is the Cubic Clustering 
Criterion. Higher values are preferred, and Figure 8 
reveals that the five and seven cluster solutions stand out 
as superior. Taken as a whole, however, the subjective 
interpretation, combined with the diagnostic statistics, 
points rather convincingly to a five cluster solution as 
being the most appropriate.
Results of the Five-Cluster Solution
Table 4 presents a summary of the five cluster 
solution, including the unstandardized cluster means and 
standard deviations for each strategy variable, and 
univariate F ratios (ANOVA's). Cluster distances are 
provided in Table 5. In general the five cluster solution 
appeared to do an adequate job of separating the groups 
along the strategic variables. The univariate F tests 
revealed highly significant differences between the cluster 
means across the five clusters for each strategy variable.
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Table 4. Summary of Cluster Analysis Results: Cluster Frequencies, Means,
_________ Standard Deviations, and F Statistics__________________________
Cluster 1 
(n=515)
Cluster 2 
(n=157)
Cluster 3 
(n=54)__
Cluster 4 
(n-564)
Cluster 5 
(n=432)
F Ratio 
p value
LPD
Std. Dev. 
rank
6518
0984
3
. 5752 
. 1205 
5
.7109
.0426
1
.6495
.0866
4
.6769
.0698
2
F=43.39 
p=.0001
Ret
Std. Dev. 
rank
1173
0687
5
.1251
.0763
4
1957
.0739
3
2417
,1244
1
.2149
.1278
2
F=113.47 
p=.0001
Comm
Std. Dev. 
rank
1078
0681
5
. 1458 
.0785 
4
.2330
,0987
2
1650
,0871
3
,3384 
, 1341 
1
F=371.57
p=.0001
Ag
Std. Dev. 
rank
1117
1159
2
5711
1293
1
0103
0183
3
0830
1083
4
0464
0818
5
F=805.63 
p=.0001
Re
Std. Dev. 
rank
1885
0982
4
, 1306 
0897 
5
.2460
.0990
2
.4276 
, 1349 
1
.2447 
, 1116 
3
F=397.57 
p=.0001
Inv
Std. Dev. 
rank
.4746 
. 1308 
1
0273
0854
5
.3148 
. 1100 
2
, 0827 
1239 
4
1554
1512
3
F=770.39
p=.0001
Lease 
Std. Dev. 
rank
1301
3367
3
1019
3034
4
.8148
.3921
1
.0887
.2845
5
.2477
.4322
2
F=62.86
p=.0001
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Cluster 1 
(n=5l5)
Cluster 2 
(n=l57)
Cluster 3 
(n=54)__
CCard 
Std. Dev. 
rank
.2058
.4047
4
.0510
.2206
5
.9260
.2643
1
Fees
Std. Dev. 
rank
. 0474 
. 0319 
3
. 0200 
. 0194 
5
.0639 
. 0284 
2
Dep
Std. Dev. 
rank
88.36 
3 .712 
3
88.51 
3 . 538 
2
77.86 
8 .448
5
LrgCd 
Std. Dev. 
rank
7.770 
6 .601 
4
7.802
7.321
3
11.02
8.114
2
TotBr 
Std. Dev. 
rank
2 .067 
1.769 
4
1.184
.4779
5
49.24 
50 .21 
1
Cluster 1 - Focused Investors
Cluster 2 - Focused Agricultural Lenders
Cluster 3 - Generalists
Cluster 4 - Focused Retailers
Cluster 5 - Generalist Wholesaler
Cluster 4 Cluster 5 F Ratio
(n=564 )_____ (n=432)_____P value
.3440 .5324 F=73.98
.4754 .4995 p=.0001
3 2
.0424 .0661 F=75.46
.0280 .0376 p=.0001
4 1
89.37 88.12 F=102.23
3.055 4.674 p=.0001
1 4
7.686 21.70 F=238.51
5.798 11.72 p=.0001
5 1
2.651 2.656 F=343.53
3.081 2.909 p=.0001
3 2
i *
o\
Table 5. Distance Between Cluster Centroids
1 1 7
Cluster 1 2 3 4
1
2 3.54 .
3 5.39 6.71 -
4 2.65 3.68 5.51
5 3.01 4.29 5.02 2.49
To investigate these differences in more detail 1
individual means were subjected to multiple comparisons 
using the Bonferroni t-test. Although other authors have 
used pairwise comparisons for this purpose (Harrigan, 1985; 
Smith and Grimm, 1987), the Bonferroni statistic was felt 
to be more appropriate since it does an effective job of 
controllingfor experimentwise error rate (SAS/STAT Users 
Guide, 1988) . The results (Table 6) revealed that the 
clusters are statistically different from each other along 
most of the strategic dimensions used. It is notable that 
DEP, LRGCD, and TOTBR, seemed to do a poorer job than the 
other variables, as approximately half the comparisons were 
insignificant for each of these variables. Overall, the 
five cluster solution explained 32.9% of the variance in 
the strategy variables.
A multivariate technique that can be used for 
assessing the overall validity of the cluster solution is 
multiple discriminant analysis (DeCastro, Chrisman,
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Table 6. Bonferroni T-tests of the Differences in Cluster 
Means for the Strategy Variables Used in the Cluster 
Analysis_____________________________________________
Clusterl
Loan Portfolio Diversity 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 ★ --
Cluster3 * A _
Cluster4 n.s ■k * _
Clusters ★ * n.s * --
Clusterl
% Retail Loans 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 n.s --
Cluster3 * *
Cluster4 it ★ * _
Cluster5 ★ * n.s * --
Clusterl
% Commercial Loans 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Cluster5
Clusterl --
Cluster2 ★ --
Cluster3 * *
Cluster4 ★ n.s *
Clusters ★ * * * --
* - significant difference between groups at .05 level
n.s. - no significant difference between groups
(table con'd.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
119
Clusterl
% Agricultural Loans 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 * --
Cluster3 * * _
Cluster4 * + * -
Clusters * * n.s * --
Clusterl
% Retail Loans 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 ★ --
Cluster3 * *
Cluster4 * * --
Clusters * * n.s * --
Clusterl
% Investments 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 * --
Cluster3 * ★
Cluster4 * * * --
Clusters ★ * ★ •k --
* - significant difference between groups at .05 level
n.s. - no significant difference between groups
(table con'd.)
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Clusterl
Lease Financing 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 n.s --
Cluster3 * *
Cluster4 n.s n.s * --
Cluster5 * * * * --
Clusterl
Credit Card Accounts 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 * --
Cluster3 ★ *
Cluster4 * ★ * --
Clusters * * * * --
Clusterl
% Fee Income 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 ★ --
Cluster3 ★ *
Cluster4 n.s * * --
Clusters ★ * n.s ★ --
* - significant difference between groups at .05 level
n.s. - no significant difference between groups
(table con'd.)
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Clusterl
Deposits/Assets 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 n.s --
Cluster3 * *
Cluster4 * n.s * --
Clusters n.s n.s n.s * --
% Time Deposits > $100 
Clusterl Cluster2 Cluster3
,000
Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 n.s --
Cluster3 n.s n.s
Cluster4 n.s n.s * --
Clusters * * * ★ --
Clusterl
Total Branches 
Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters
Clusterl --
Cluster2 n.s --
Cluster3 * ★ —  _
Cluster4 n.s n.s * --
Clusters n.s n.s * n.s --
* - significant difference between groups at .05 level
n.s. - no significant difference between groups
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Schweiger, and Sandberg, 1994) . Discriminant analysis is 
an appropriate statistical technique for testing the 
hypothesis that group means of multiple groups are equal 
(Hair et al., 1992). The results of a canonical 
discriminant analysis using the SAS DISC procedure are 
shown in Table 7. A sample of 1290 banks, approximately 
75% of the total sample, was used to calculate the 
discriminant functions. The number of discriminant 
functions necessary for a five group discriminant analysis 
is four. Each discriminant function is a linear composite 
that attempts to explain the variations or differences in 
the dependent categorical variables (Hair et al., 1992).
The highly significant F values associated with each 
discriminant function in Table 7 allow us to reject the 
null hypothesis that the canonical correlations equal zero. 
In other words, each linear combination of strategy 
variables explains a significant amount of the variance 
between the clusters. In addition, the discriminant 
function accurately classified 91.4% of the 432 firms from 
the holdout sample into the correct cluster. Thus, taken 
as a whole, the strategy variables do a good job of 
explaining the variance in the clusters, confirming the 
adequacy of the five cluster solution.
In summary, the statistical tests applied above all 
point to an adequate cluster solution. The strategy 
variables exhibit significant differences across the five
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Table 7. Results of Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Function
Eigen­
value
Canonical
Correlation
Approximate
F Pr > F
1 2.296 .8346 254.59 .0001
2 2.046 .8196 242.04 .0001
3 1.280 .7493 214.99 .0001
4 .994 .7060 212.42 .0001
clusters when tested with both univariate and multivariate 
techniques. Thus the cluster analysis was apparently 
successful at separating the groups in a manner that 
maximized between group and minimized within group 
variance.
Interpreting the Clusters
Cluster interpretation involves an examination of the 
nature of the clusters in order to assign names or labels 
(Hair et al., 1992). Ideally, the clusters should not only 
differ from each other along the strategic dimensions, but 
should exhibit patterns of differences that make sense from 
a judgmental and/or theoretical perspective. The 
interpretation process is typically accomplished by 
inspecting the rank order and absolute values of the 
unstandardized cluster means used in the analysis 
(Harrigan, 1985; Goes, 1989, Smith and Grimm, 1987) . This 
information is found in Table 4. To further aid in the 
analysis, the standardized cluster means for each variable 
were plotted by cluster in Figure 9 (standardized to a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one) . This visual
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1 2 5
image represents an efficient means of communicating the 
strategic patterns for each cluster simultaneously.
A description of each group is as follows:
Cluster 1 - Focused4 Security Investors
Banks in this cluster can be characterized as being 
rather narrowly focused security investors. Security 
investments on average make up nearly half of the 
lending/investment portfolio (47.5%), which is considerably 
higher than that found in the other clusters. An 
inspection of Figure 9 reveals that these banks rank below 
average on all the remaining strategy variables, indicating 
a relatively low reliance on traditional lending areas, as 
well as a low level of dependency on non-traditional 
products and funding sources. Also, with only two branches 
on average, their level of geographic diversity is quite 
low. Because investment securities are typically limited 
to those issued by the U.S. Treasury, and other federal, 
state and local government agencies, this strategy is quite 
conservative. In his examination of success factors in the 
banking industry from 1977 to 1984, Goodman (1988) found a 
number of banks following this strategy. Interestingly, 
since it entails relatively low risk, this strategy was
4The term focused is used here to indicate a firm with 
a relatively narrow scope. Focus was felt to appropriately 
capture the notion of scope for the banking industry since 
most banks participate in a wide variety of lending and 
investment activities, but may emphasize one area over the 
other.
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found to be the most consistently profitable in each year 
and under every environmental circumstance examined.
Guarino (1991) also found a number of banks following this 
strategy, with a move toward security investments 
representing the most common strategic change between 1977 
and 1987. Thus, such a strategy has precedence in the 
literature. Also, given the results of these studies, it 
is not surprising that this cluster is one of the largest. 
Cluster 2 - Focused Agricultural Lenders
The banks in cluster 2 stand out for their strong 
emphasis on agricultural lending. On average, these banks 
invested approximately 57% of their investment/loan 
portfolio in agricultural loans. By comparison, the 
remainder of the sample averaged less than 8% of their 
total portfolio in agricultural loans. As with the cluster 
1 members, these banks were rather highly concentrated in a 
single segment, and ranked below average in all other 
strategic categories. Thus they rely relatively little on 
other lending activities, and are highly traditional when 
it comes to new products and funding sources. These banks 
are geographically concentrated, and not surprisingly, are 
the smallest in size (Average assets of $21.9 million).
Once again, Goodman (1988) found banks following this 
strategy in his sample, although he concluded that the more 
successful ones moved away from this strategy following a 
decline in the agricultural economy in 1979. This is
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consistent with the relatively small membership found in 
this cluster.
Cluster 3 - Generalists
Cluster 3 banks stand out primarily for assuming a 
broad based, diversified strategy, or what organization 
theorists refer to as a generalist strategy (Aldrich, 1979; 
Zammuto and Cameron, 1985). The LPD index of .71 (maximum 
is . 80)5 indicates an equal balance within the 
lending/investment portfolio. Although no single portfolio 
item stands out, these banks are involved in retail and 
commercial lending, and investments to a greater extent 
than the average banks in other clusters. The only 
lending/investment category that they are not heavily 
involved in is agricultural loans. These banks also invest 
quite heavily in non-traditional products and funding 
sources. They are ranked first in the areas of leasing and 
credit cards, with 81.5% and 92.6% of firms in the cluster 
offering these services, respectively. The relatively low 
deposit to asset ratio, suggests a reliance on alternative 
funding sources. One of the most striking features of this 
cluster, is its high level of geographic diversity. On
sLoan portfolio diversity, or LPD, is calculated as 
follows:
LPD = 1 - E(RET2 + COMM2 + AG2 + RE2 + INV2) . In an equally 
balanced portfolio, each portfolio category equals .20, 
resulting in an LPD of .80.
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average, the banks following this strategy have over 49 
branches.
Generalists appear to fit the description of 
relatively large regional banks. Regional banks are more 
likely to have the resources necessary to compete 
successfully in multiple markets simultaneously. In fact, 
some have argued the necessity of such banks to diversify 
and move into non-traditional services (Crane and Eccles, 
1987) . These banks are significantly larger than those in 
the remaining clusters, with average assets of $2.1 
billion.
Cluster 4 - Focused Retailers
Banks in this cluster rank first in the categories of 
retail loans (loans to individuals) and real estate loans. 
This pattern is often characterized as a retail 
orientation (Passmore, 1985). On average, 43% of their 
lending/investment portfolio is in real estate loans and 
24% is in loans to individuals. Banks in this cluster are 
below average in other lending/investment categories, and 
are not heavily involved in non-traditional products or 
funding sources. They rank first in deposits/assets, 
indicating a somewhat stronger than average reliance on 
traditional deposits. Because deposits from individuals 
are traditionally thought to be a more stable source of 
funds than commercial deposits, these banks probably have 
less need for non-traditional sources. In keeping with
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this logic, they also rank last in large certificates of 
deposit (over $100,000) as a percentage of deposits. Thus 
the patterns demonstrated by the strategic variables all 
point consistently toward a retail orientation.
Classification of banks as either retail or wholesale 
oriented is quite common in the literature (Reger, Duhaime 
and Stimpert, 1992; Passmore, 1985). Retail banks deal 
predominantly with individuals and small businesses, while 
wholesale banks borrow from and lend to, large corporate 
accounts. Passmore (1985) clustered a relatively small 
number of regional and multinational banks on lending and 
deposit categories, and found that they fell into retail 
and wholesale clusters.
Cluster 5 - Generalist Wholesalers
Banks in this cluster were a little more difficult to 
characterize. The overall pattern suggested a wholesale 
orientation; i.e., they ranked first in commercial loans, 
first in fee income, and first in large C.D.'s as a 
percentage of deposits. A larger degree of fee income is 
consistent with a wholesale orientation, as corporate 
customers are more likely to purchase non-credit services 
such as cash management accounts and wire transfers (Crane 
and Eccles, 1987). Also, corporate deposits are likely to 
be less stable, so it is logical that there is a greater 
reliance on "bought money"; i.e., large C.D.'s. However, 
it was also noted that these banks displayed a broader
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focus than the other focused clusters. On average, 
commercial loans made up 33.8% of the lending/investment 
portfolio, but these banks also invested rather heavily in 
real estate loans (24.5%) and loans to individuals (21.5%). 
In addition, they participated heavily in other less 
traditional products, such as credit cards (53.2%) and 
leasing (24.8%). In general, these banks seem to take on a 
wholesale orientation; i.e., catering to businesses, but 
remain rather heavily involved in a number of different 
activities. Thus, they are characterized as generalist 
wholesalers.
Given the uncertain lending environment for wholesale 
bankers in the early 1980's, high interest rates and an 
increase in the number of alternate funding sources 
available to businesses, it is perhaps not surprising that 
these banks chose to diversify their risks. This notion is 
supported by Goodman's (1988) finding that banks following 
a focused commercial lending strategy during the early 
1980's were the least profitable.
Summary
The first goal of the cluster analysis was to develop 
a limited set of differentiated and interpretable strategic 
groups. After deleting those strategic variables found to 
be undifferentiated, the cluster analysis yielded five 
distinct strategic configurations: focused security 
investors, focused agricultural lenders, generalists,
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focused retailers, and generalist wholesalers. The 
patterns for these groups are fairly distinctive and were 
easy to interpret. Also, these strategic types are similar 
to those described in the banking literature (Guarino,
1991; Goodman, 1988; Passmore, 1985). Thus, the cluster 
analysis appeared to accomplish its first goal.
The final step in the cluster analysis, was to use the 
clusters to detect and code strategic change. The next 
section details the results of this process and examines 
the patterns of strategic change that occur.
Patterns of Strategic Change
As noted, the above cluster analysis includes two 
observations for each bank in the sample. Banks that fail 
to change strategies will occur twice in the same cluster. 
Those that change strategies will fall into two clusters. 
Table 8 gives a detailed breakdown of the changes that 
occurred in group membership. The columns represent group 
membership in 1985, while the rows represent 1982 
membership. Thus, the diagonal elements in the table 
depict the number of banks that remained in their groups, 
while the off diagonal elements represent changes in group 
membership. Overall, 4 92 firms, or 57% of the sample 
changed strategies, while 389 exhibited no change. These 
results are consistent with those found in previous studies 
that examined change during periods of environmental
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Table 8. Changes in Group Membership and Distances Between Cluster Centroids
1982
Strategies
1
Focused
Investors
2
Focused 
Ag. Lenders
1985 Strategies 
3
Generalists
4
Focused
Retailers
5
Generalist
Wholesalers
1982
Total
1
Focused
Investors 51 0 l 3 8 63
(distance)
O (--)
(3.54) (5.39) (2.65) (3.01)
Focused Ag.
Lenders 117 16 0 5 3 141
(distance) (3.54) (--) (6.71) (3.68) (4.29)
j
Generalists 1 0 20 1 1 23
(distance) (5.39) (6.71) (--) (5.51) (5.02)
•*
Focused
Retailers 230 0 6 130 36 402
(distance) (2.65) (3.68) (5.51) (--) (2.49)
Generalist
Wholesalers 53 0 4 23 152 232
(distance) (3.01) (4.29) (5.02) (2.49) (--)
1985 Total 452 16 31 162 200 861
Total entered 401 0 11 32 48
Total exited 12 125 3 272 80
Total Number of Changes = 492 Total Number of Non-Changes = 369 HWto
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upheaval. Thus, as expected, change was a rather common 
occurrence in the banking industry during this time period.
As can be seen, there was a strong movement away from 
the agricultural lending (cluster 2) and retail strategies 
(cluster 4), toward securities investment (cluster 1). In 
fact over half the 1985 sample of banks (53.5%) followed an 
investment strategy, compared to 7.3% that followed this 
strategy in 1982. In contrast, a meager 1.8% followed an 
agricultural strategy and 18.8% followed a retail strategy 
in 1985, compared to 16.4% and 46.7%, respectively, in 
1982. Generalists (cluster 3) and wholesaling generalists 
(cluster 5) experienced less drastic changes in group 
membership.
A total of 125 (88.6%) focused agricultural lenders 
changed their strategies, with 117 of these changing to an 
investment focus. 272 (67.6%) of the retailers 
changedstrategies, 23 0 of which changed to an investment 
focus. Eighty banks (34.5%) in the generalist wholesaler 
group changed strategies, with the majority switching to an 
investment strategy. However, 48 banks also switched to a 
generalist wholesale strategy, mostly from the focused 
retail strategy.
Two things are particularly interesting about the 
patterns of change that occured. First, the notion of 
centroid distances acting as surrogate for mobility 
barriers seems to be borne out by the changes noted. Table
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9 presents a comparison of centroid distances and number of 
changes. As can be seen, the number of changes decreases 
dramatically as the distance scores increase.
Table 9. Centroid Distances 
and Strategic Change
Centroid Number of
Distance Changes
2.49 59
2.65 233
3 .01 61
3 .54 117
3.68 5
4.29 3
5.02 5
5.39 2
5.51 7
6.71 0
To test this, the firms were classified into three groups: 
those making slight changes (centroid distance less than 
3.0; n=292), those making moderate changes (centroid 
distance greater than 3.0 but less than 4.0; n=183), and 
those making extreme changes (centroid distance greater 
than 4.0; n=17). A chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated that these frequencies were significantly 
different from an even distribution (chi-square = 358.8,
p<.001).
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Second, it is interesting to note that strategic 
change was quite common among the more focused groups, 
apparently as their niches became less accommodating 
following deregulation. Goodman (1988) noted that retail 
and agricultural lenders were among the least profitable in 
1983, which he attributed to the recession occurring at 
that time, combined with a particularly strong decline in 
the agricultural economy. The move toward an investment 
strategy may reflect either a desire to adopt a more 
conservative strategy during this turbulent time, or simply 
a lack of suitable lending opportunities available in their 
relevant markets. On the other hand, the generalists in 
clusters 3 and 5 were apparently in a better position to 
deal with the changes, due to their diversity. This is 
consistent with the population ecology argument that 
generalists tend to be better suited than specialists to 
conditions of "coarse grained" environmental change. In 
general, the patterns of change noted seem to make sense 
from both a theoretical and historical perspective.
The change patterns noted above are similar to those 
found by Guarino (1991). He examined changes in portfolio 
patterns between 1978 and 1987 and found that there was a 
general movement away from agricultural and retail loans, 
toward investments. Although he did not measure scope, per 
se, he found that larger banks exhibited less change.
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Medium and large commercial lenders (wholesalers) exhibited 
very little change.
Summary
An examination of the changes and change patterns 
yielded some interesting insights. First, it was noted 
that strategic change was not an uncommon event, and the 
frequency with which it occurred during the time of this 
study is consistent with that found in other studies. 
Second, the patterns of change were non-random and seemed 
to make sense from both a theoretical and historical 
perspective. Finally, the patterns noted, are similar to 
those found in the study by Guarino (1991). Thus, the 
results of the cluster analysis and the changes identified 
seem to provide valid data for testing the hypotheses.
Testing Change Antecedents
This section examines the impact of certain variables 
that are thought to inhibit or encourage change efforts. 
Hypotheses one and three suggested that low or declining 
performance and a lack of slack resources will prompt 
organizations to change strategies. Furthermore, it was 
suggested that lower levels of performance and slack will 
induce greater magnitudes of change. Hypotheses five and 
seven argue that inertial forces associated with age and 
size will inhibit change efforts. That is, the greater the 
size and the older the organization, the lower the 
magnitude of change.
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The above hypotheses were tested with a multiple 
regression model, using the SAS REG procedure. Table 10 
presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations 
among the independent variables. The results of the 
regression are summarized in Table 11, which contains 
standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, as 
well as the standard errors and t-statistics.
Discussion of the outcomes will proceed in three 
steps. First, the overall model will be evaluated for its 
significance and appropriateness. Second, the results of 
the analyses will be discussed in terms of their 
implications for the hypotheses. Finally, the results will 
be summarized and discussed.
Evaluating the Model
Before estimating the model, each of the variables 
were assessed for normality. Although normality of the 
independent variables is not an assumption of regression 
(Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973), Hair et al. (1992) suggest 
that they be assessed and, if necessary, subjected to 
transformations to improve normality. The SAS Univariate 
procedure was used to produce normal probability plots, box 
plots, and the Shapiro-Wilkes statistic. Only three of the 
eleven variables passed the Shapiro-Wilkes test, although 
many of the variables did not appear to depart drastically 
from normality. Log transformations significantly improved
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Table 10. Correlations Among Independent Variables - Full Sample
ROABEF ROACHBEF EFFBEF EFCHBEF CHLNASBE SLACKBEF ASCAPBEF LAGE82 LASSET82! HOLDC UNEMP85
ROABEF 1.00000
0.0
ROACHBEF -0.05698
0.0951
1.00000
0.0
EFFBEF -0.15865
0.0001
-0.10629
0.0018
1.00000
0.0
EFCHBEF -0.14944
0.0001
0.08455
0.0132
-0.85139
0.0001
1.00000
0.0
CHLNASBE -0.07324
0.0319
0.20369
0.0001
-0.14570
0.0001
0.17311
0.0001
1.00000
0.0
SLACKBEF 0.00849
0.8037
-0.01465
0.6681
0.02804
0.4118
0.00179
0.9582
0.03094 
0.3651
1.00000
0.0
ASCAPBEF -0.41338 
0.0001
-0.02543
0.4567
0.22521
0.0001
-0.12295
0.0003
0.03072 
0.3684
0.06154
0.0714
1.00000
0.0
LAGE82 0.23483
0.0001
-0.14512
0.0001
-0.00873
0.7982
-0.13336
0.0001
-0.24483 
0.0001
-0.08311
0.0148
0.03180
0.3520
1.00000
0.0
LASSET82 -0.04704
0.1684
-0.03601
0.2918
0.00977
0.7749
-0.02759
0.4193
0.00371 
0.9136
0.31402
0.0001
0.41187
0.0001
0.09598
0.0049
1.00000
0.0
HOLDC 0.06538
0.0554
0.03585
0.2939
-0.01726
0.6135
-0.02888
0.3980
0.13378
0.0001
-0.00796
0.8157
0.26008
0.0001
-0.02378
0.4863
0.26535
0.0001
1.00000
0.0
UNEMP85 -0.10013
0.0033
-0.04643
0.1745
0.00511
0.8813
0.01190 
0 .7280
-0.12440
0.0003
0.06424 - 
0.0602
-0.00995
0.7712
-0.00901
0.7921
0.20234 - 
0.0001
0.14301
0.0001
1.00000
0.0
Mean 
St. Dev.
1.086
.674
- .042 
.411
.592
.328
.023
.463
-.958
3.95
.143
.205
12.23
2.94
3.78
.944
10.41
1.12
.458
.498
7.38
1.72
1
3
8
1 3 9
Table 11. Results of Regression Analysis for Degree of 
Change_________________________________________________
Variable
Unstandardized
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Error t-statistic Beta
ROA .021 .099 .208 .014
ROACH -.051 .119 -.427 -.021
EFF - .374 .435 -.859 -.123
EFFCH - .218 .296 -.736 -.101
CHLNAS -.031 .013 -2.371 ** -.122
LIQUID -1.975 .247 -8.006 *** - .406
ASCAP -.050 .021 -2.404 ** - .148
LAGE .353 .055 6.424 *** .333
LASSET -.151 .053 -2.873 *** - .170
HOLDC .058 .105 - .550 -.029
UNEMP -.043 .029 -1.467 - .073
Intercept 3.36 .645 5 .208 1.71
R2 = .2060 F = 19.925 N = 857
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
the distribution of the size and age variables, and these 
transformations were retained for the analysis.
The overall model was highly significant, with an F 
value of 19.925, and it explained slightly over 20% of the 
variance in the dependent variable (R2 = .206) . Four of 
the prior performance measures and the control variables
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were not significant. A separate regression model, 
estimated without the control variables produced almost 
identical results and is not reproduced here. Four 
observations were dropped from the analysis due tomissing 
variables, resulting in a sample size of 857.
The major assumptions of regression are: 1) the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables is 
linear, 2) constant variance of the error terms 
(homoscedasticity), 3) independence of error terms (auto­
correlation) , and 4) normal distribution of error terms 
(Hair, et al., 1992). Other important items that can 
distort results are multicollinearity and outlying 
observations.
The most commonly used tool for detecting non- 
linearity and unequal variances (heteroscedasticity) is the 
analysis of residuals (Lewis-Beck, 1980; Hair et al.,
1992). This technique involves the visual inspection of 
partial residual plots. A healthy plot will exhibit no 
pattern; i.e., the points will be scattered randomly. 
Nonlinear relationships can be indicated by a curvilinear 
pattern to the residuals, and heteroscedasticity is 
revealed by fan or diamond shaped patterns in the 
residuals.
An inspection of the partial residual plots revealed 
no curvilinear patterns nor the typical patterns associated 
with unequal variance. Therefore, it was concluded that
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the linearity and equal variance assumptions were 
adequately met.
The independence of error terms was evaluated using 
the Durbin-Watson d statistic. This statistic is commonly 
used to test for the existence of a first order 
autoregressive process (Freund and Littell, 1986). The 
value of the d statistic was 1.705. According to the table 
for this statistic, a value less than 1.561 (for n=200- 
maximum in the table, k=ll) indicates the existence of a 
first order autocorrelation at a significance level of .01. 
Since the value of d for the model exceeds this value, the 
test suggests that the assumption of independent terms has 
been met.
Normality of the error term was evaluated using a 
normal probability plot, histogram, and Shapiro-Wilkes 
statistic generated by the SAS Univariate procedure. The 
Shapiro-Wilkes test suggested a lack of normality among 
residuals. Examination of the histogram revealed a clear 
bi-modal distribution, with the sample fairly evenly split. 
This split was also observed in a visual examination of the 
residual plots, where the observations were noted to 
cluster in two groups. Careful examination of the data 
revealed that this split was quite clearly between the 
banks that changed and failed to change strategies. Thus, 
although the data was measured on a continuous scale of 
distance between clusters, the outcome was a fairly
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distinct grouping into two categories, change and no­
change. Cohen and Cohen (1983) note that the result of 
this type of analysis, which is in effect a biserial 
correlation, must be interpreted with caution. The 
relationships suggested by a regression analysis are 
hypothetical correlations, that could be obtained if the 
categorical variable were in fact continuous. They suggest 
that the significance of a bivariate biserial correlation 
be confirmed by a t test on the difference between the 
means. The multivariate equivalent would be to perform a 
discriminant or logit model. Therefore, the observations 
were coded as change or no change, and evaluated using a 
logit model. The results are very similar to the 
regression model (see Appendix A). The variables that are 
significant in the regression model remain significant in 
the logit model, and the parameter estimates are all in the 
same direction. Thus, the validity of the model is 
confirmed, despite this deviation from normality.
Two other problems that can distort regression results 
are multicollinearity and outlying observations. An 
examination of the correlation matrix for the independent 
variables (Table 10), reveals a potential collinearity 
problem due to the high correlations between the efficiency 
and change in efficiency variables (.85). To further 
assess multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF), and its inverse, the tolerance value, were
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calculated. Although an exact threshold value of the VIF 
is not available, values considerably larger than one 
indicate serious multicollinearity problems (Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989). Hair et al. (1992) suggest a 
cutoff value of 10 for the VIF value and a corresponding 
value of .10 for the tolerance value. Once again, the 
efficiency and change in efficiency variables were 
identified as potential problems, with VIF scores of 8.39 
and 8.44, respectively. To evaluate the impact of these 
variables, two additional regression models were estimated, 
one deleting the efficiency variable and the other deleting 
the change in efficiency variable. Each of these reduced 
models produced almost identical results to the full model 
(see Appendix B), therefore a decision was made to leave 
the variables in the model.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the residual 
plots, was a large number of obvious outlying observations. 
Approximately 20 observations were identified as outliers, 
based on their studentized residuals exceeding a value of 
2. Each of these observations was examined carefully for 
coding or input errors but none were detected. Although 
outlying observations can significantly impact a regression 
model, most authors suggest that their exclusion be based 
on pressing practical (errors) or theoretical reasons 
(Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989). Since neither of 
these reasons existed, the observations were retained.
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Summary of Model Evaluation
The initial regression model proved to be robust, 
despite some potential problems identified with non­
normality of the error terms, and multicollinearity. The 
bi-modal distribution apparently had little impact on the 
regression results, as confirmed by the similar results 
obtained with the logit model. However, as noted by Cohen 
and Cohen (1983), the limited distribution of the data 
means that the results of the regression must be 
interpreted with caution. In effect the results may be 
more indicative of a change/no change relationship, rather 
than a degree of change relationship. Also, the 
collinearity associated with the two efficiency variables 
proved to have no substantial impact on the model.
Although a number of outliers were identified, they were 
retained in the model as there existed no practical or 
theoretical reason for removing them.
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicts that organizational performance 
will be negatively related to degree of change. That is, 
organizations experiencing low or declining performance 
will be more motivated to make large scale changes. The 
model contained five measures of performance intended to 
correspond with overall financial performance (ROA and 
change in ROA), efficiency (efficiency ratio and change in 
efficiency ratio), and effectiveness (Change in loans to
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assets) . Table 11, demonstrates mixed support for the 
first hypothesis. One of the performance variables, change 
in loans to assets (Chinas), was significantly related to 
degree of change. The negative relationship suggests that 
organizations experiencing declining loan portfolios were 
more likely to make strategic changes. Most of the 
remaining performance variables were negatively related to 
change, but were not significant. The overall evidence 
suggests that a decline in effectiveness, or strategic 
performance, is a strong force for change, but efficiency 
and overall financial performance are not.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that slack resources will be 
positively related to degree of change. In other words, 
higher levels of slack resources will tend to encourage 
major changes. Two measures of slack resources were used, 
the liquidity ratio (LIQUID) and assets to capital (ASCAP). 
When interpreting the regression coefficients, it is 
important to note that Ascap is inversely related to 
liquidity. That is, high levels of ASCAP indicate 
relatively low levels of capital. As can be seen in Table 
11, the regression model provided mixed support for 
hypothesis 3. The liquidity ratio, which is the banking 
equivalent to a current ratio, was strongly and negatively 
related to degree of change. Banks with low levels of 
liquid assets, (cash, readily converted investments, and 
net fed funds loans), were more likely to make major
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changes in strategy than those with high levels of liquid 
assets. On the other hand, banks with relatively high 
levels of capital (low ASCAP) were significantly more 
likely to make major strategic changes than those with low 
levels of capital.
The negative relationship between liquid resources and 
change fails to support hypothesis 3 and on the surface 
seems to lend credence to the buffering arguments of 
Starbuck and others (1988). That is, high levels slack may 
serve to dull the organization's senses and discourage 
change efforts. On the other hand, the positive 
relationship between capital resources and change, supports 
hypothesis 3, and indicates that slack resources in the 
form of capital, encourage change and experimentation 
(Bourgeois, 1981). Apparently, those banks with a larger 
capital base were more likely to take risks and incur the 
expenses associated with change. On the other hand, banks 
with higher levels of liquid resources were less willing to 
make changes. These finding are interesting and suggest 
the need to delve further into the relationship between 
slack and change, and perhaps to further explore the 
definitional and measurement issues surrounding the slack 
construct itself.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that organizational age will be 
negatively related to degree of change. Table 11 reveals 
that age and degree of change were significantly related,
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but in the opposite direction from that predicted. Contrary 
to predictions, older organizations were significantly more 
likely to make changes in their strategy than younger 
organizations. Because this finding was both unexpected 
and difficult to explain, additional analysis was performed 
to rule out alternate explanations. First, since the 
argument concerning age was based on the concept of 
inertia, it was reasoned that inertia and age are not 
likely to be related in a continuous manner. If inertial 
forces increase with age, there may be some point 
relatively early in the life of an organization when 
inertia becomes a relatively fixed feature. To test this 
notion, age was dichotomized at five years, and the 
regression model was re-estimated with age as a dummy 
variable. This analysis produced very similar results, 
i.e., age remained positively related to change.
It was also reasoned that an organization's original 
strategy may be highly correlated with age, and that the 
observed relationship could be spurious. That is, change 
may be dictated primarily by the original strategy, with 
age being indirectly related by its correlation to cluster 
membership. To test for this, a separate regression model 
was estimated and original cluster membership was 
introduced as a control variable. This analysis produced
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even stronger results for age6. These results confirmed 
the original outcome, and suggested a particularly strong 
relationship between age and degree of change. The 
implications of these findings will be explored more 
thoroughly in the discussion section.
Hypothesis 7 predicts that organizational size will be 
negatively related to degree of change. Table 11 reveals 
that assets (LASSET) are significantly related to degree of 
change in the predicted direction. Thus, large 
organizations were found to be less likely to change 
strategies than small organizations. This is consistent 
with the notion that smaller organizations tend to be more 
flexible and less subject to inertial forces than larger 
organizations. However, it is important to note that this 
relationship could be spurious. When original strategies 
(clusters) are entered into the equation, size becomes 
insignificant. Because the patterns of change noted in the 
cluster analysis were strongly suggestive of a relationship 
between strategy and change, and since size was noted to be 
related to strategy, it is assumed that the changes were 
driven by strategy, and that the size-change relationship 
is spurious.
6Since this explanation could apply to any of these 
results, it is worth noting that controlling for group 
membership produced very similar results for most of the 
variables. The only exception was size. The implication of 
this outcome will be further discussed in the following 
section.
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Discussion
In summary, the evidence supporting the relationships 
between performance, slack, size, and age on degree of 
change is mixed. A decline in effectiveness, as measured 
by a drop in loans, was found to be a significant predictor 
of change. The two measures of slack were also found to 
significantly predict change, but in opposite directions. 
High levels of liquidity apparently serve to buffer the 
organization, while high levels of capital seemed to 
encourage change. Organizational age was also a 
significant predictor, but in the opposite direction than 
predicted, and size was not a significant predictor, when 
original strategies were controlled.
The findings concerning slack resources and age were 
both interesting. When measured in terms of liquidity, 
slack exhibited a negative relationship to change. This 
can be explained using the notion of environmental 
buffering, however, alternative explanations may be even 
more plausible. For example, high levels of liquidity may 
also be indicative of an organization's overall disposition 
toward risk. This is particularly true in the banking 
industry, where liquid assets offer clearly lower returns, 
but lower risk. Thus, the findings concerning liquidity 
and change may be tapping the related construct of risk 
disposition. High levels of liquid resources indicate risk
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aversion, which also is consistent with an unwillingness to 
make changes.
On the other hand, when measured as capital, slack 
resources were positively related to change. Excess 
capital and loan loss reserves serve as a primary lines of 
defense against loan losses. Moving into less familiar 
lending markets or niches is apparently made much easier 
when there is a cushion available to absorb possible 
mistakes. This is consistent with the notion that slack 
resources encourage change and experimentation (Bourgeois, 
1981; Cyert and March, 1963).
The robust findings concerning the relationship 
between age and change, suggest that the inertial arguments 
proposed by the selection theorists may need revision. 
Rather than becoming more inert, older organizations, at 
least in the banking industry, apparently become more 
flexible and willing to make changes. The population 
ecologists note that certain routines and skills become 
embedded in organizations over time (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). This notion of organizations continuing in a set of 
established routines is part of the reasoning behind the 
inertia argument. Established routines are said to 
increase the organizations' level of accountability and 
reliability, and thus have survival value. Supposedly, the 
price to pay for this, is a reduction in flexibility. 
However, something that this position fails to consider is
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that flexibility and the ability to learn are also 
organizational skills that can enhance survival. It also 
makes sense that these abilities are acquired over time, as 
the organization experiences and overcomes environmental or 
internal upheavals. Thus, one argument consistent with the 
above findings, is that organizations learn, and become 
more adept at reacting to their environments over time. 
Therefore, it perhaps should not be as surprising as theory 
would lead us to believe, that age is positively correlated 
with change.
Another interesting finding was that size became 
insignificant when the original strategies were entered 
into the regression equation. Since certain patterns of 
change were noted to occur relative to the scope of the 
organization, this suggests that strategy rather than size 
may be the driving force behind strategic change. Given 
the amount of attention and research that has been placed 
on the size/inertia argument, this finding could be quite 
meaningful and certainly suggests the need for further 
research.
The picture that emerges from these findings is that 
certain adaptive forces, such as slack resources and a 
decline in effectiveness encourage strategic change. Age, 
which was thought to represent an inertial force, instead 
was positively related to change. The only factor found to 
inhibit strategic change was excess liquidity. Although
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this may be explained with the buffering argument, an 
equally plausible explanation is that it represents an 
overall bias toward risk aversion. Finally, an interesting 
finding was that strategy also seemed to be a significant 
predictor of change.
Testing the Strategic Change/Performance Relationship 
This section tests those hypotheses regarding factors 
that are thought to moderate the relationship between 
organizational change and performance. Hypothesis 2 
contends that performance prior to the change will 
significantly impact change outcomes. Specifically, 
organizations exhibiting low or declining performance prior 
to the change are argued to benefit more from the change 
than those exhibiting higher or increasing performance. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that slack resources will have a 
positive impact on performance for all firms, but they will 
be significantly more important for firms that choose to 
change strategies. Hypotheses 5 and 8 predict that 
inertial forces associated with size and age will have a 
negative impact on performance for firms that change 
strategies, but have certain benefits that are likely to 
have a positive relationship to performance for firms that 
fail to change strategies. Finally, hypothesis 10 proposes 
that degree of change will be positively related to 
performance.
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All hypotheses except degree of change were tested 
with a series of multiple regression and hierarchical 
regression models. Tables 12 and 13 present separate 
means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 
independent variables for the change and no-change samples. 
The multiple regression results are summarized in Tables 
14, 15, and 16, which contain standardized and 
unstandardized regression coefficients, as well as the 
standard errors and t-statistics for the three different 
performance outcomes. Hierarchical regression results are 
presented in Tables 17, 18, and 19. The hierarchical 
regression models were estimated for each moderator to test 
for an interaction effect. The significance of an 
interaction is that the regression lines determined 
separately in the change and no-change groups have 
significantly different slopes, hence performance outcomes 
depend on the level of those variables. The multiple 
regression models tested the basic direction of the 
hypothesized relationships. It is important to note that 
it is not necessary for the main effects (those in the 
multiple regression model) to achieve significance in order 
to interpret the interaction term (Baron and Kenny, 1986; 
Bedeian and Mossholder, 1994) . Thus, the main test for 
moderation will consist of the significance of the 
interaction term, with the multiple regression results 
providing evidence as to the direction of the relationship.
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Table 12, Correlations Among Independent Variables - Firms that Changed Strategies
____________ROABEF ROACHBEF EFFBEF EFCHBEF CHLNASBE SLACKBEF ASCAPBEF LAGE82 LASSET82 HOLDC UNEMP85
ROABEF 1.00000
0.0
o ROACHBEF -0.09423 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
CD
0.0409 0 . 0
O('—'i EFFBEF -0.48639 -0.08460 1 . 0 0 0 0 0u
■o*<
0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0666 0 . 0
-5
ca EFCHBEF -0.14140 0.07181 -0.56511 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 2 1 0.1196 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0
O
s CHLNASBE -0.12842 0.13591 0.03647 0.11843 1 . 0 0 0 0 03
CD 0.0053 0.0031 0.4298 0 . 0 1 0 1 0 . 0
T| SLACKBEF 0.05136 -0.07610 -0.02008 0.11321 0.06724 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
C 0.2660 0.0990 0.6638 0.0140 0.1451 0 . 0
CD ASCAPBEF -0.49421 0.02406 0.34304 -0.10962 0.06159 0.01752 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
— iCD
0 . 0 0 0 1 0.6025 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0173 0.1821 0.7046 0 . 0
■o
('—'i LAGE82 0.23084 -0.09085 -0.10846 -0.20900 -0.21904 -0.13247 -0.05749 1 . 0 0 0 0 0u
Q.
c
0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0488 0.0185 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0040 0.2130 0 . 0
a LASSET82 -0.10485 -0.03351 -0.01590 -0.01493 0.04258 0.23728 0.32628 0.04206 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
O
3 0.0229 0.4681 0.7307 0.7466 0.3566 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.3625 0 . 0
■o
o HOLDC 0.04264 0.00760 -0.11330 0.03910 0.10533 -0.07756 0.19047 0.03141 0.12678 1.00000
3^
O'
0.3558 0.8693 0.0139 0.3972 0 . 0 2 2 2 0.0927 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.4965 0.0059 0 . 0
l-H
CD UNEMP8 5 0.12283 -0.05007 -0.02371 0.07477 -0.14400 0.00434 -0.07037 -0.03161 0.23149 -0.24705
Q. 0.0076 0.2782 0.6078 0.1051 0.0017 0.9252 0.1272 0.4937 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1
$
l-H
3" Mean 1.158 - .056 .577 .013 -1.532 .076 11.785 3.983 10.169 .397
O
c St. Dev. .626 .406 .170 . 195 3.634 .191 2.798 .731 .889 .489
1.00000
0.0
7.346
1.699
U1
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Table 13. Correlations Among Independent Variables - No-Change Sample. n=326
ROABEF ROACHBEF EFFBEF EFCHBEF CHLNASBE SLACKBEF ASCAPBEF LAGE82 LASSET82 HOLDC UNEMP85
ROABEF 1.00000
0.0
ROACHBEF 0.05247
0.3450
1.00000 
0.0
EFFBEF -0.52336
0.0001
-0.12037
0.0298
1.00000
0.0
EFCHBEF 0.07773
0.1614
-0.00446
0.9360
-0.47511
0.0001
1.00000
0.0
CHLNASBE 0.09117
0.1003
0.26683
0.0001
-0.20334
0.0002
0.07989
0.1501
1.00000
0.0
SLACKBEF 0.10164
0.0668
0.01846
0.7398
-0.00966
0.8621
-0.08932
0.1075
-0.14741
0.0077
1.00000
0.0
ASCAPBEF -0.41056
0.0001
-0.05965
0.2829
0.15200
0.0060
-0.06316
0.2554
-0.01603
0.7731
-0.04503
0.4177
1.00000
0.0
LAGE82 0.12572
0.0232
-0.17460 
0.0016
-0.17958
0.0011
0.10265
0.0641
-0.17258
0.0018
0.15296
0.0056
0.20114
0.0003
1.00000
0.0
LASSET82 0.00352
0.9495
-0.03286
0.5544
-0.06727
0.2258
0.01162
0.8344
-0.06428
0.2471
0.28875
0.0001
0.39069
0.0001
0.23774
0.0001
1.00000
0.0
HOLDC 0.10169
0.0667
0.04780
0.3896
-0.07581
0.1721
-0.01183
0.8315
0.16989
0.0021
-0.04404
0.4281
0.28085
0.0001
0.01200
0.8291
0.33036
0.0001
1.00000
0.0
UNEMP85 -0.09566
0.0856
-0.06322
0.2565
0.02162
0.6982
-0.00501
0.9284
-0.12119
0.0292
0.09082
0.1027
0.05901
0.2896
0.03140
0.5734
0.20994
0.0001
-0.01716
0.7584
1.00000 
0.0
Mean 
St. Dev.
1.021
.554
-.037
.382
.633
.238
.000
.187
- .469 
4.014
.229 12.753 
.196 2.938
3.568
1.078
10.713
1.262
.512
.501
7.483
1.759
H
in
in
155
156
Table 14. Results of Regression Analysis for Change in
ROA (PROA)_____________________
Variable
Uns tandardi zed 
Regression Standard 
Coefficient Error t-statistic Beta
Chancre in Stratecrv
ROA -.646 .082 _ _ _ M««« -7.907 -.401
ROACH .227 .104 2.178” .091
LIQUID - .299 .233 -1.282 - .056
ASCAP - .012 .019 -.624 - .033
LAGE .127 .060 2.111” .092
LASSET .118 .055 2.155” . 170
HOLDC - .222 .092 -2.423“ -.104
UNEMP .045 .027 1.660’ .045
Intercept -1.471 .555 -2.648*** -.241
R2 = .2087 F = 15.233*'* N ;= 471
No-Chancre in Stratecrv
ROA -.940 .141 -6.643“* -.408
ROACH .465 .174 2.670*** .139
LIQUID .575 .359 1.601 .088
ASCAP - .044 .029 -1.508 - . 100
LAGE .213 .066 3 .220*” .180
LASSET .060 .064 .935 .060
HOLDC - .196 .146 -1.341 - .154
UNEMP .001 .038 .969 .001
Intercept - .499 .649 -.768 .001
R2 = .1782 F=8.536*** N=323
* p < .10
** p < .05 
*** p < .01
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Table 15. Results of Regression Analysis for Change in
Efficiency_______________________________________________
Variable
Unstandardized
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Error t-statistic Beta
Chancre in Stratecrv
EFF -.272 .174 -1.561 -.567
EFCH .448 .144 3 .105’*’ .934
LIQUID .019 .119 .160 .008
ASCAP -.001 .009 -.156 -.008
LAGE .014 .031 .458 .022
LASSET - .016 .028 - .570 -.030
HOLDC .076 .047 1.597 .159
UNEMP .002 .013 .206 .006
Intercept .198 .307 .646 .209
R2 = .0717 F = 4.462'** N = 471
No-Chance in Stratecrv
EFF -.453 1.812 -2.503** - .232
EFCH .404 .166 2.433’** .163
LIQUID - .027 .129 - .213 -.012
ASCAP .000 .009 .032 . 002
LAGE - .068 .023 _ _ _ •••-2 .979 - .160
LASSET -.001 .023 - .037 -.002
HOLDC -.013 .051 - .248 -.027
UNEMP .001 .013 .080 -.002
Intercept .592 .253 2.336" .007
R2 = .1177 F = 5.252*** N = 324
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Table 15. Results of Regression Analysis for Change in
Loans/Assets_____________________________________________
Variable
Uns tandardi zed 
Regression 
Coefficient
Standard
Error t-statistic Beta
Chancre in Stratecrv
CHLNASBE -.055 .053 -1.040 -.014
LIQUID .370 1.030 .359 .017
ASCAP .029 .072 .404 .020
LAGE -.357 .266 -1.345 -.064
LASSET .647 .243 2.661”' .141
HOLDC -1.129 .406 -2.776'" .001
UNEMP .002 .120 .019 - .276
Intercept -5.650 2.387 -2.367” .085
R2 = .0423 F = 2.924"' N = 471
No-Chancre in Stratecrv
CHLNASBE - .076 .065 -1.162 -.067
LIQUID 1.949 1.368 1.425 .083
ASCAP .145 .095 1.526 .092
LAGE .024 .245 .100 .005
LASSET .319 .243 1.312 .087
HOLDC -2.212 .549 . _  _  _  ••• -4.027 - .479
UNEMP .015 .145 .109 . 003
Intercept -5.094 2.345 -2.173” .216
R2 = .0795 F* 3.900'” N=323
* P < .10
** p < .05
* * * P < .01
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Table 17. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis with
Chance in ROA as the Dependent Variable n=797
Variables Cumulative 
Included R-squared
Uns t andardi zed 
Regression 
Coefficients
F-ratio for 
Individual 
Variables
Change .0035 .1361 2.82’
Change .1362 .2303 9.17’’’
ROA -.6873 121.96"*
Change .1371 .1964 .40
ROA -.7659 53.17*”
Change x ROA .1211 .86
Change .0140 .1416 3 .07
ROACH .2909 8 .44
Change .0140 .1413 3.02’
ROACH .2953 3.29*
Change x ROACH -.0069 .00
Change .0037 .1491 2.93*
LIQUID .0852 .17
Change .0108 .3131 7.99*"
LIQUID .6620 4.33"
Change x Liquid -.9977 5.68’"
Change .0209 .1864 5.23"
ASCAP .0520 14.08’”
Change .0216 -.0712 .04
ASCAP .0402 3.63”
Change x ASCAP .0209 .56
Change .0075 .1031 1.54
LAGE .0794 3.14*
Change .0102 .6183 2.97*
LAGE .1333 5.32"
Change x LAGE -.1349 2 .18
Change .0112 .1871 _  _ . •• 5 .04
LASSET . 0937 6.20"*
Change .0128 -.7003 .77
LASSET .0580 1.39
Change x LASSET . 0853 1.25
p < .10• • _  _p < .05
p < .01
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Table 18. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis with 
Change in Efficiency (EFF) as the Dependent Variable n=797
Variables Cumulative 
Included R-squared
Unstandardized
Regression
Coefficients
F-ratio for 
Individual 
Variables
Change .0050 -.0682 O o •
Change .0954 -.1083 10.84’’*
EFF -.7118 79.34’’*
Change .0970 -.2237 4.76’*
EFF -.7934 56.70”’
Change x EFF .1919 1.41
Change .0645 -.0759 5.24"
EFCH .6052 50.50’’’
Change .0646 -.0756 5.20“
EFCH .6352 21.59’*’
Change x EFCH - .0492 .08
Change .0052 -.0734 4.02**
LIQUID - .0340 .15
Change .0063 -.1005 4.61“
LIQUID -.1291 .92
Change x Liquid .1643 .86
Change .0097 -.0793 5 .26”
ASCAP -.0113 3.73"
Change .0097 -.1185 .62
ASCAP -.0131 2 .16
Change x ASCAP .0032 .07
Change .0070 -.0585 2 .79*
LAGE -.0236 1.56
Change .0102 -.1867 1.52
LAGE -.0370 2 .30
Change x LAGE .0336 .76
Change .0056 -.0743 4 .45“
LASSET -.0111 .49
Change .0056 -.0908 .07
LASSET .0118 .32
Change x LASSET . 0016 .00
p < .10• • _ _p < . 05•** A  •p < .01
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Table 19. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis with
Change in Loans/Assets (CHLNASAF) as the Dependent
Variable n=797__________________________________________
Variables Cumulative 
Included R-squared
Unstandardized
Regression
Coefficients
F-ratio for 
Individual 
Variables
Change .0006 -.2243 .52
Change .0073 - .3226 1.06
CHLNASBE -.0924 5.29“
Change .0092 -.2270 .50
ROA -.1467 6.10*“
Change x CHLNASBE .1000 1.54
Change .0097 .1010 .09
LIQUID 2 .1349 7.29*“
Change .0111 .3756 .79
LIQUID 3 .1001 4.33"
Change x Liquid -1.6711 1.09
Change .0031 -.1519 .23
AS CAP .0749 1.96
Change .0032 .2745 .04
AS CAP .0945 1.35
Change x AS CAP - .0345 .10
Change .0008 -.2502 .61
LAGE .0622 .13
Change .0047 2.0974 2.32
LAGE .3076 1.92
Change x LAGE -.6149 3.07*
Change .0117 .0095 .00
LASSET .4297 8.92*“
Change .0106 -2.9630 .94
LASSET .3102 2.70*
Chance x LASSET .2859 .96* P < .10
P < .05• ••
P < .01
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Since degree of change pertains to organizations that 
change strategies, this hypothesis will be assessed with a 
separate regression equation.
The discussion below will proceed in three stages. 
First the overall adequacy of the models will be assessed. 
Second, the results of the analyses will be examined in 
light of their implications for the hypotheses. Finally, 
the implications of the results will be discussed and 
summarized.
Multiple Regression Models
Tables 14, 15, and 16, present the results of the 
multiple regression analyses for the three different 
performance outcomes. Separate regression equations were 
estimated for banks that changed and did not change, 
resulting in a total of six different equations. Log 
transformations of age and size were used because they 
resulted in a distribution that more closely resembled 
normality. Each model was statistically significant, 
although the R-squared values indicate that the moderators 
did a better job of explaining changes in ROA (R2 = .208 
and .178) than they did for efficiency (R2 = .071 and .118) 
or loans to assets (R2 = .042 and .079). It is worth 
noting, once again, that the significance of main effects 
is irrelevant when testing for moderation (Cohen and Cohen, 
1983; Bedeian and Mossholder, 1994). Thus, the 
significance or lack of significance in the multiple
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regression equations is not a factor in testing the 
hypotheses. However, the directions of the relationships 
are important, since they were specifically predicted.
The pattern of residuals from the partial regression 
plots suggested no significant problems with 
heteroscedasticity or non-linearity. The Durbin-Watson d 
values all indicated no significant problems with auto­
correlation. Normal probability plots, histograms, and the 
Shapiro Wilkes statistic all revealed departure from 
normality for residuals when using change in ROA (DROA) and 
change in efficiency (DEFF). Various transformations 
suggested by Hair et al. (1992) failed to correct this 
problem. A number of researchers have suggested that the 
violation of normality is the least serious of the 
assumption violations, particularly when the sample size is 
large (Lewis-Beck, 1980; Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973). 
Nevertheless, it may suggest caution when interpreting the 
results.
The correlation matrices for the change and no-change 
groups (Tables 12 and 13) revealed similar patterns to 
those observed for the full sample. Despite relatively 
high correlations between efficiency and change in 
efficiency, the VIF and Tol values indicated no problem 
with multicollinearity. As with the previous analysis, 
there appeared to be a significant number of outliers.
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Inspection of the data revealed no coding errors, so the 
outlying observations were retained.
Hierarchical Regression Models
Table 17, 18, and 19 present the results of three sets 
of hierarchical regression models, one for each dependent 
variable. To maximize the chance of detecting a 
significant interaction effect, separate models were used 
for each moderator. A forward selection, model building 
approach found in the SAS REG procedure was used to fit 
three models for each moderator, one containing the change 
variable, one containing the change variable and a 
moderator, and one containing the change variable, the 
moderator, and an interaction term. The test for 
moderation involved testing the significance of the 
increase in variance explained when adding the interaction 
term to the model (indicated by the significance of the F 
ratio in the table).
Each of the hierarchical equations was significant, 
although many researchers do not consider the significance 
of the overall equation to be a requirement to detect 
significant moderation (Bedeian and Mossholder, 1994) . As 
with any model containing an interaction term, the 
hierarchical models appear to suffer from relatively high 
levels of multicollinearity. This suggests that the 
individual regression coefficients should be interpreted 
with caution, however, the F tests of concern in this
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analysis are not affected (Evans, 1991; Hair et al., 1992). 
Tables 17, 18, and 19 reveal few significant results for 
the interaction terms, suggesting that the hypotheses were 
generally not supported.
Results
Though not hypothesized, it is notable that a 
significant main effect was observed between change and two 
performance variables, ROA and efficiency. Change 
demonstrated a weak, but positive relationship with ROA. 
Because the efficiency measure actually represents an 
inverse measurement (higher levels of the efficiency 
measure indicate lower efficiency), efficiency was also 
noted to demonstrate a strongly positive relationship with 
change. That is, banks that changed strategies increased 
both their return on assets and efficiency. Since few 
studies have found significant main effects between change 
and performance, this result is quite interesting. The 
positive relationship between efficiency and change is 
particularly interesting, since it seems counter intuitive. 
These results will be further explored in the next section.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that prior performance will 
covary negatively with regard to subsequent performance.
For firms that change strategies, prior performance was 
expected to be negatively related to subsequent 
performance, while the opposite was expected for firms that 
failed to change. The underlying notion is that
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performance outcomes can be expected to vary, depending on 
the need for change.
Although prior performance in the form of ROA and 
efficiency are both significantly related to subsequent 
performance in the multiple regression equations, the 
direction of the relationship is the same for both groups. 
ROA is negatively related and change in ROA is positively 
related to subsequent RCA for both the change and no-change 
groups. The direction of the relationships is similar for 
the efficiency variables. Prior change in loans/assets was 
not a significant predictor for either the change or no­
change groups. Furthermore, the hierarchical regression 
results indicate no significant difference in the slopes of 
these relationships. Thus hypothesis 2 is not supported.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that slack resources will be 
significantly related to subsequent performance for both 
firms that change and fail to change, but that it will be 
more important for firms that change. Hierarchical 
regression results indicated that slack resources in the 
form of liquidity did moderate the change/ROA relationship, 
but the direction of the relationship is different than 
predicted for banks that changed strategies. Thus 
hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Table 14 shows that slack resources were negatively 
related to ROA for firms that changed strategies and 
positively related for firms that failed to change. In
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other words, slack resources seem to have a detrimental 
impact on performance for firms that change strategies, but 
a positive impact for those that fail to change. This 
result is surprising, given that slack resources are 
generally thought to ease the implementation of change 
efforts (Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990; Bourgeois, 1981). 
Possible explanations will be explored in the discussion 
section.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that organizational age will be 
negatively related to performance for firms that change 
strategies and positively related for those that fail to 
change. That is, age is likely to be an advantage under 
conditions of relative stability, but a disadvantage when 
attempting to change due to higher levels of inertia. This 
hypothesis was partially supported. Table 19 revealed that 
age (LAGE) was a marginally significant moderator for 
predicting change in loans/assets. Furthermore, the 
multiple regression results indicate that the relationships 
occurred as predicted. Thus, the results support the 
notion that age can serve to moderate certain performance 
outcomes between the change and no-change banks.
Hypothesis 8 predicts that organizational size will be 
negatively related to performance for banks that change 
strategies and positively related for banks that fail to 
change. The general idea is that inertial forces 
associated with size make change more difficult. However,
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size has certain advantages that accrue to firms that fail 
to change. There is no evidence to support this 
hypothesis. The results suggest that size has equally 
positive benefits for ROA and efficiency, and equal 
drawbacks for change in loans to assets. That is, there is 
no moderating effect.
Discussion
Several results of the analysis are interesting and 
call for further exploration. First, an interesting 
finding from the hierarchical regressions, is that change 
alone had a significant main effect on performance. Change 
was positively related to subsequent ROA and efficiency. 
These results were unanticipated and quite suggestive. Few 
studies have found any significant relationships between 
strategic change and financial performance, and the 
relationship between efficiency runs counter to the inertia 
arguments proposed by selection theorists and many 
strategic management proponents. However, several studies 
from the turnaround literature have found that 
organizations often attempt strategic and operating 
turnarounds simultaneously, and there is some evidence to 
suggest that both types of actions are necessary to effect 
succesful turnarounds (Schendel and Patton, 1976; Grinyer 
and McKiernan, 1990; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Thus, the 
notion that organizations may seek efficiency and strategic 
improvements at the same time is not unprecedented. This
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finding seems to place some of the basic tenants of 
selection theory in doubt.
Another result that was both surprising and counter 
intuitive was the negative relationship between slack 
resources and prior performance that moderated performance 
outcomes for organizations that changed strategies. Though 
surprising, this outcome may be consistent with the 
previous finding concerning slack resources and propensity 
to change. As noted above, liquidity was found to be 
negatively related to degree of change. This could be due 
to a buffering effect, that dulls the organization and 
makes it less reactive to its environment, or may reflect 
an over-all aversion to risk. The buffering argument 
suggests that these organizations may delay change, 
resulting in a general decline in performance prior to the 
change, and/or resulting in lost opportunities that are 
associated with a first-mover advantage. Since this study 
fails to detect the precise timing of the change, either of 
these explanations could explain the negative relationship 
between slack and subsequent performance. The risk 
aversion argument suggests that high levels of slack may be 
associated with an incremental or evolutionary approach to 
change. This approach may be less risky, but it also may 
mean lower levels of performance when environmental changes 
dictate organizational changes of a more quantum nature.
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Whatever the reason, this finding is interesting and 
suggests the need for further research.
Summary
Overall, the analysis provided little support for the 
hypotheses concerning performance outcomes. Prior 
performance and size had no moderating impact on subsequent 
performance. Age was found to moderate the relationship in 
the expected direction for loan portfolio growth, but not 
for overall financial performance or efficiency. Slack 
resources also were significant moderators of ROA outcomes, 
but in a different direction than hypothesized.
Decree of Chance
Hypothesis 11 predicts that among survivors of change, 
degree of change will be positively related to performance. 
This is based on the notion of there being a risk/return 
tradeoff involved in making major changes. Although large 
scale changes are likely to be riskier, the returns 
associated with such changes are assumed to be larger.
This hypothesis was tested with three regression models, 
one for each performance measure. Table 20 presents the 
results of the regression analysis for the three different 
performance outcomes.7 The regression models were first 
estimated using only those firms that changed strategies. 
Given the bi-modal distribution of the data, it was felt
’Models were also estimated using all the independent 
variables from the previous analysis. The results were 
consistent with those reported in Table 20.
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that a clearer picture of degree of change would emerge by 
eliminating those firms that did not change. The following 
sections evaluate the adequacy of the models, report the 
results, and discuss the implications.
Adequacy of the Models
The model with efficiency as the dependent variable 
failed to achieve overall significance and thus is excluded 
from the following analysis. Neither of the remaining 
models explained a great deal of variance, but degree of 
change did a better job of explaining changes in ROA (R2 = 
.062) than changes in loans/assets (R2 = .020).
Residual plots suggested no problems with 
heteroscedasticity and no deviations from linearity. The 
Durbin Watson d values indicated no problems with auto­
correlation. The Shapiro Wilkes test suggested some 
deviation from normality for the residual plots for the ROA 
model; however, the histogram and normal probability plots 
indicated that the problem was not severe. The Tol and VIF 
values indicated no problems with multicollinearity.
Once again, outliers were retained in the analysis.
Results
Degree of change was predicted to be positively 
related to change for firms that changed strategies and 
survived. Table 20 reveals that degree of change was 
significantly related to ROA outcomes, but in the opposite 
direction from that predicted. In other words radical
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Table 20. Results of Regression Analyses for Performance 
with Decree of Change as the Independent Variable (n=47l)
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard 
Error t-statistic
Difference in ROA as the dependent variable
DCHNG - .283 .079 -3.550’**
HOLDC -.157 .096 -1.637
UNEMP .073 .028 2.630***
R2 = .0623 F = 10.348’**
Difference in efficiency as the dependent variable
DCHNG .024 .039 .621
HOLDC . 089 .047 1.900*
UNEMP .007 .014 .568
R2 = .0091 F = 1.423
Change in loans/assets as the dependent variable
DCHNG -.406 .329 -1.232
HOLDC -.876 .397 -2.207"
UNEMP .093 .115 .810
R2 = .0203 F = 3.218"
* p < .10 
** p < .05
*** p < .01
changes tended to have a detrimental effect on overall 
financial performance. This result was not predicted, but 
it is not surprising. This supports the notion advocated 
by many strategic management theorists concerning the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
difficulty of overcoming mobility barriers (Porter, 1980). 
To the extent that cluster distance represents height of 
mobility barriers (Harrigan, 1985), one would anticipate 
changes between distant groups to be more difficult to 
successfully implement than those between more similar 
groups. Degree of change was also negatively related to 
change in loans/assets; however, this relationship was not 
significant.
Discussion
The finding that degree of change negatively impacts 
financial performance, combined with the previous finding 
that change alone is positively related to performance 
present an interesting set of results, even if not 
predicted. The implication of these findings is that 
change can have a positive impact on performance, but too 
much change can become detrimental to performance; i.e., 
there is a curvilinear relationship between change and 
performance. To directly test this observation, the sample 
was split into three different groups; no change, moderate 
change (distance < 3.0), and extreme change (distance >
3.0). A three-way ANOVA was run to test whether these 
three groups differed in terms of their performance. The 
results, shown in Table 21, support the notion of a 
curvilinear relationship. Each of the three performance 
measures was significant, and the performance for the 
moderate group was superior (recall that a negative change
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Table 21. ANOVA Results. Three Levels of Change by 
Performance____________________________________________
Performance
Variable
No
Chancre
Moderate
Chance
Extreme
Chance F p
Difference in 
ROA -.5855 -.2688 -.8987 17.11 .0001
Difference in 
Efficiency .0447 -.0376 .0113 2.51 .0817
Change in 
Loan/Asset - .2441 -.0270 -1.5672 6.49 .0016
N 326 336 135
in efficiency represents an improvement). This finding has 
important research implications as it may serve to explain 
the lack of significant findings that a number of 
researchers have experienced when examining the 
change/performance relationship. For example, this study 
detected no main effect difference in Loan/Asset growth, 
but controlling for degree of change revealed that those 
firms experiencing a moderate change achieved significantly 
better performance than those that failed to change or 
those that changed too much. Also, the weak main effect 
noted for ROA became highly signicant when taking into 
account degree of change.
Testing the Strategic Change/Survival Relationship
This section tests those hypotheses regarding factors 
that are thought to moderate the relationship between 
organizational change and survival. Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 
predict the identical relationships between change and
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survival that were predicted between change and 
performance. Hypothesis 2 contends that organizations 
exhibiting low or declining performance prior to changing 
will be more likely to benefit from the change, and will 
therefore, be more likely to survive. Hypothesis 4 
predicts that slack resources will moderate the 
relationship between change and survival by improving the 
chances of survival for firms that change strategies. 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that inertial forces associated with 
age will reduce the chances of survival for organizations 
that change strategies. Hypotheses 9 and 10 predict 
different outcomes for survival than were predicted for 
performance. Hypothesis 9 predicts that organizational 
size will be positively related to survival for firms that 
change strategy. Finally, hypothesis 10 predicts that 
degree of change will be negatively related to survival; 
i.e., the greater the change, the lower the odds of 
survival.
Testing of these hypotheses proceeded in much the same 
manner as that used to test the change/performance 
moderators. A series of multiple and hierarchical logistic 
regression models were estimated to test for direction and 
interaction effects, respectively. A significant 
interaction term indicates that the variable in question 
moderates the change/survival relationship. The direction 
of that relationship will be determined by the multiple
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logistic regression models performed on the change and no 
change groups. Once again, the significance of main 
effects in the logistic regression models is not a factor 
when testing for an interaction (Cohen and Cohen, 1983) . 
Table 22 presents the results of the logit analysis for the 
change and no-change groups. Table 23 presents the results 
of the hierarchical logistic regression analysis.
Adequacy of the Models
The models were fitted using the LOGISTIC procedure 
found in SAS. The overall test for goodness of fit for 
logit equations is given by the likelihood value, or more 
correctly -2 log likelihood (-2LL). Although there is no 
true R-squared value in logit analysis, certain authors 
advocate the use of "pseudo" R-squares to aid in the 
interpretation. These values were computed as suggested by 
Aldrich and Nelson (1984), and are included in the tables. 
The overall test for goodness of fit for the no-change 
group was not significant. Bedeian and Mossholder (1994) 
argue that such significance is not crucial when testing 
for moderation. The crucial point of interest in this 
table is the direction of the results, not significance.
The pseudo R-squared value for the change group was .1274 
and for the no-change group was .0100.
The results of the hierarchical analysis are shown in 
Table 23. A forward selection, model building approach 
found in SAS's LOGISTIC procedure was used to fit three
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Table 22. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses
Unstandardized 
Regression 
Variable Coefficient
Standard
Error
Wald
Chi-Sauare Beta
ROA .969 .457 4.506" .377
ROACH 1.053 .493 4.567" .245
EFF 3 .260 2.204 2.187 .789
EFFCH 2.359 1.455 2.629 .877
CHLNAS - .277 .064 18.628*” - .647
LIQUID - .788 1.657 .226 -.083
ASCAP - .091 .116 .603 - .151
LAGE .129 .268 .231 .079
LASSET .077 .261 .086 .055
UNEMP .181 .188 .925 .176
HOLDC
-2LL = 53.30
.352 
Dseudo R2 =
.696
.1274
.256 .097
ROA - .776 .929 .698 - .272
ROACH - .484 1.047 .214 - .107
EFF -5.121 4.339 1.393 - .475
EFFCH -1.055 3.699 .081 - .111
CHLNAS - .054 .101 .281 - .106
LIQUID - .215 1.955 .012 - .023
ASCAP -.098 .161 .372 - .152
LAGE - .229 .527 .190 - .094
LASSET .523 .479 1.190 .258
UNEMP .039 .257 .024 .037
HOLDC
-2LL =4.98
-.507 
Dseudo R2 = .
.793
0100
.409 -.138
* p < .10
** p < .05 
*** p < .01
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Table 23. Results of Logistic Hierarchical Regression 
(n=859)___________________________________________
Variables
Included
Cumulative 
Pseudo-R2
Unstandardized
Regression
Coefficients
Wald Chi-Square 
for Individual 
Variables
Change .0100 1.1949 7.82***
Change .0264 1.0853 6.31“’
ROA .6101 8.69’”
Change . 0419 1.7402 5.06”
ROA .8088 7.38”’
Change x ROA - .7154 1.34
Change . 0101 1.1920 _ _ _ 7.78
ROACH -.1228 .07
Change .0102 1.1873 7.70’”
ROACH -.0003 .00
Change x ROACH - .3804 .16
Change .0100 1.1963 _ - _ •••7.83
EFF .0605 .02
Change .0108 2.9146 3 .45*
EFF .1337 .13
Change x EFF -2.8379 1.41
Change .0104 1.1903
_ _ _ *•«7.75
EFCH .0934 .17
Change .0104 1.1867 7.67”*
EFCH - .0972 .19
Change x EFCH .3000 .01
Change .0359 .9035 4.21"
CHLNASBE -.1751 19.53’”
Change .0523 .7869 2.86’
CHLNAS -.2045 19. 50’”
Change x CHLNASBE .1340 1.67
Change .0103 1.2738 7.78*"
LIQUID .5177 .24
Change .0104 1.2967 6.23”
LIQUID .5848 .21
Chance x Liouid -.2067 .01
(table con'd.)
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Variables Cumulative Unstandardized Wald Chi-Square
Included Pseudo-R2 Regression for Individual
__________________________Coefficients_____ Variables
Change .0106 1.1458 7.01'"
ASCAP - .0478 .53
Change .0108 1.1083 .35
ASCAP -.0486 .39
Change X ASCAP .0030 .00
Change .0147 1.0221 5.35”
LAGE .3142 3.32*
Change .0176 2.4668 1.44
LAGE .3770 3.93"
Change X LAGE -.3852 .54
Change .0137 1.3368 _ _ „ • ••9.50
LASSET .3098 2.75*
Change .0138 -1.5903 .11
LASSET .2527 1.53
Change X LASSET .2941 .38
* p < .10
** p < .05 
*** p < .01
models for each moderator. One contained the change 
variable, one contained the change variable and a 
moderator, and the final one contained the change variable, 
the moderator, and an interaction term. A significant 
improvement in overall fit when adding the interaction 
term, as calculated by the logistic procedure, indicates a 
significant moderating effect.
Important assumptions for the logit model are 
linearity of the relationships, the absence of auto­
correlation, and no exact or near linear dependencies among
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the independent variables; i.e., severe multicollinearity 
(Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). Unfortunately, there are few 
diagnostics available to detectthese problems, and even 
when detected, there is little guidance in the literature 
as to how they can be remedied. The regression diagnostics 
and correlation tables from the previous analysis suggest 
that severe multicollinearity is not a problem in the 
straight logit models. Multicollinearity is typically a 
problem with hierarchical analysis; however, the overall 
test of fit is not affected by this problem. Also, it has 
been shown that auto-correlation is not a problem as long 
as sample sizes are large (Robinson, 1982). Thus, we can 
assume that the models provided unbiased estimates.
Results
An examination of Table 23 reveals that no significant 
interactions were observed. In addition, Table 22 shows 
that none of the relationships were in the hypothesized 
direction. In fact, the only significant predictors were 
ROA, change in ROA, and change in loans to assets. Each of 
these performance indicators were positively related to 
survival for firms that changed strategies. This is 
counter to the hypothesis that suggested a negative 
relationship between performance and survival for firms 
that change strategies. Thus, no support was provided for 
any of the hypotheses concerning the moderating variables 
and survival outcomes.
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Once again, it was interesting to note that change 
alone had a highly significant and positive effect on 
survival (see Table 23). Approximately 58% of the 
surviving firms changed strategy, compared to 29% of those 
that failed. In other words, changing strategies appeared 
to have survival value, rather than increase chances of 
failure. A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to 
shed more light on this relationship, and the results are 
shown in Table 24.
Table 24. Chi-Square Test - Change and Survival Data 
__________________ No Change______________Chance________
Failed
Observed 19 8
Estimated 11 16
Residuals 2.41 2.00
Survived
Observed 326 471
Estimated 334 463
Residuals .437 .372
Chi-Square = 9.317
Probability = .002
The chi-square value is significant (p=.002), and the 
residuals for the failed firms indicate that those two 
cells contributed to the significant chi-square value. As 
can be seen, there were significantly fewer failures than 
expected in the change group, and significantly more
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failures than expected in the no change group. This 
strongly supports the strategic management perspective and 
seems to run counter to the selection arguments proposed by 
the population ecologists.
Degree of Chance and Survival
Hypothesis 10 predicts that degree of change will be 
negatively related to survival. Change to less similar 
groups, presumably entails greater investment in 
resources; i.e., the greater the change, the higher the 
mobility barriers. Furthermore, many of the resources 
necessary to compete in new markets may not be readily 
available in factor markets (Barney, 1991). The failure to 
acquire necessary resources for competing in new groups 
places an organization at a disadvantage to its 
competitors, thus decreasing its chances of survival.
Results of the logit model used to test this 
hypothesis are displayed in Table 25. The first logit 
model used only firms that changed strategies; however, 
this model failed to achieve significance (pseudo-R2 = 
.0018). A second model was analyzed that included all 
firms. This model revealed a significant and positive 
relationship between degree of change and survival, however 
these results must be interpreted with caution. It has 
been demonstrated that degree of change is distributed in a 
bi-modal fashion between firms that changed and those that 
did not. Also, very few firms that changed strategies
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Table 25. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses with
Degree of Change as the Independent Variable______________
Unstandardized 
Regression 
Variable Coefficient
Standard
Error
Wald
Chi-Souare Beta
Change in Strategy
DCHNG -.079 .590 .018 -.025
HOLDC -.210 .735 .082 -.057
UNEMP .189 .248 .586 .176
-2LL = .900 pseudo-R2 = .0018 n=492
Full SamDle
DCHNG .3 92 .143 7.518'** .332
HOLDC .052 .396 .017 . 014
UNEMP .189 .128 2.157 .179
-2LL = 10.054 pseudo-R2 = .0116 n=857
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01
failed (8 out of 492). The limited sample, combined with 
the distribution of the data, suggest that the results be 
interpreted as a change/no change relationship rather than 
a degree of change relationship. Thus, these findings 
probably just reinforce the finding that change is 
positively related to survival. The results concerning 
degree of change and survival can only be said to be 
inconclusive.
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Discussion of the Change/Survival Findings
Analysis of the change/survival relationships revealed 
no support for the hypothesized relationships. None of the 
proposed moderators were significant, and the results 
concerning degree of change were inconclusive at best. An 
important issue in this analysis, however, is the 
relatively small sample of failed banks. Although logit 
analysis does not require an even sample (Aldrich and 
Nelson, 1984), recent research suggests that detection of 
moderating effects of dichotomous variables can be 
seriouslyundermined by uneven sample sizes. Stone-Romero, 
Alliger, and Aguinis (1994) used a Monte Carlo simulation 
to show that the power to detect moderating effects 
diminishes significantly as the proportion of cases in each 
group becomes greater, even when sample size is large.
These findings indicate that the inference of no moderating 
effect in this study may be erroneous. The results may be 
due to low statistical power rather than the absence of a 
moderating effect.
One interesting outcome of the logit analysis, was the 
finding that the failure rates were significantly higher 
for banks that failed to change than for banks that changed 
strategies. This would appear to provide rather strong 
evidence in support of the strategic management 
perspective. For this particular sample, it could be 
argued that strategic change served to enhance, rather than
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reduce survival rates. At least during the time frame of 
this study, the selection arguments are not supported.
Summary
This chapter reported the results of the 
classification efforts and statistical tests of the 
hypotheses. The cluster analysis was successful at 
identifying five strategic groups that were distinct and 
easy to interpret. The groups were used to measure 
strategic change. Distinct patterns of change were 
detected. Both the strategic groups, and the patterns of 
change made sense and were consistent with previous studies 
that have examined these issues. The results of the 
cluster analysis were used to test hypotheses concerning 
the antecedents and outcomes of strategic change. A 
summary of the hypotheses and results of the analysis are 
provided in Table 26. In addition, since a number of the 
more interesting findings in this study were not 
hypothesized, Table 27 includes a summary of some of the 
more interesting results.
Summary of Chance Antecedents
Prior performance, slack resources, and organizational 
age were all found to be significant predictors of 
strategic change, but not always in the direction 
predicted. A decline in loans as a percentage of assets 
was found to be significantly related to change. Other 
performance measures such as ROA and efficiency were not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
w
ithout perm
ission.
Table 26. Summary of Hypotheses and Results______________________________
Hypothesis _____________________________Support______________ Comments
Performance
HI Prior performance is negatively 
related to change.
Mixed Supported for effectiveness 
measures, but not efficiency of 
financial performance measures.
H2 Strategic change and prior perf­
ormance covary negatively with 
respect to subsequent performance 
and survival.
Not
Supported
No significance
Slack
H3 Slack resources are positively 
related to change.
Mixed Supported for asset to capital 
measure, but not liquidity 
measure.
H4 Strategic change and slack res­
ources covary positively with 
respect to performance and 
survival.
Not Liquidity and change covaried
Supported negatively with respect to ROA.
Age
H5 Organizational age is negatively 
related to change.
H6 Age and strategic change covary 
negatively with respect to per­
formance and survival.
Not Relationship was significant, but
Supported in the opposite direction.
Mixed Age and change covaried neg­
atively with respect to 
effectiveness.
(table con1d.)
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Hypothesis______________________________
Size
H7 Size is negatively related to 
change.
H8 Size and strategic change covary 
negatively with respect to sub­
sequent performance.
H9 Size is positively related to 
survival.
Degree of Change
H10 Degree of change is negatively 
related to survival.
Hll Degree of change is positively 
related to performance for 
survivors.
Support Comments
Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Mixed
Relationship was insignificant 
when original strategies were 
entered into the equation.
No significance
No significance
Change alone was found to be 
positively related to survival.
Change and performance were 
found to have a curvilinear 
relationship.
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Table 27. Important Findings Not Hypothesized______________
1) Change was not uncommon and patterns of change observed 
sue- . ast a relationship between scope and change.
2) Liquid resources and age were both significantly related 
to change, but in the opposite direction from that 
predicted.
3) Size became an insignificant predictor of change when 
original strategy was entered into the equation.
4) Change was positively related to both performance and 
survival.
5) Change was found to be related to performance in a 
curvilinear manner.
significant predictors of change. Given that loans/assets 
is an indicator of strategic effectiveness for banks, this 
finding seems appropriate. Strategic management theorists 
have advocated that strategic change is necessary in 
response to a loss of effectiveness; i.e., a lack of fit 
with the environment.
Slack resources had mixed effects on strategic change. 
Liquid assets were found to have a negative influence on 
strategic change, while capital was positively related to 
change. One explanation may be that liquidity measures are 
tapping into another construct, risk posture. High levels 
of liquidity also indicate a tendency toward risk aversion 
in the banking industry. Thus, it is not too surprising 
that high levels liquidity are negatively related to 
change. High levels of capital, apparently encourage banks 
to change strategies due to the cushion provided.
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Age was a particularly strong and robust predictor of 
change, but the direction of the influence was in the 
opposite direction from that predicted. Older 
organizations, contrary to the propositions of selection 
theorists, demonstrated a higher propensity to change. It 
was suggested that this finding may reflect a learning 
effect. As organizations grow older and experience 
environmental changes, they may learn how to become 
flexible and responsive.
As predicted, size was found to be negatively related 
to change. However, when controlling for original 
strategy, this effect became insignificant. Thus, the size 
effect was assumed to be spurious.
Summary of Performance Outcomes
This section tested the notion that certain factors 
may moderate the relationship between change and 
performance outcomes. Age, slack resources, and degree of 
change were all found to have a significant influence on 
performance outcomes. Age was a weak moderator for changes 
in loan portfolio growth, but not for ROA or efficiency. 
Furthermore, the direction of the relationship supported 
the hypothesis. Age was negatively related to performance 
(effectiveness) for firms that changed strategies, but was 
positively related for organizations that failed to change 
strategies. Though hypothesized, this relationship is 
surprising, given the findings that age was positively
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related to change. Apparently older organizations are more 
prone to attempt change, but have more difficulty in the 
implementation.
Slack resources in the form of liquidity were also 
found to moderate performance outcomes. Surprisingly, 
slack was negatively related to performance for 
organizations that changed strategies. It was suggested 
that either a buffering or risk aversion may explain this 
relationship. Since liquidity was found to deter change, 
it is possible that when change is attempted, the timing or 
degree of change may affect subsequent performance. In 
other words, the change may be "too little" or "too late" 
or a combination of the two.
Degree of change was found to be negatively related to 
ROA outcomes.’ For organizations that changed strategies, 
more radical changes were associated with lower performance 
outcomes. On the other hand, change itself was found to be 
positively related to performance, particularly when the 
more radical changers were eliminated from the sample.
This finding strongly suggests that change can positively 
impact performance, but that too much change can have a 
detrimental result.
Summary of Survival Outcomes
This section tested the hypotheses predicting survival 
outcomes. None of the hypotheses were supported. This was 
assumed to be partially due to the small number of failed
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firms in the sample, and the resulting lack of statistical 
power. One finding of note was that survival was found to 
be positively related to change. Over 58% of the surviving 
firms changed strategies, while only 29% of the failed 
firms changed. Thus, changing strategies appeared to 
decrease rather than increase chances of survival.
In conclusion, although the hypotheses received mixed 
support, many of the findings were interesting. The 
outcomes provided support for many of the basic strategic 
management tenets. Change was found to be a rather common 
occurrence, and in general the results point to positive 
change outcomes.
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reviews the findings and conclusions of 
the study. The first section contains an overview of the 
study and findings. The ensuing discussion will include an 
examination of the contributions and limitations of the 
study, as well as its implications for theory, management 
practice, and future research.
Overview of the Study 
This study started out by proposing three questions 
that are fundamental to the strategic management 
perspective, but have received relatively little attention 
by researchers. The first two questions were:
1. Do organizations engage in strategic change following 
environmental discontinuities?
2. Do those organizations that change strategies following 
major environmental discontinuities improve their 
performance and survival chances?
Based on the theoretical and empirical research to date, it 
was anticipated that the answer to these questions is, "it 
all depends." Therefore, the focus of this study was 
placed on exploring a third question:
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3. To what extent is the relationship between change in 
strategy, performance, and survival influenced by firm 
and situation specific factors?
Based on a review of the literature, a conceptual 
model was developed that predicted change would be 
influenced by two factors, adaptive forces and inertial 
forces. Adaptive forces include two factors that have been 
hypothesized to encourage change, prior performance and 
slack resources. Inertial forces include two factors 
sometimes thought to hamper change, organizational size and 
age. Change outcome was predicted to be influenced by 
degree of change and moderated by the adaptive and inertial 
forces. Guided by previous theoretical and empirical 
research, cluster analysis was used to measure strategy and 
degree of change. The conceptual model was tested within 
the context of the commercial banking industry from 1980 to 
1987.
Data analysis suggested a number of interesting 
conclusions. First, the cluster analysis revealed that 
over half (57%) of the banks in the sample changed 
strategies during the time of the study. This finding is 
roughly consistent with percentages observed in previous 
studies that have examined strategic change in industries 
undergoing discontinuous change. Certain patterns of 
change also emerged. For example, there was a strong 
movement away from the agricultural lending and retail
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segments, and a strong movement toward investments. Firms 
following strategies that were broader in scope 
demonstrated relatively less change than those following 
more focused strategies. These results are consistent with 
the ecological arguments that generalists are better suited 
to withstand major environmental discontinuities (Freeman 
and Hannan, 1983). However, the fact that the narrower 
scope firms were able to shift to a different strategy 
obviously supports the strategic management perspective.
In general, this study joins a growing number of 
studies that suggest strategic change is a rather common 
event following major environmental discontinuities. Thus, 
as expected, this study offers an affirmative answer to the 
first research question posed. Organizations do tend to 
engage in strategic change following major environmental 
changes. Furthermore, the pattern of changes noted suggest 
that the initial strategy seems to be an important 
determinant of change. Narrower scope firms in particular 
seem to be in a more precarious position following 
environmental changes, as evidenced by the larger number of 
changes noted among these groups. This observation 
suggests an area for further research.
Second, the conceptual model proved to be useful in 
understanding the relationship between certain firm level 
factors and the propensity of organizations to change 
strategies. Some evidence was found to support the notion
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that prior performance, slack resources, and age are all 
important antecedents to change. Effectiveness, as 
measured by loan portfolio growth, was found to be 
negatively related to change. That is, banks experiencing 
a decline in their loan portfolios, relative to overall 
assets, experienced a greater degree of strategic change.
On the other hand, efficiency and overall financial 
performance were not significantly related to change. This 
finding rather strongly supports the strategic management 
framework, particularly the position that stresses the 
inertial characteristics of organizations.
Slack resources in the form of excess capital, were 
found to have a positive influence on degree of change.
This supports the notion that an excess cushion of 
resources can act as an adaptive force, encouraging change 
and experimentation. On the other hand, liquidity was 
negatively associated with change; however, this 
relationship may be indicative of an overall aversion to 
risk. One particularly interesting and unexpected result 
was the finding that age was positively related to change. 
A learning effect was offered as an explanation, but this 
result suggests the need for further research.
The overall picture that emerges from these findings 
is that declining effectiveness and slack resources act as 
adaptive forces; i.e., they encourage strategic change as 
predicted. However age and size failed to inhibit change
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as predicted. In fact, age was found to be a positive 
force for change. In addition, though not a part of the 
model, the results suggest that risk aversion and group 
membership may be important factors that influence change.
Third, this study suggests that change is positively 
related to performance and survival, regardless of firm 
level factors suggested in the model. Change was noted to 
be positively related to ROA, efficiency, and survival. 
Significance was weak for ROA, moderate for efficiency, and 
strong for survival. This finding was unexpected, given 
that few studies have found a significant main effect 
relationship between change and performance. The 
improvement in efficiency was particularly interesting, in 
light of the liability of newness arguments proposed by 
population ecologists. Apparently a number of banks were 
able to successfully implement strategic changes, while 
simultaneously improving efficiency. Also, it was 
interesting to note that change appeared to have survival 
value. This set of findings is interpreted as offering 
rather strong support for the strategic management 
perspective.
Fourth, the relationship between change and 
performance becomes even more clear when degree of change 
is considered. Specifically, the evidence suggests a 
curvilinear relationship between performance and change. 
Firms that underwent moderate levels of change outperformed
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those that did not change as well as those that underwent a 
more drastic degree of change. Interestingly, this finding 
is similar to that of Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988), who 
found that too little or too much change was associated 
with organizational failure. Although change can have 
positive outcomes, organizations must find the right 
balance when attempting strategic change. Changing too 
much may be just as detrimental as not changing, even when 
environmental circumstances dictate the need for change.
Finally, a few firm level factors, age and slack 
resources (liquidity) were found to moderate the 
relationship between change and performance. Specifically, 
high levels of liquidity were negatively related to 
performance (ROA) for firms that changed strategies and 
positively related for firms that failed to change. Since 
liquidity is generally thought to aid in the implementation 
of new strategies, this finding may reflect an indirect 
relationship. For example, high levels of liquidity may 
reflect a risk averse posture, resulting in a conservative 
or tenuous approach to change. Either through the timing 
of the change or the degree of change, such an approach may 
have a negative impact on performance. Age was a weakly 
significant moderator of the change-effectiveness 
relationship. 'Older organizations apparently have a more 
difficult time implementing changes, despite being more 
prone to attempt change.
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In summary, the findings provided some support for the 
conceptual model, although revisions are apparently in 
order. For example, factors such as group membership and 
risk posture may be important change antecedents to 
consider. Also, a quite important finding was that degree 
of change seems to be related to performance in a 
curvilinear fashion. Overall, these findings lend credence 
to the major assumptions of the strategic management 
perspective and have some important implications for 
practicing managers as well. These issues will be 
addressed in the following sections.
Conclusions and Contributions of the Study 
The conclusions and contributions of this study will 
be examined by reviewing the individual components of the 
model and evaluating the outcomes in light of the theory 
used to develop the hypotheses.
Performance and Strategic Change
The literature suggested that there would be a 
relationship between performance and strategic change.
First, a number of theorists advocate an inertial view of 
strategic change (Oster, 1982; Miller and Friesen, 1984) . 
The implication of this view is that change will tend to be 
delayed until an obvious gap develops between desired and 
actual performance. Low or declining performance will tend 
to provide an incentive for change to occur. The evidence 
from this study lends credence to this view, but also
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suggests that managers may be more sensitive to certain 
types of performance. In this study, banks tended to 
change strategies in response to a decline in loans to 
assets, a measure intended to capture overall 
effectiveness. Since effectiveness is more closely 
associated with strategic "fit", this finding seems 
appropriate. A drop in loans, which are typically the 
primary earning assets for a bank, is likely to be the 
first internal indication of the need to seek out new 
markets. On the other hand, a decline in overall financial 
performance may be a function of efficiency problems, or 
perhaps, uncontrollable but temporary economic conditions 
such as changes in interest rates. Thus, the banks in this 
study seemed to respond to specific performance signals. 
Also, none of the static measures of performance were 
significant, indicating that managers are more sensitive to 
changes in their own performance, rather than performance 
relative to competitors.
Second, given the difficulties associated with changes 
of a strategic nature asserted by the population ecologists 
as well as many strategic management theorists, it was 
reasoned that such changes will be beneficial only for 
those organizations demonstrating a strong need for change. 
Theoretically, these organizations will be more motivated 
to implement the change, and will stand to gain more from 
the change. In essence, the gains for these organizations
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are expected to outweigh the costs. However, change is 
likely to be detrimental for those demonstrating little 
need for change. Here, the costs are likely to outweigh 
the gains. Need for change was assumed to be closely 
related to performance; therefore, it was reasoned that 
prior performance would moderate change outcomes. 
Unfortunately, none of the prior performance measures 
significantly moderated performance or survival outcomes; 
therefore, this study provides no evidence to support this 
view.
Obviously, this lack of evidence could indicate that 
need for change and change outcomes are unrelated; however, 
there are other explanations as well. For example, these 
findings may simply reflect an imperfect correlation 
between performance and need for change. Although a 
decline in loans to assets was related to change above, 
this explains only a small percentage of the variance in 
change. Changes may also be triggered by external events 
that increase aspiration levels (Grinyer and McKiernan, 
1990), such as threat of a takeover or change in the 
competitive environment or by internal events such as 
change in management. Under such circumstances, 
organizations may recognize the need for change, prior to 
experiencing a decline in performance.
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Slack Resources and Strategic Change
Researchers disagree as to how slack resources will 
impact organizational change. Some argue that excess 
resources will encourage organizations to experiment and 
take a more proactive approach to change (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Cyert and March, 1963). Others argue that slack resources 
will discourage change by buffering the organization from 
its environment (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 1988). At 
first glance, the results of this study appear to support 
both views, since two different measures of slack were 
signicant in opposite directions. Liquidity was found to 
be negatively related to change, supporting the buffering 
argument. On the other hand, capital was positively 
related to change, supporting the experimentation argument.
One explanation offered in this study is that 
liquidity may be tapping into a related construct, risk 
posture. Liquid resources, consisting of cash and 
investments that can be quickly converted to cash, are a 
first line of defense for banks in case of a deposit "run­
off." In the event of a large decline in deposits, liquid 
resources can be depleted rather quickly. However, most 
banks have a number of options, including loans from other 
banks (fed funds), loans from the government agencies, or 
simply "bought money" (i.e., high interest rate, large 
denomination C.D.'s). Investments in cash or liquid 
resources offer clearly lower returns for banks, but they
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also lower the risk of having to rely on more expensive 
funds in the event of a decline in deposits. Thus, 
substantial investment in liquid resources can be 
interpreted as a tendency toward risk aversion.
In retrospect, liquid resources are perhaps not a very 
crucial source of slack for banks. For one thing, banks 
have a number of available funding alternatives designed to 
protect them from short term cash shortfalls, since such 
shortfalls can have disastrous consequences. Also, 
considering that they offer little protection against loan 
losses, the notion that high levels of liquidity discourage 
banks from monitoring and reacting to their environment 
does not seem to be an extremely plausible explanation. 
Thus, the most reasonable explanation for these results is 
that liquid resources represent a measure of risk posture. 
High levels of liquid resources represent an aversion to 
risk, and thus reduce the likelihood of change.
On the other hand, capital reserves represent a 
primary line of defense against unanticipated loan losses. 
Unanticipated loan losses, those that exceed loan loss 
reserves, go directly to the "bottom line", thereby 
reducing capital. Marginal capital reserves can be 
depleted rather quickly in the event of large investment or 
loan losses, forcing a bank into insolvency. It is 
apparent that excess capital represents an important 
cushion for banks moving into less familiar lending
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territory where unexpected losses may occur. Therefore, 
the finding that capital reserves are positively related to 
change supports the view that slack resources encourage 
change and experimentation.
It was also anticipated that slack resources would 
moderate change outcomes by positively impacting 
performance and survival. The reasoning is that slack 
resources provide a cushion of resources that could be 
utilized during the reorganization process following 
change. Liquidity was found to moderate the change 
process, but in the opposite direction from that predicted. 
For organizations that changed strategies, liquidity was 
found to be negatively related to performance. However, if 
liquidity is an indicator of risk posture as suggested 
above, these results do not seem surprising. Conservative 
organizations, when they do make changes, may go about it 
in more tenuous fashion. Attempting to change in a 
"piecemeal" fashion or delaying change and entering new 
markets after the competition may hamper performance, even 
when change is called for.
Organizational Ace and Strategic Change
Hannan and Freeman (1984) make a strong argument for a 
correlation between age and inertia. As organizations age, 
certain routines and skills become embedded. Having an 
established set of routines is said to increase 
accountability and reliability, and thus improve an
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organization's chances of survival. Supposedly, the price 
paid for accountability and reliability is loss of 
flexibility. This notion suggests a negative relationship 
between age and change. However, the results of this study 
indicate that this line of reasoning may be erroneous.
Age was found to positively related to change. That is, 
older banks in this study were more likely to change 
strategies than younger banks. It was suggested that this 
result may be due to a learning effect. As organizations 
age and survive environmental upheavals, it is likely that 
one of the skills they master is the ability to adapt.
The population ecology arguments also suggest that 
organizational age may moderate the relationship between 
change and performance outcomes. Since younger 
organizations are supposedly more flexible, they should 
have an advantage over older organizations when changing 
strategies. On the other hand, the liability of newness 
argument suggests that older organizations may have an 
advantage under conditions of stability. This study 
provides some evidence to support this line of reasoning. 
Age weakly moderated the relationship between change and 
loan portfolio growth in the direction expected. That is, 
age was negatively related to portfolio growth for banks 
that changed strategies, but was positively related for 
firms that did not change. Though hypothesized, this 
result was surprising since age was found to be positively
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related to change. This finding suggests a more complex 
relationship than a straight-forward learning argument. 
Apparently, the experience gained by older banks translates 
into superior environmental scanning skills, allowing them 
to recognize the need for change. Thus, older banks are 
more likely to initiate change. However, this does not 
translate into superior implementation skills. Inertial 
forces apparently serve to slow down or hamper change 
efforts in these organizations, resulting in a failure to 
achieve the full benefits of the change. Thus, older banks 
were more prone to change strategies, but were less able to 
implement certain aspects of the change.
The findings concerning age were surprising. In fact, 
a fair amount of additional analysis was performed to rule 
out alternate explanations, but the relationship proved to 
be quite robust. The only other study to directly examine 
the influence of age on change found that age was 
positively related to the length of time taken to implement 
changes (Ginsberg and Bucholtz, 1990). That finding agrees 
with the result in this study that age may negatively 
impact certain performance outcomes. However, neither of 
these seem consistent with the finding that age is 
positively related to change. Our post-hoc explanation 
that relates age to learning seems plausible, but there is 
obviously a need for further theoretical and empirical 
exploration of this phenomenon.
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Organizational Size and Strategic Change
Larger organizations are frequently argued to have 
greater inertial qualities than small organizations (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984; 1989; Fombrum and Ginsberg, 1990). The 
arguments suggest that the standardization and 
formalization associated with large, complex organizations 
make them less amenable to the will of managers and less 
flexible. This study provides no support for this
position. Size was found to be negatively related to
change; however, when controlling for original group 
membership this effect became insignificant. Size also 
failed to moderate performance and survival outcomes. When 
controlling for original group membership, large banks in
this study were just as likely to change strategy and were
able to implement strategies as effectively as smaller 
ones.
This finding contradicts a number of studies that have 
found size to be a significant inhibitor of change (Fombrun 
and Ginsberg, 1990; Guarino, 1991; Rediker and Middleton, 
1992; Silverman and Castaldi, 1992). It is interesting to 
note, however, that all but one of these studies have 
occurred in the banking industry, and none controlled for 
original group membership. This study suggests an 
alternate explanation to the size/inertia argument 
typically offered. The patterns of change noted in this 
study suggested a relationship between scope and strategic
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change. Organizations with narrower scopes tended to 
exhibit a greater degree of change than those with a wide 
scope. Because scope is generally related to size, it may 
be argued that relationships between size and change, 
actually represent a relationship between scope and change. 
Larger, broad scope, firms are likely to have less need for 
change during times of environmental discontinuities 
(Zammuto and Cameron, 1985). Therefore, the relationship 
noted by previous researchers between size and change may 
be spurious.
Degree of Chance and Change Outcomes
Both population ecologists and strategic management 
theorists have argued that the type, or degree, of change 
is an important consideration when hypothesizing change 
outcomes. The population ecologists are obviously much 
more restrictive, arguing that organizational core 
features, including domain and technology, are highly inert 
and can rarely be successfully changed. Strategic 
management theorists, on the other hand, stress that 
mobility barriers may restrict certain types of changes. 
Generally speaking, the more similar the groups, the lower 
the mobility barriers, and the easier the change. As 
suggested by Harrigan (1985), this study used distance 
between groups, to measure degree of change. The greater 
the distance or degree of change, the higher the mobility 
barriers. The results suggest that change is related to
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performance outcomes in a curvilinear fashion.
Organizations that engaged in moderate levels of change 
experienced superior performance compared to those that 
experienced no change, or extreme levels of change. This 
outcome provides more support for the strategic management 
perspective than for population ecology.
Limitations of the Study
One important limitation to any study focusing on a 
single industry is that of generalizability. This study 
focused on a single industry, at a particularly turbulent 
time in its history. Different findings may be obtained by 
examining different industries under different 
environmental circumstances, or even by examining the same 
industry at a different time in its history. Therefore, 
caution must be exercised when generalizing these results 
to other industry sectors. Nevertheless, the loss of 
generalizability was offset by a greater depth of 
understanding associated with examining changes occurring 
within a single industry. As more researchers take this 
approach, generalizability can be assessed by comparing 
results obtained in numerous industries over different 
points in time.
A second limitation of this study lies in its design. 
Care was taken to choose an appropriate time frame, one 
that would capture changes in the industry following 
deregulation, and one that would be long enough for the
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changes to materialize. However, as with any study of this 
type, the exact times for measuring strategy and 
performance were somewhat arbitrary. It is likely that 
some of the firms in the sample changed strategies prior to 
1982 or after 1985, thus distorting the results. Also, the 
design did not allow for determining the exact timing of 
the change. Therefore, prior and post performance measures 
can only be said to be approximate.
Another limitation related to the time frame issue, 
was the failure to include a large enough sample of failed 
banks to adequately test the hypotheses related to 
survival. Two ways to increase the sample of failed banks 
would be to extend the time frame of the study or to 
develop a matched set of failed and surviving banks. The 
most methodologically desirable approach would be to extend 
the time frame of the study, using the same randomly drawn 
sample. However, there is no guarantee that this approach 
would sufficiently increase the sample of failed banks. 
Also, the further removed the failure from the measurement 
of change, the weaker the linkage becomes. Therefore, 
future studies to examine this issue may need to used 
matched sets of failed and surviving organizations.
Another time frame limitation concerns the overall 
length of the study. Although the study is longitudinal, 
covering an eight year time frame, it still may be argued 
to be relatively short from the perspective of population
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ecologists. For example, Hannan and Freeman (1977) go back 
literally hundreds of years in their attempt to argue that 
even the largest organizations eventually fail. While one 
could certainly argue the merits of taking such a long term 
perspective, it does point out that the time frame for this 
study may be considered too short to be meaningful from the 
selection perspective.
A fourth limitation is the choice of strategy 
variables. Choices pertaining to scope (i.e., products 
offered and markets served) represents an important 
strategic consideration. A number of studies, both in the 
population ecology and strategic management literature have 
relied on similar variables to measure strategy. 
Nevertheless, this definition of strategy may result in 
specification error. For example, this study fails to 
consider other important strategic components such as 
competitive weapons and segmentation (Chrisman, Hofer, and 
Boulton, 1988) . In addition, the measures used may fail to 
capture more subtle changes in scope. For example, an 
organization switching its focus from large commercial 
lending to small business loans, would still be classified 
as a wholesale lender in this study. Failure to capture 
such changes represents specification error, which could 
distort the results.
A final limitation of this study results from the 
assumptions and judgement calls associated with doing a
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cluster analysis. Cluster analysis may be seriously 
impacted by the variables included in the analysis and the 
clustering algorithm used. As noted, an attempt was made 
to choose appropriate variables, and the non-hierarchical 
algorithm associated with the FASTCLUS procedure had quite 
a bit of precedence in the literature. Nevertheless, the 
inclusion or deletion of certain variables or the use of a 
different clustering method may have resulted in 
significantly different results. Also, though the five 
cluster solution seemed to be superior, the number of 
clusters chosen is ultimately a subjective decision that 
can impact the results.
Implications for Theory 
This study drew on the theories of population ecology 
and strategic management to investigate strategic change in 
the banking industry. Population ecologists argue that 
inertial forces largely preclude change to the core 
features of an organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1977;
1984). Furthermore, when changes are attempted, they will 
tend to be disruptive and maladaptive resulting in an 
increased risk of failure. On the other hand, the 
strategic management approach suggests that managers have 
considerable latitude in altering competitive strategies, 
and that such alterations are sometimes necessary to ensure 
continued survival. The literature suggested that taking a 
middle-ground approach to investigating strategic change
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would result in a better understanding of the phenomenon. 
That is, the degree to which strategic choice and selection 
arguments are salient may depend on certain firm level 
factors.
Overall, this study provides little evidence to 
support the natural selection view of strategic change. 
First, changes between strategic groups was not an uncommon 
occurrence for banks during the time of this study. 
Approximately 57% of the banks in this study changed group 
membership. Second, banks that changed strategies improved 
their performance relative to those that did not. The 
curvilinear relationship noted between degree of change and 
performance suggests limitations to change. Such 
limitations could be argued to contradict the extreme views 
of strategic choice assumed by some schools of thought 
within the strategic management paradigm; however, this 
view is consistent with the main stream view that assumes 
choice to be limited by mobility barriers. The extreme 
selection view argues that any change to core features will 
have a detrimental impact on performance. Third, failure 
rates were significantly higher for banks that did not 
change strategies than for those that changed strategies. 
Contrary to the selection arguments, change seemed to 
associated with survival. Fourth, although age and size 
have been hypothesized to be positively related to inertia, 
neither seemed to significantly hamper change efforts. In
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fact, older banks were more prone to engage in strategic 
change than younger banks. Size was found to have no 
impact on change, when group membership was controlled. 
These findings indicate that the natural selection 
arguments need some revision.
In general, this study suggests that managers have 
quite a bit of discretion in altering their strategies in 
response to environmental changes. However, the evidence 
that certain aspects of prior performance were signicant 
antecedents to change supports the notion that strategies 
tend to be "sticky" (Oster, 1982). Banks in this study 
appeared to need a performance downturn to stimulate 
change. Also, there appear to be limitations to change.
At some point, the costs of changing apparently outweigh 
the benefits, resulting in performance downturns. Thus, 
although managers have strategic choice, not all changes 
are easy to implement, or are they likely to have positive 
outcomes.
In some ways, the results of this study are in keeping 
with a growing body of literature suggesting that the 
natural selection view and strategic management perspective 
be reconciled by considering the type or degree of change 
considered (House, Singh, and Tucker, 1986; Haveman, 199 ; 
Bauerschmidt and Chrisman, 1993). Selection theorists have 
made the distinction between core and peripheral changes, 
however this study suggest that a finer distinction be
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considered. Within the core features, which include stated 
goals, forms of authority, core technology, and marketing 
strategy, it may be necessary to consider degree of change. 
Perhaps as changes become more unrelated, requiring old 
competencies to be discarded and new ones developed, the 
selection view becomes more salient.
Implications for Management Practice
As noted above, this study indicates that managers 
have a great deal of discretion in changing strategies, but 
this does not mean that all types of changes work, or that 
change is an easy process. When environmental upheavals 
change the face of competition, and make certain niches 
more or less desirable, managers should seek to respond by 
changing strategies. On average, organizations that 
changed strategies outperformed those that did not in this 
study.
The role of degree of change in this study suggests 
that managers carefully weigh the various mobility barriers 
prior to undergoing changes. Changes that are highly 
dissimilar to existing strategies may require the 
development of new competencies that are not readily 
available, or that are quite costly. In all probability, 
this explains the popularity of the change to a focused 
investor orientation during the time of this study, as an 
investment strategy may be argued to require less 
specialized skills than other strategies. Organizations
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attempting to overcome high mobility barriers are likely to 
find themselves at a disadvantage relative to their 
competitors. This study suggests that mobility barriers 
play an important role in the outcome of strategic change. 
Changes to relatively similar positions are more likely to 
result in positive outcomes.
Contrary to the findings of previous studies, this 
research suggests that age and size have relatively little 
impact on change outcomes. There is some evidence to 
suggest that older organizations were more prone to change 
strategies, but that they experienced somewhat lower 
performance. However, overall the results seem to indicate 
that older and larger banks experienced little more 
difficulty in changing strategies than smaller, younger 
banks. Managers of large or older organizations should not 
consider these factors as barriers when attempting to 
change strategies.
Implications for Future Research
The results of this study indicate a number of 
directions for future research. First, the results suggest 
that future studies should examine the impact of scope on 
change and change outcomes. Though not hypothesized, an 
interesting outcome from this study was that size became 
insignificant when original group membership was entered 
into the equation. This finding challenges a number of 
studies that have found size to be a significant inhibitor
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of change (Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990; Guarino, 1991; 
Rediker and Middleton, 1992; Silverman and Castaldi, 1992). 
Specifically, it implies that organizational strategy, as 
measured by scope, is a more important change antecedent 
than size. The patterns of change noted in this study 
suggest that banks following focused strategies (narrow 
scopes) tended to change more frequently than banks 
following generalist strategies (broad scopes). This 
finding is consistent with the notion that broad scoped 
firms are better suited to weather environmental 
discontinuities due to their diversity (Zammuto and 
Cameron, 1985) . It also suggests an alternate hypothesis 
to the size/inertia argument typically offered. A related 
issue that deserves exploration concerns the impact of 
scope on change outcomes. In general, this study indicates 
that scope could be an important variable for understanding 
strategic change, which in turn suggests the need for 
further theoretical development and empirical research in 
this area.
A more obvious, but seldom considered factor that is 
likely to impact change and change outcomes is a firm's 
overall disposition toward risk. This study found that 
liquid resources were negatively related to change and 
performance. Since larger levels of liquid resources are 
seen as an indicator of risk aversion, these findings 
suggest that risk posture may be an important variable for
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predicting both change and change outcomes. Further 
research is needed to explore this issue.
An unexpected finding in this study that deserves 
further exploration is the positive relationship found 
between age and change, and subsequent negative 
relationship between age and change outcomes. Post-hoc 
reflection suggested that this may be due to learning 
effects, or scanning experience in the industry, but this 
explanation needs to be further developed and tested.
Another interesting relationship that could bear 
further exploration is that between degree of change and 
performance. Although the findings relating cluster 
distance to performance outcomes are interesting in their 
own right, further studies may want to explore this 
relationship in more depth. For example, can the concept 
of "relatedness" be used to better understand this 
phenomenon? Also, the concept of asymmetric mobility 
barriers may be an interesting phenomenon to explore 
(Harrigan, 1985). That is, the success in moving between 
groups may depend not only on the degree of change, but the 
direction of change. For example, in this study 53 firms 
moved from a generalist wholesale strategy to a focused 
investment strategy, while only eight firms changed from 
focused investors to generalist wholesalers. Although the 
distance traveled remains the same, intuitively moving 
toward an investment strategy would seem to be much easier
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than the reverse. The notion of assymetric mobility 
barriers seems to be borne out by the patterns of change 
noted in this study, but further research may want to 
explicitely test this notion by accounting for direction of 
change when testing change outcomes.
In addition to the above, a number of suggestions for 
future research can be made to overcome the limitations of 
this study. For example, replications using different 
industries, different strategy variables, and different 
methods would be useful. As evidence accumulates in this 
manner, a core group of generalizable conclusions can be 
amassed.
It would also be useful to extend this study, 
measuring strategic change over multiple time periods. 
Several interesting questions could be explored by such an 
extension. For example, did firms that switched to an 
investment strategy switch again as the industry settled 
down and became more predictable? More specifically, did a 
change to an investment strategy represent a stepping stone 
to more drastic change, or perhaps a safe port to ride out 
the turbulence in the industry? In general, this pertains 
to the whole issue of incremental versus quantum change. 
Although this study suggests that quantum changes are less 
likely to be succesful, perhaps organizations achieve such 
change incrementally, making a series of smaller changes
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over time, or changing to a "safe" strategy while they 
accumulate the skills necessary to make major changes.
Another important area for future research is the 
focus on strategic change and failure. As noted, this 
study failed to capture a large enough sample of failed 
banks to test the hypotheses related to survival. This 
could be dealt with in several ways. First, the time frame 
of the study could be extended to increase the number of 
failures. Another approach would be to develop a matched 
set of failed and surviving banks for comparison. A final 
approach would involve utilizing a failure or bankruptcy 
scale similar to Altman's Z score, to obtain a measure of 
risk of failure.
Another important but neglected research topic 
concerns the methodology for measuring change. Although a 
number of studies have relied on similar techniques to 
those utilized in this study, others have used more narrow 
definitions of strategy and/or relied on continuous 
measures of change. Validation studies using multiple 
measures and multiple methods as suggested by Cook and 
Campbell (1979) would be a valuable contribution to the 
field.
Finally, it is important that future research consider 
the moderating impact of different environmental 
circumstances on change and change outcomes. The banking 
industry was undergoing several different types of
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environmental change during the time of this study, 
including regulatory changes, temporary economic 
fluctuations, and technological changes to name a few. 
Future studies should consider examining strategic change 
and change outcomes during times of relative stability, or 
even during times of industry growth. It is quite likely 
that the outcomes observed in this study, and others that 
have concentrated on industries undergoing periods of 
disequilibrium, may be different under different 
environmental circumstances.
Conclusions
This study represented an attempt to examine some 
basic but seldom tested assumptions underlying the 
strategic management perspective. The focus of the study 
was on exploring some of the firm level factors that the 
literature suggested would influence change and change 
outcomes. It was anticipated that the outcomes would 
provide a "middle-ground" approach for understanding 
strategic change. That is, it would identify certain key 
factors that serve to instigate change and moderate 
outcomes.
The results were mixed, sometimes providing support 
for the hypothesized relationships, sometimes providing 
unexpected but understandable outcomes, and sometimes 
providing ambiguous and confusing outcomes. Overall, the 
results strongly supported the strategic management
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perspective of strategic change, and provided little 
evidence to support the natural selection view underlying 
the population ecology perspective. However, it is 
apparent that much more research is needed to understand 
this phenomenon. Strategic change is both an important and 
interesting research topic. It is hoped that this study 
will add to this growing research stream and provide a 
framework upon which future researchers can continue to 
build.
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APPENDIX A
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 28. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses for 
Change Antecedents________________________________
Variable
Uns t andardi zed 
Regression 
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Wald
Chi-Souare Beta
ROA .107 .167 .409 .040
ROACH .028 .195 .021 . 006
EFF - .779 .703 1.229 -.141
EFFCH - .442 .481 .844 -.113
CHLNAS -.065 .022 8.776 ** -.141
LIQUID -3.815 .458 69.336 *** -.432
AS CAP -.057 .036 2.593 * -.093
LAGE .473 .091 27.326 *** .246
LASSET - .269 .087 9.668 *** - .167
HOLDC - .248 .171 2 .107 - .068
Intercept 3.03 1.063 8.088 ** -
-2LL = 217. 3 9 Dseudo R2 = .1854
* p < .10
** p < .05 
*** p < .01
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APPENDIX B
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - EFF OMITTED
Table 29. Results of Regression Analysis for Degree of 
Change - EFF Omitted from Analysis__________________
Variable
Unstandardized
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Error t-statistic Beta
ROA .065 .085 .775 . 044
ROACH -.034 .118 -.295 -.014
EFFCH .019 .107 .181 .009
CHLNAS -.031 .013 -2.430 ** -.124
LIQUID -1.993 .245 -8.107 *** -.409
AS CAP -.051 .021 -2.470 ** -.151
LAGE .359 .054 6.592 *** .339
LASSET -.145 .052 -2.793 *** -.164
HOLDC -.053 .104 -.512 -.027
UNEMP - .043 .029 -1.458 - .073
Intercept 3 .02 .512 5.906 *** 1.71
R2 = .2053 
variables)
F = 21.850 N = 857 (4 obs. had missing
* P < .10** P < .05*** P < .01
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APPENDIX C
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - EFFCH OMITTED
Table 30. Results of Regression Analysis for Degree of 
Change - EFFCH Omitted from Analysis________________
Variable
Unstandardized
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Error t-statistic Beta
ROA .061 .083 .735 .041
ROACH -.039 .118 -.330 -.016
EFF - .075 .158 - .480 - .025
CHLNAS -.031 .013 -2.467 ** -.125
LIQUID -1.989 .246 -8.085 *** -.408
AS CAP -.050 .021 -2.398 ** -.147
LAGE .359 .054 6.584 *** .339
LASSET - .147 .052 -2.821 *** - .166
HOLDC -.054 .104 -.522 - .027
UNEMP - .043 .029 -1.458 - .073
Intercept 3 .07 .517 5.941 *** 1.71
R2 = .2054 
variables)
F = 21.875 N = 857 (4 obs. had missing
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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